•  8
    Griffin on Human Rights
    Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 30 (1): 193-205. 2010.
  •  35
    Rule consequentialism
    In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Ethical Theory: An Anthology, Wiley-blackwell. pp. 482-495. 2007.
  •  15
    Dancy on How Reasons Are Related to Oughts
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (S1): 114-120. 2003.
  •  91
    Promises and rule consequentialism
    In Hanoch Sheinman (ed.), Promises and Agreements: Philosophical Essays, Oxford University Press. pp. 235-252. 2010.
    The duty to keep promises has many aspects associated with deontological moral theories. The duty to keep promises is non-welfarist, in that the obligation to keep a promise need not be conditional on there being a net benefit from keeping the promise—indeed need not be conditional on there being at least someone who would benefit from its being kept. The duty to keep promises is more closely connected to autonomy than directly to welfare: agents have moral powers to give themselves certain obli…Read more
  •  93
    The Golden Rule
    Think 4 (10): 25-29. 2005.
    Should you always do unto others as you would have them do unto you? Brad Hooker investigates a seemingly plausible-looking moral principle: the Golden Rule
  •  43
  •  11
    Mark Overvold’s Contribution to Philosophy
    Journal of Philosophical Research 16 333-344. 1991.
    The prevailing theory of self-interest (personal utility or individual welfare) holds that one’s Iife goes well to the extent that one’s desires are fulfilled. In a couple of seminal papers, Overvold raised a devastating objection to this theory---namely that the theory (added to commonsensical beliefs about the nature of action) makes self-sacrifice logically impossible. He then proposed an appealing revision of the prevailing theory, one which provided adequate logical space for self-sacrifice…Read more
  •  15
    Some Questions Not to Be Begged in Moral Theory
    International Journal of Applied Philosophy 19 (2): 277-284. 2005.
    This paper starts by considering Sterba’s argument from non-question-beggingness to morality. The paper goes on to discuss his use of the “ought” implies “can” principle and the place, within moral theorizing, of intuitions about reasonableness.