•  2207
    Ontological Minimalism about Phenomenology
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1): 1-40. 2011.
    I develop a view of the common factor between subjectively indistinguishable perceptions and hallucinations that avoids analyzing experiences as involving awareness relations to abstract entities, sense-data, or any other peculiar entities. The main thesis is that hallucinating subjects employ concepts (or analogous nonconceptual structures), namely the very same concepts that in a subjectively indistinguishable perception are employed as a consequence of being related to external, mind-independ…Read more
  •  864
    This paper defends and develops the capacity view against insightful critiques from Matt McGrath, Adam Pautz, and Ram Neta. In response to Matt McGrath, I show why capacities are essential and cannot simply be replaced with representational content. I argue moreover, that the asymmetry between the employment of perceptual capacities in the good and the bad case is sufficient to account for the epistemic force of perceptual states yielded by the employment of such capacities. In response to Adam …Read more
  •  1119
    Perceptual Particularity
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1): 25-54. 2016.
    Perception grounds demonstrative reference, yields singular thoughts, and fixes the reference of singular terms. Moreover, perception provides us with knowledge of particulars in our environment and justifies singular thoughts about particulars. How does perception play these cognitive and epistemic roles in our lives? I address this question by exploring the fundamental nature of perceptual experience. I argue that perceptual states are constituted by particulars and discuss epistemic, ontologi…Read more
  •  366
    De Se Content and De Hinc Content
    Analysis 76 (3): 334-345. 2016.
  •  346
    Experience and Evidence Abridged
    In M. Bergmann & B. Coppenger (eds.), Traditional Epistemic Internalism, Oxford University Press. 2016.
  •  1343
    Sellarsian Perspectives on Perception and Non-Conceptual Content
    Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 92 (1): 173-196. 2006.
    I argue that a Sellarsian approach to experience allows one to take seriously the thought that there is something given to us in perception without denying that we can only be conscious of conceptually structured content. I argue against the traditional empiricist reading of Sellars, according to which sensations are understood as epistemically graspable prior to concrete propositional representations, by showing that it is unclear on such a view why sensations are not just the given as Sellars …Read more