John Preston

Popper's conception of methodology and its relationship to epistemology is examined, and found wanting. Popper argues that positivist criteria of demarcation fail because they are attempts to discover a difference in the natures of empirical science and metaphysics. His alternative to naturalism is that a plausible criterion of demarcation is a proposal for an agreement, or convention. But this conventionalism about methodology is misplaced. Methodological rules are conventions, but which methodological rules are followed by scientists it is not itself a matter of convention. This casts doubt upon the status of Popper's famous criterion of demarcation.

The relationship between thought and language has been of central importance to philosophy ever since Plato characterised thinking as 'a dialogue the soul has with itself'. In this volume, several major twentieth-century philosophers of mind and language make further contributions to the debate. Among the questions addressed are: is language conceptually prior to thought, or vice versa? Must thought take place 'in' a medium? To what extent can creatures without language be credited with thoughts? Do we have to suppose that thinking involves the use of concepts? What does it mean to have and deploy a concept? How do recent psychological experiments bear on these issues? Are beliefs, desires, hopes and fears rightly construed as 'attitudes towards propositions'? Should twentieth-century philosophy be conceived of in terms of Michael Dummett's distinction between 'analytical philosophy' and the 'philosophy of thought'?

This book radically counters the optimism sparked by Competence Based Education and Training, an educational philosophy that has re-emerged in Schooling, Vocational and Higher Education in the last decade. CBET supposedly offers a new type of learning that will lead to skilled employment; here, Preston instead presents the competency movement as one which makes the concept of human learning redundant. Starting with its origins in Taylorism, the slaughterhouse and radical behaviourism, the book charts the history of competency education to its position as a global phenomenon today, arguing that competency is opposed to ideas of process, causality and analog human movement that are fundamental to human learning.

This volume discusses Wittgenstein’s work, as well as his oeuvre in general, and its implications for the nature of reason. Investigates the nature of reason which has always been a topic at the very heart of Western philosophy Analyses how Wittgenstein raised crucial questions about the subject - most notably in his critique of Frazer’s _Golden Bough_, his discussions of various philosophical aspects of religion, and the famous ‘rule-following considerations’ from his _Philosophical Investigations_ Contributors include prominent Wittgenstein scholars from the UK and continental Europe including Hanjo Glock, Genia Schönbaumsfeld, Severin Schroeder Joachim Schulte and Crispin Wright Contains a translation of an important paper by the French Wittgenstein scholar Jacques Bouveresse, alongside six new papers by other contributors

Many commentators agree that Wittgenstein took the idea that propositions are Bilder, or at least the terminology of Bilder, from Heinrich Hertz, or from Hertz and Ludwig Boltzmann. Boltzmann, the great Viennese theoretical physicist, was the founder of statistical thermodynamics, the modern theory of heat. The context within which Hertz and Boltzmann worked was one in which many prominent theoretical physicists accepted the Kantian restriction that our thought cannot access 'things in themselves', but works only with representations. Wittgenstein may have found what Hertz said attractive, but even if he did develop a theory of representation or a picture theory of meaning, neither was something that he just took over from Hertz, fully formed, and his main concerns were puzzles about intentionality, not science. Hertz and Boltzmann did influence various aspects of the Tractatus. Their greatest and most lasting influence on Wittgenstein, though, was on his conception of philosophy itself: its aim, and its method.

This stimulating collection is devoted to the life and work of the most flamboyant of twentieth-century philosophers, Paul Feyerabend. Feyerabend's radical epistemological claims, and his stunning argument that there is no such thing as scientific method, were highly influential during his life and have only gained attention since his death in 1994. The essays that make up this volume, written by some of today's most respected philosophers of science, many of whom knew Feyerabend as students and colleagues, cover the diverse themes in his extensive body of work and present a personal account of this fascinating thinker.

Identifications, diagnoses, and treatments of pseudo-problems form a family of classic methodologies in later nineteenth century philosophy and at least partly, as I shall argue, in the philosophy of science. They were devised, not by academic philosophers, but by three of the greatest of the philosopher-scientists. (Later, the idea was taken up by academic philosophers, of course. But I will not discuss that development). Here I show how Ernst Mach, Heinrich Hertz and Ludwig Boltzmann each deployed methods of this general kind, how they identified different pseudo-problems, how they gave different diagnoses of such problems, and how they suggested quite different treatments for them. I argue that it was Mach who really first developed the idea of a pseudo-problem, that he did so in a relatively focused way on the basis of two kinds of examples. Hertz’s contribution was much more limited, identifying two specific pseudo-problems concerning physics, and suggesting a way in which they might be treated. Boltzmann’s conception of pseudo-problems, though, was far less focused, being applied to a very wide range of problems in philosophy and physics. However, his conception was certainly more influential in philosophy, and perhaps ultimately more fruitful and suggestive. I argue for the originality and continuing interest of such approaches, and I try to dissociate them from any problematic ‘positivism’.

