•  96
    Creativity, conservativeness & the social epistemology of science
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 76 1-4. 2019.
  •  226
    From things to thinking: Cognitive archaeology
    Mind and Language 34 (2): 263-279. 2019.
    Cognitive archaeologists infer from material remains to the cognitive features of past societies. We characterize cognitive archaeology in terms of trace-based reasoning, which in the case of cognitive archaeology involves inferences drawing upon background theory linking objects from the archaeological record to cognitive features. We analyse such practices, examining work on cognitive evolution, language, and musicality. We argue that the central epistemic challenge for cognitive archaeology i…Read more
  •  114
    Creativity and Philosophy
    British Journal of Aesthetics 60 (2): 225-229. 2020.
    Creativity and PhilosophyBerys Gaut and Matthew Kieran Routledge. 2018. pp. 394. £30.99.
  •  108
    Existential Risk, Creativity & Well-Adapted Science
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. forthcoming.
  •  117
    Creativity Without Agency: Evolutionary Flair & Aesthetic Engagement
    with Derek Turner and Derek Turner*
    Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 10 (n/a). 2023.
    Common philosophical accounts of creativity align creative products and processes with a particular kind of agency: namely, that deserving of praise or blame. Considering evolutionary examples, we explore two ways of denying that creativity requires forms of agency. First, we argue that decoupling creativity from praiseworthiness comes at little cost: accepting that evolutionary processes are non-agential, they nonetheless exhibit many of the same characteristics and value associated with creati…Read more
  •  90
    In Denis Walsh’s Organisms, Agency, and Evolution, he argues that new developments in the science of biology motivate a radical change to our metaphysical picture of life: what he calls ‘Situated Darwinism’. The central claim is that we should take the biological world to be at base about organisms, and organisms in a fundamentally teleological sense. We critically examine Walsh’s arguments and suggest further developments.