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Capacities-First PhilosophyIn Jonathan Cohen & Brian McLaughlin (eds.), Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind, Blackwell. pp. 406-430. 2023.
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360Block on Attribution, Discrimination, and AdaptationPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research. forthcoming.
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Bayesian liberalismIn Justin Vlasits & Katja Maria Vogt (eds.), Epistemology after Sextus Empiricus, Oxford University Press. 2020.
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Perceptual consciousness as a mental activityIn Josh Weisberg (ed.), Consciousness (Key Concepts in Philosophy), Polity. 2014.
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89The generality and particularity of perceptionMind and Language 37 (2): 235-247. 2022.This paper responds to critical comments by Christopher Hill, Ram Neta, and Nico Orlandi on my book The Unity of Perception: Content, Consciousness, Evidence (OUP 2018). It addresses questions about why analyzing mental states in terms of capacities is more explanatory powerful than analyzing them in terms of processes. It further develops my view of functions and their relation to mental capacities. It clarifies the internalist commitments of my externalist view of content, consciousness, and e…Read more
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502Perceptual Capacities, Knowledge, and Gettier CasesIn Rodrigo Borges, Claudio de Almeida & Peter David Klein (eds.), Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on the Gettier Problem, Oxford University Press. pp. 74-95. 2017.This paper argues for a sufficient evidence condition on knowledge and I argue that there is no belief condition on knowledge.
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771Précis of The Unity of PerceptionPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3): 715-720. 2020.
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300Una defensa del contenido perceptualIn Ignacio Cervieri & Álvaro Peláez (eds.), Contenido y Fenomenología de la Percepción: Aproximaciones Filosóficas, Gedisa-uam. pp. 19-77. 2020.
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719Accuracy Conditions, Functions, Perceptual DiscriminationAnalysis 79 (4): 739-754. 2019.I am deeply indebted to Alex Byrne, Jonathan Cohen and Matthew McGrath for their careful, constructive, and penetrating comments on The Unity of Perception and I am grateful for the opportunity to clarify my view further.
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351SummaryAnalysis 79 (4): 709-713. 2019.The Unity of Perception: Content, Consciousness and Evidence By SchellenbergSusannaOxford University Press, 2018. 272 pp.
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523The origins of perceptual knowledgeEpisteme 14 (3): 311-328. 2017.I argue that the ground of the epistemic force of perceptual states lies in properties of the perceptual capacities that constitute the relevant perceptual states. I call this view capacitivism, since the notion of a capacity is explanatorily basic: it is because a given subject is employing a mental capacity with a certain nature that her mental states have epistemic force. More specically, I argue that perceptual states have epistemic force due to being systematically linked to mind-independe…Read more
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404Fregean ParticularismIn Dirk Kindermann, Peter van Elswyk, Andy Egan & Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini (eds.), Unstructured Content, Oxford University Press. forthcoming.
