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49Parfit's arguments for the present-aim theoryAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (1). 1992.This paper has been about the question of what there is most reason to doin situations in which either there are no moral considerations to be takeninto account or the moral considerations to be taken into account are equally balanced. I have assessed all Parfit's arguments for concluding that the Present-aim Theory is right and the Self-interest Theory wrong aboutthis question. In § III, I showed how Parfit's argument from personal identity leads not to the abandonment of the Self-interest Theo…Read more
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3Scanlon's Contractualism, the Spare Wheel Objection, and Aggregation'In Matt Matravers (ed.), Scanlon and Contractualism, Frank Cass. 2003.
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151Well-Being and Morality: Essays in Honour of James Griffin (edited book)Clarendon Press. 2000.An international line-up of fourteen distinguished philosophers present new essays on topics relating to well-being and morality, prominent themes in contemporary ethics and particularly in the work of James Griffin, White's Professor of Moral Philosophy at Oxford, in whose honour this volume has been produced. Professor Griffin offers a fascinating development of his own thinking on these topics in his replies to the essays.
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61Mark Overvold’s Contribution to PhilosophyJournal of Philosophical Research 16 333-344. 1991.The prevailing theory of self-interest (personal utility or individual welfare) holds that one’s Iife goes well to the extent that one’s desires are fulfilled. In a couple of seminal papers, Overvold raised a devastating objection to this theory---namely that the theory (added to commonsensical beliefs about the nature of action) makes self-sacrifice logically impossible. He then proposed an appealing revision of the prevailing theory, one which provided adequate logical space for self-sacrifice…Read more
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129Brink, Kagan, Utilitarianism and Self-SacrificeUtilitas 3 (2): 263. 1991.Act-utilitarianism claims that one is required to do nothing less than what makes the largest contribution to overall utility. Critics of this moral theory commonly charge that it is unreasonably demanding. Shelly Kagan and David Brink, however, have recently defended act-utilitarianism against this charge. Kagan argues that act-utilitarianism is right, and its critics wrong, about how demanding morality is. In contrast, Brink argues that, once we have the correct objective account of welfare an…Read more
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74When is impartiality morally appropriate?In Brian Feltham & John Cottingham (eds.), Partiality and impartiality: morality, special relationships, and the wider world, Oxford University Press. pp. 26-41. 2010.
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22FairnessEthical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (4): 329-352. 2005.The main body of this paper assesses a leading recent theory of fairness, a theory put forward by John Broome. I discuss Broome's theory partly because of its prominence and partly because I think it points us in the right direction, even if it takes some missteps. In the course of discussing Broome's theory, I aim to cast light on the relation of fairness to consistency, equality, impartiality, desert, rights, and agreements. Indeed, before I start assessing Broome's theory, I discuss two very …Read more
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46Theory vs anti-theory in ethicsIn Ulrike Heuer & Gerald Lang (eds.), Value, Luck, and Commitment, Oxford University Press. pp. 19-40. 2012.
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19Publicity in moralityRatio 23 111-117. 2010.Consider the idea that moral rules must be suitable for public acknowledgement and acceptance, i.e., that moral rules must be suitable for being ‘widely known and explicitly recognized’, suitable for teaching as part of moral education, suitable for guiding behaviour and reactions to behaviour, and thus suitable for justifying one’s behaviour to others. This idea is now most often associated with John Rawls, who traces it back through Kurt Baier to Kant.[1] My book developing ruleconsequentialis…Read more
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58The demandingness objectionIn Tim Chappell (ed.), The Problem of Moral Demandingness, Palgrave. pp. 148-62. 2009.
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14Moral particularism and the real worldIn M. Lance, M. Potrc & V. Strahovnik (eds.), Challenging Moral Particularism, Routledge. pp. 12-30. 2007.
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121Sidgwick and Common–Sense MoralityUtilitas 12 (3): 347. 2000.This paper begins by celebrating Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics. It then discusses Sidgwick's moral epistemology and in particular the coherentist element introduced by his argument from common-sense morality to utilitarianism. The paper moves on to a discussion of how common-sense morality seems more appealing if its principles are formulated as picking out pro tanto considerations rather than all-things-considered demands. Thefinal section of the paper considers the question of which version of …Read more
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414The demandingness objectionIn T. Chappell (ed.), The Problem of Moral Demandingness, Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 148-162. 2009.This paper’s first section invokes a relevant meta-ethical principle about what a moral theory needs in order to be plausible and superior to its rivals. In subsequent sections, I try to pinpoint exactly what the demandingness objection has been taken to be. I try to explain how the demandingness objection developed in reaction to impartial act-consequentialism’s requirement of beneficence toward strangers. In zeroing in on the demandingness objection, I distinguish it from other, more or less c…Read more
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33Rule consequentialismIn R. Shafer-Landau (ed.), Ethical Theory: An Anthology, . pp. 482-495. 2007.
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1205Utilitarianism and fairnessIn Ben Eggleston & Dale E. Miller (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Utilitarianism, Cambridge University Press. pp. 251-271. 2014.
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22Dancy on How Reasons Are Related to OughtsSouthern Journal of Philosophy 41 (S1): 114-120. 2003.
Reading, Berkshire, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Specialization
Normative Ethics |
Meta-Ethics |
Value Theory |
Social and Political Philosophy |
Areas of Interest
Normative Ethics |
Value Theory |
Meta-Ethics |