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2030Phenomenal evidence and factive evidencePhilosophical Studies 173 (4): 875-896. 2016.Perceptions guide our actions and provide us with evidence of the world around us. Illusions and hallucinations can mislead us: they may prompt as to act in ways that do not mesh with the world around us and they may lead us to form false beliefs about that world. The capacity view provides an account of evidence that does justice to these two facts. It shows in virtue of what illusions and hallucinations mislead us and prompt us to act. Moreover, it shows in virtue of what we are in a better ep…Read more
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2005Perceptual ParticularityPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1): 25-54. 2016.Perception grounds demonstrative reference, yields singular thoughts, and fixes the reference of singular terms. Moreover, perception provides us with knowledge of particulars in our environment and justifies singular thoughts about particulars. How does perception play these cognitive and epistemic roles in our lives? I address this question by exploring the fundamental nature of perceptual experience. I argue that perceptual states are constituted by particulars and discuss epistemic, ontologi…Read more
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2587Action and self-location in perceptionMind 116 (463): 603-632. 2007.I offer an explanation of how subjects are able to perceive the intrinsic spatial properties of objects, given that subjects always perceive from a particular location. The argument proceeds in two steps. First, I argue that a conception of space is necessary to perceive the intrinsic spatial properties of objects. This conception of space is spelled out by showing that perceiving intrinsic properties requires perceiving objects as the kind of things that are perceivable from other locations. Se…Read more
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1914Sellarsian Perspectives on Perception and Non-Conceptual ContentPoznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 92 (1): 173-196. 2006.I argue that a Sellarsian approach to experience allows one to take seriously the thought that there is something given to us in perception without denying that we can only be conscious of conceptually structured content. I argue against the traditional empiricist reading of Sellars, according to which sensations are understood as epistemically graspable prior to concrete propositional representations, by showing that it is unclear on such a view why sensations are not just the given as Sellars …Read more
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1418Phenomenal evidence and factive evidence defended: replies to McGrath, Pautz, and NetaPhilosophical Studies 173 (4): 929-946. 2016.This paper defends and develops the capacity view against insightful critiques from Matt McGrath, Adam Pautz, and Ram Neta. In response to Matt McGrath, I show why capacities are essential and cannot simply be replaced with representational content. I argue moreover, that the asymmetry between the employment of perceptual capacities in the good and the bad case is sufficient to account for the epistemic force of perceptual states yielded by the employment of such capacities. In response to Adam …Read more
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1036Robert B. Brandom: Making it Explicit: Reasoning, Representing and Discursive Committment (review)Philosophischer Literaturanzeiger 51 (2): 187-195. 1998.
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663Experience and Evidence AbridgedIn Brett Coppenger & Michael Bergmann (eds.), Intellectual Assurance: Essays on Traditional Epistemic Internalism, Oxford University Press. 2016.
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1643The epistemic force of perceptual experiencePhilosophical Studies 170 (1): 87-100. 2014.What is the metaphysical nature of perceptual experience? What evidence does experience provide us with? These questions are typically addressed in isolation. In order to make progress in answering both questions, perceptual experience needs to be studied in an integrated manner. I develop a unified account of the phenomenological and epistemological role of perceptual experience, by arguing that sensory states provide perceptual evidence due to their metaphysical structure. More specifically, I…Read more
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4424Perceptual Content DefendedNoûs 45 (4). 2011.Recently, the thesis that experience is fundamentally a matter of representing the world as being a certain way has been questioned by austere relationalists. I defend this thesis by developing a view of perceptual content that avoids their objections. I will argue that on a relational understanding of perceptual content, the fundamental insights of austere relationalism do not compete with perceptual experience being representational. As it will show that most objections to the thesis that expe…Read more
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