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2593Action and self-location in perceptionMind 116 (463): 603-632. 2007.I offer an explanation of how subjects are able to perceive the intrinsic spatial properties of objects, given that subjects always perceive from a particular location. The argument proceeds in two steps. First, I argue that a conception of space is necessary to perceive the intrinsic spatial properties of objects. This conception of space is spelled out by showing that perceiving intrinsic properties requires perceiving objects as the kind of things that are perceivable from other locations. Se…Read more
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1915Sellarsian Perspectives on Perception and Non-Conceptual ContentPoznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 92 (1): 173-196. 2006.I argue that a Sellarsian approach to experience allows one to take seriously the thought that there is something given to us in perception without denying that we can only be conscious of conceptually structured content. I argue against the traditional empiricist reading of Sellars, according to which sensations are understood as epistemically graspable prior to concrete propositional representations, by showing that it is unclear on such a view why sensations are not just the given as Sellars …Read more
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1420Phenomenal evidence and factive evidence defended: replies to McGrath, Pautz, and NetaPhilosophical Studies 173 (4): 929-946. 2016.This paper defends and develops the capacity view against insightful critiques from Matt McGrath, Adam Pautz, and Ram Neta. In response to Matt McGrath, I show why capacities are essential and cannot simply be replaced with representational content. I argue moreover, that the asymmetry between the employment of perceptual capacities in the good and the bad case is sufficient to account for the epistemic force of perceptual states yielded by the employment of such capacities. In response to Adam …Read more
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1041Robert B. Brandom: Making it Explicit: Reasoning, Representing and Discursive Committment (review)Philosophischer Literaturanzeiger 51 (2): 187-195. 1998.
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665Experience and Evidence AbridgedIn Brett Coppenger & Michael Bergmann (eds.), Intellectual Assurance: Essays on Traditional Epistemic Internalism, Oxford University Press. 2016.
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1645The epistemic force of perceptual experiencePhilosophical Studies 170 (1): 87-100. 2014.What is the metaphysical nature of perceptual experience? What evidence does experience provide us with? These questions are typically addressed in isolation. In order to make progress in answering both questions, perceptual experience needs to be studied in an integrated manner. I develop a unified account of the phenomenological and epistemological role of perceptual experience, by arguing that sensory states provide perceptual evidence due to their metaphysical structure. More specifically, I…Read more
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4430Perceptual Content DefendedNoûs 45 (4). 2011.Recently, the thesis that experience is fundamentally a matter of representing the world as being a certain way has been questioned by austere relationalists. I defend this thesis by developing a view of perceptual content that avoids their objections. I will argue that on a relational understanding of perceptual content, the fundamental insights of austere relationalism do not compete with perceptual experience being representational. As it will show that most objections to the thesis that expe…Read more
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1924The Relational and Representational Character of Perceptual ExperienceIn B. Brogaard (ed.), Does Perception Have Content, Oxford University Press. pp. 199-219. 2014.
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904A Trilemma about Mental ContentIn Schear Joseph (ed.), Mind, Reason, and Being-in-the-world, Routledge. pp. 272-282. 2013.Schellenberg sheds light on the recent debate between Dreyfus and McDowell about the role and nature of concepts in perceptual experience, by considering the following trilemma: (C1) Non-rational animals and humans can be in mental states with the same kind of content when they are perceptually related to the very same environment. (C2) Non-rational animals do not possess concepts. (C3) Content is constituted by modes of presentations and is, thus, conceptually structured. She discusses…Read more
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1079Perceptual Experience and the Capacity to ActIn N. Gangopadhay, M. Madary & F. Spicer (eds.), Perception, Action, and Consciousness, Oxford University Press. pp. 145. 2010.This paper develops and defends the capacity view, that is, the view that the ability to perceive the perspective-independent or intrinsic properties of objects depends on the perceiver’s capacity to act. More specifically, I argue that self-location and spatial know-how are jointly necessary to perceive the intrinsic spatial properties of objects. Representing one’s location allows one to abstract from one’s particular vantage point to perceive the perspective-independent properties of objects.…Read more
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