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67Rule-Consequentialism, Incoherence, FairnessProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95. 1995.Brad Hooker; II*—Rule-Consequentialism, Incoherence, Fairness1, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 95, Issue 1, 1 June 1995, Pages 19–36, https://d.
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82Rule-consequentialism and obligations toward the needyPacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (1). 1998.Most of us believe morality requires us to help the desperately needy. But most of us also believe morality doesn't require us to make enormous sacrifices in order to help people who have no special connection with us. Such self-sacrifice is of course praiseworthy, but it isn't morally mandatory. Rule-consequentialism might seem to offer a plausible grounding for such beliefs. Tim Mulgan has recently argued in _Analysis and _Pacific Philosophical Quarterly that rule-consequentialism cannot do so…Read more
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30Dancy on How Reasons Are Related to OughtsSouthern Journal of Philosophy 41 (S1): 114-120. 2003.
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1017Rule-consequentialismMind 99 (393): 67-77. 1990.The theory of morality we can call full rule - consequentialism selects rules solely in terms of the goodness of their consequences and then claims that these rules determine which kinds of acts are morally wrong. George Berkeley was arguably the first rule -consequentialist. He wrote, “In framing the general laws of nature, it is granted we must be entirely guided by the public good of mankind, but not in the ordinary moral actions of our lives. … The rule is framed with respect to the good of …Read more
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45Up and Down with AggregationSocial Philosophy and Policy 26 (1): 126-147. 2009.This paper starts by addressing some objections to the very idea of aggregate social good. The paper goes on to review the case for letting aggregate social good be not only morally relevant but also sometimes morally decisive. Then the paper surveys objections to letting aggregate social good determine personal or political decisions. The paper goes on to argue against the idea that aggregate good is sensitive to desert and the idea that aggregate good should be construed as incorporating agent…Read more
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49Parfit's arguments for the present-aim theoryAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (1). 1992.This paper has been about the question of what there is most reason to doin situations in which either there are no moral considerations to be takeninto account or the moral considerations to be taken into account are equally balanced. I have assessed all Parfit's arguments for concluding that the Present-aim Theory is right and the Self-interest Theory wrong aboutthis question. In § III, I showed how Parfit's argument from personal identity leads not to the abandonment of the Self-interest Theo…Read more
Reading, Berkshire, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Specialization
Normative Ethics |
Meta-Ethics |
Value Theory |
Social and Political Philosophy |
Areas of Interest
Normative Ethics |
Value Theory |
Meta-Ethics |