Various claims have been made about the influence of Heinrich Hertz's Principles of Mechanics on Wittgenstein's work. I consider some such recent claims, made by Allan Janik, to the effect that Hertz exercised a very strong influence on Wittgenstein, early and late. I suggest they are ill-founded, in virtue of misinterpretations either of Hertz, or of Wittgenstein, or of both. I try to set the record straight on issues such as the three criteria Hertz suggests for evaluating scientific 'representations' [Darstellungen] or 'images' [Bilder], his conception of philosophy, the nature of Hertz's project and its relation to philosophy, the extent to which he agrees and disagrees with Ernst Mach, and his influence on the Tractatus.

Western philosophy has a long-standing interest in the relationship between thought and language. This is not least because language use and our mental capacities are so central to our human self-conception, as well as to the ways in which we have tried to think about other beings. Retrospectively, it is possible to identify certain broad traditions in the philosophical study of thought and language, traditions which also have their representatives in psychology and linguistics. In this introduction I shall focus on one such tradition, the one sometimes known as ‘lingualism ’, in so far as it bears on the papers brought together in this volume.

There have recently appeared claims that the influence Heinrich Hertz exerted over Wittgenstein's later work was far more abiding than previously recognised. I critically evaluate such claims by Gordon Baker and Allan Janik. I first show that Hertz was indeed concerned with the same feature, clarity, which often exercised Wittgenstein. But I then argue that Wittgenstein should not be seen as having adopted the conception of philosophical method, which Hertz deployed in The Principles of Mechanics. I show that Hertz ‘clarifies’ the concept of force only in the sense that he alters that concept, and that he is not using the sort of ‘contrastive’ methods characteristic of Wittgenstein's later works.

Gestalt psychology of perception was one of the main inspirations behind the philosophical work of the Hungarian polymath Michael Polanyi. Seeing scientists and philosophers backing away from its implications, he proposed instead to take those implications seriously. I detail four ways in which he did so, the result of which was his theory of “tacit knowing”. This can be thought of as a Gestalt epistemology, because it takes the figure/ground relation as the model for all knowing. Polanyi took his Gestalt epistemology to apply widely. I argue that it is more successful with some of the problems to which he applied it than with others, and thus that Polanyi was wrong to think that they all exhibit a common pattern. Polanyi’s epistemological work led him to a position alongside phenomenology. He compared his project to the work of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty in a positive way. But, while he sympathised with the phenomenological method, and strongly endorsed its anti-reductionist conclusions, he criticised phenomenologists for acquiescing in a positivistic or mechanistic view of the natural sciences, and he went on to develop a metaphysics or ontology which he considered to have gone beyond phenomenology. However, Polanyi did sometimes follow certain phenomenologists in an existentialist direction, to conclusions about meaningfulness and its “destruction”, and to his related account of the various degrees or levels of “indwelling”. I conclude by arguing that, in the places where he did this, Polanyi’s thought over-extends, and that this raises a problem for his entire theory of tacit knowing.

The version of moral relativism that Paul Feyerabend discusses in his 1991 book "Three Dialogues on Knowledge" is evaluated. It is shown to be in conflict with an essential feature of appraisal vocabulary known as supervenience. This is enough to render this version of relativism untenable. But the way in which Feyerabend defends his relativist principle against the Platonic objection that relativist is self-refuting also involves that might be called semantic nihilism', the idea that nothing can be said to logically follow from our beliefs and utterances. The roots of semantic nihilism in Feyerabend's philosophy are traced, and semantic nihilism is shown to be untenable in virtue of being dialectically self-refuting

One foundation of Eliminative Materialism is the claim that the totality of our ordinary resources for explaining and predicting behaviour, ?Folk Psychology?, constitutes a theoretical scheme, potentially in conflict with other theories of behaviour. Recent attacks upon this claim, as well as the defence by Paul Churchland, are examined and found to be lacking in a suitably realistic conception of theory. By finding such a conception, and by correctly identifying the level of conceptual structures within which Folk Psychology is located, the original claim is reinforced