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924Perceptual CapacitiesIn Steven Gouveia, Manuel Curado & Dena Shottenkirk (eds.), Perception, Cognition and Aesthetics, Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy. 2019.Despite their importance in the history of philosophy and in particular in the work of Aristotle and Kant, mental capacities have been neglected in recent philosophical work. By contrast, the notion of a capacity is deeply entrenched in psychology and the brain sciences. Driven by the idea that a cognitive system has the capacity it does in virtue of its internal components and their organization, it is standard to appeal to capacities in cognitive psychology. The main benefit of invoking capaci…Read more
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127The Unity of Perception: Content, Consciousness, EvidenceOxford University Press. 2018.Perception is our key to the world. It plays at least three different roles in our lives. It justifies beliefs and provides us with knowledge of our environment. It brings about conscious mental states. It converts informational input, such as light and sound waves, into representations of invariant features in our environment. Corresponding to these three roles, there are at least three fundamental questions that have motivated the study of perception. How does perception justify beliefs and yi…Read more
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2454Spatial perception: The perspectival aspect of perceptionPhilosophy Compass 13 (2). 2018.When we perceive an object, we perceive the object from a perspective. As a consequence of the perspectival nature of perception, when we perceive, say, a circular coin from different angles, there is a respect in which the coin looks circular throughout, but also a respect in which the coin's appearance changes. More generally, perception of shape and size properties has both a constant aspect—an aspect that remains stable across changes in perspective—and a perspectival aspect—an aspect that c…Read more
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1757Perceptual Consciousness as a Mental ActivityNoûs 53 (1): 114-133. 2019.I argue that perceptual consciousness is constituted by a mental activity. The mental activity in question is the activity of employing perceptual capacities, such as discriminatory, selective capacities. This is a radical view, but I hope to make it plausible. In arguing for this mental activist view, I reject orthodox views on which perceptual consciousness is analyzed in terms of peculiar entities, such as, phenomenal properties, external mind-independent properties, propositions, sense-data,…Read more
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2622Action and self-location in perceptionMind 116 (463): 603-632. 2007.I offer an explanation of how subjects are able to perceive the intrinsic spatial properties of objects, given that subjects always perceive from a particular location. The argument proceeds in two steps. First, I argue that a conception of space is necessary to perceive the intrinsic spatial properties of objects. This conception of space is spelled out by showing that perceiving intrinsic properties requires perceiving objects as the kind of things that are perceivable from other locations. Se…Read more
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1933Sellarsian Perspectives on Perception and Non-Conceptual ContentPoznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 92 (1): 173-196. 2006.I argue that a Sellarsian approach to experience allows one to take seriously the thought that there is something given to us in perception without denying that we can only be conscious of conceptually structured content. I argue against the traditional empiricist reading of Sellars, according to which sensations are understood as epistemically graspable prior to concrete propositional representations, by showing that it is unclear on such a view why sensations are not just the given as Sellars …Read more
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1454Phenomenal evidence and factive evidence defended: replies to McGrath, Pautz, and NetaPhilosophical Studies 173 (4): 929-946. 2016.This paper defends and develops the capacity view against insightful critiques from Matt McGrath, Adam Pautz, and Ram Neta. In response to Matt McGrath, I show why capacities are essential and cannot simply be replaced with representational content. I argue moreover, that the asymmetry between the employment of perceptual capacities in the good and the bad case is sufficient to account for the epistemic force of perceptual states yielded by the employment of such capacities. In response to Adam …Read more
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1074Robert B. Brandom: Making it Explicit: Reasoning, Representing and Discursive Committment (review)Philosophischer Literaturanzeiger 51 (2): 187-195. 1998.
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679Experience and Evidence AbridgedIn Brett Coppenger & Michael Bergmann (eds.), Intellectual Assurance: Essays on Traditional Epistemic Internalism, Oxford University Press. 2016.
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1676The epistemic force of perceptual experiencePhilosophical Studies 170 (1): 87-100. 2014.What is the metaphysical nature of perceptual experience? What evidence does experience provide us with? These questions are typically addressed in isolation. In order to make progress in answering both questions, perceptual experience needs to be studied in an integrated manner. I develop a unified account of the phenomenological and epistemological role of perceptual experience, by arguing that sensory states provide perceptual evidence due to their metaphysical structure. More specifically, I…Read more
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4473Perceptual Content DefendedNoûs 45 (4). 2011.Recently, the thesis that experience is fundamentally a matter of representing the world as being a certain way has been questioned by austere relationalists. I defend this thesis by developing a view of perceptual content that avoids their objections. I will argue that on a relational understanding of perceptual content, the fundamental insights of austere relationalism do not compete with perceptual experience being representational. As it will show that most objections to the thesis that expe…Read more
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1950The Relational and Representational Character of Perceptual ExperienceIn B. Brogaard (ed.), Does Perception Have Content, Oxford University Press. pp. 199-219. 2014.
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