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416The demandingness objectionIn Timothy Chappell (ed.), The Problem of Moral Demandingness: New Philosophical Essays, Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 148-162. 2009.This paper’s first section invokes a relevant meta-ethical principle about what a moral theory needs in order to be plausible and superior to its rivals. In subsequent sections, I try to pinpoint exactly what the demandingness objection has been taken to be. I try to explain how the demandingness objection developed in reaction to impartial act-consequentialism’s requirement of beneficence toward strangers. In zeroing in on the demandingness objection, I distinguish it from other, more or less c…Read more
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809Utilitarianism and fairnessIn Ben Eggleston & Dale E. Miller (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Utilitarianism, Cambridge University Press. pp. 251-271. 2014.
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15Dancy on How Reasons Are Related to OughtsSouthern Journal of Philosophy 41 (S1): 114-120. 2003.
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35Rule consequentialismIn Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Ethical Theory: An Anthology, Wiley-blackwell. pp. 482-495. 2007.
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93The Golden RuleThink 4 (10): 25-29. 2005.Should you always do unto others as you would have them do unto you? Brad Hooker investigates a seemingly plausible-looking moral principle: the Golden Rule
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43Dancy on How Reasons Are Related to OughtsSouthern Journal of Philosophy 41 (S1): 114-120. 2003.
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91Promises and rule consequentialismIn Hanoch Sheinman (ed.), Promises and Agreements: Philosophical Essays, Oxford University Press. pp. 235-252. 2010.The duty to keep promises has many aspects associated with deontological moral theories. The duty to keep promises is non-welfarist, in that the obligation to keep a promise need not be conditional on there being a net benefit from keeping the promise—indeed need not be conditional on there being at least someone who would benefit from its being kept. The duty to keep promises is more closely connected to autonomy than directly to welfare: agents have moral powers to give themselves certain obli…Read more
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American moral philosophyIn Cheryl Misak (ed.), The Oxford handbook of American philosophy, Oxford University Press. 2008.
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11Mark Overvold’s Contribution to PhilosophyJournal of Philosophical Research 16 333-344. 1991.The prevailing theory of self-interest (personal utility or individual welfare) holds that one’s Iife goes well to the extent that one’s desires are fulfilled. In a couple of seminal papers, Overvold raised a devastating objection to this theory---namely that the theory (added to commonsensical beliefs about the nature of action) makes self-sacrifice logically impossible. He then proposed an appealing revision of the prevailing theory, one which provided adequate logical space for self-sacrifice…Read more
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15Some Questions Not to Be Begged in Moral TheoryInternational Journal of Applied Philosophy 19 (2): 277-284. 2005.This paper starts by considering Sterba’s argument from non-question-beggingness to morality. The paper goes on to discuss his use of the “ought” implies “can” principle and the place, within moral theorizing, of intuitions about reasonableness.
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160Is Rule-Consequentialism a Rubber Duck?Analysis 54 (2). 1994.Some things aren't what their names suggest. This is true of rubber ducks, stool pigeons, clay pigeons, hot dogs, and clothes horses. Frances Howard-Snyder's "Rule Consequentialism is a Rubber Duck" ("APQ", 30 (1993) 271-78) argues that the answer is Yes. Howard-Snyder thinks rule-consequentialism is a form of deontology, not a form of consequentialism. This thought is understandable: many recent definitions of consequentialism are such as to invite it. Thinking rule-consequentialism inferior to…Read more
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152Ross-style pluralism versus rule-consequentialismMind 105 (420): 531-552. 1996.This paper employs (and defends where needed) a familiar four-part methodology for assessing moral theories. This methodology makes the most popular kind of moral pluralism--here called Ross-style pluralism--look extremely attractive. The paper contends, however, that, if rule-consequentialism's implications match our considered moral convictions as well as Ross-style pluralism's implications do, the methodology makes rule-consequentialism look even more attractive than Ross-style pluralism. The…Read more
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Virtues and the Good. Does moral virtue constitute a benefit to the agent?In Roger Crisp (ed.), How Should One Live?: Essays on the Virtues, Oxford University Press. 1996.
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5Fairness, needs, and desertIn Matthew H. Kramer, Claire Grant, Ben Colburn & Antony Hatzistavrou (eds.), The legacy of H.L.A. Hart: legal, political, and moral philosophy, Oxford University Press. 2008.
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421Ideal code, real world: a rule-consequentialist theory of moralityOxford University Press. 2000.What are the appropriate criteria for assessing a theory of morality? In this enlightening work, Brad Hooker begins by answering this question. He then argues for a rule-consequentialist theory which, in part, asserts that acts should be assessed morally in terms of impartially justified rules. In the end, he considers the implications of rule-consequentialism for several current controversies in practical ethics, making this clearly written, engaging book the best overall statement of this appr…Read more
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65Theory versus Anti-theory in EthicsIn Ulrike Heuer & Gerald R. Lang (eds.), Luck, Value, and Commitment: Themes from the Ethics of Bernard Williams, Oxford University Press Usa. pp. 19. 2012.
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15Publicity in morality: a reply to Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter SingerRatio 23 (1): 111-117. 2010.
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6The Demands of Consequentialism, by Tim Mulgan. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001, 313 pp. + vi,??35, $49.95 (hbk). ISBN 0-1-825093-2 (review)Philosophy 78 (2): 289-307. 2003.
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100Act-consequentialism versus rule-consequentialismIn Steven M. Cahn & Andrew Forcehimes (eds.), Principles of Moral Philosophy: Classic and Contemporary Approaches, Oxford University Press. 2016.
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284The Collapse of Virtue EthicsUtilitas 14 (1): 22. 2002.Virtue ethics is normally taken to be an alternative to consequentialist and Kantian moral theories. I shall discuss what I think is the most interesting version of virtue ethics – Rosalind Hursthouse's. I shall then argue that her version is inadequate in ways that suggest revision in the direction of a kind of rule-consequentialism
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9One central moral idea is that your doing some act is morally permissible only if others’ doing that act would also be morally permissible. There are a number of different ways of developing this idea. One is the suggestion that, before deciding to do some act, you should ask yourself ‘What if everyone did that?’ Another central moral idea is that it is immoral to ‘use’ people.
Reading, Berkshire, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Specialization
Normative Ethics |
Meta-Ethics |
Value Theory |
Social and Political Philosophy |
Areas of Interest
Normative Ethics |
Value Theory |
Meta-Ethics |