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18The we and its many forms: Kurt Stavenhagen’s contribution to social phenomenologyBritish Journal for the History of Philosophy 28 (6): 1094-1115. 2020.ABSTRACT ‘We’ is said in many ways. This paper investigates Kurt Stavenhagen’s neglected account of different kinds of ‘we’, which is maintained to be one of the most sophisticated within classical phenomenology. The paper starts by elaborating on the phenomenological distinction between mass, society, and community by claiming that individuals partake in episodes of experiential sharing only within communities. Stavenhagen conceptualizes experiential sharing as a meshing of conscious experience…Read more
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7Obbligazione e pretesa in Adolf Reinach: due relazioni socialiRivista di Estetica 39 225-240. 2008.Nel 1913 Adolf Reinach pubblica I Fondamenti A Priori del Diritto Civile, opera che rappresenta senza dubbio il capolavoro del giovane fenomenologo tedesco. Il saggio si staglia sul denso sfondo di questioni semantiche, ontologiche e psicologico-descrittive dibattute a cavallo tra Otto e Novecento nei circoli fenomenologici di Monaco e Gottinga. Tali questioni, che rappresentano il vero e proprio terreno fertile dell’opera, nei Fondamenti non diventano però tema esplicito dell’indagine. Quest...
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43Helping others in interactionJournal of Social Philosophy 51 (4): 608-627. 2020.Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.
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75Consciousness, belief, and the group mind hypothesisSynthese 198 (2): 1-25. 2019.According to the Group Mind Hypothesis, a group can have beliefs over and above the beliefs of the individual members of the group. Some maintain that there can be group mentality of this kind in the absence of any group-level phenomenal consciousness. We present a challenge to the latter view. First, we argue that a state is not a belief unless the owner of the state is disposed to access the state’s content in a corresponding conscious judgment. Thus, if there is no such thing as group conscio…Read more
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3Ontologia degli oggetti culturaliRivista di Estetica 36 (36): 181-198. 2007.1 La relatività a una cultura Negli ultimi anni si parla pressoché quotidianamente di “differenze” o “caratteristiche” culturali. Queste espressioni vengono spesso impiegate in contesti prefilosofici senza una chiara esplicazione del loro riferimento. Uno sguardo più attento può tuttavia rilevare che il semplice aggettivo “culturale” prescrive delle condizioni di verità aggiuntive alle proposizioni che lo contengono. Così, ad esempio:(1) la simmetria è un criterio culturale di bellezza classi...
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10Giudizio ed esistenza: Schröder, Husserl e Meinong. Introduzione al carteggio tra Meinong e HusserlRivista di Estetica 40 149-167. 2009.1. Un incontro mancato I legami tra Edmund Husserl e Alexius Meinong, e più in generale tra fenomenologia tedesca e teoria degli oggetti, narrano una storia per certi versi paradossale, che vede i due brillanti allievi e caustici critici di Franz Brentano percorrere per un lungo periodo di tempo binari di pensiero non lontani gli uni dagli altri, in certi momenti persino paralleli, per poi divergere proprio nel momento in cui le loro conclusioni andavano consolidandosi, aprendo la strada a un...
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33Collective Intentionality and the Collective Person in Max SchelerIn Harald A. Wiltsche & Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl (eds.), Analytic and Continental Philosophy: Methods and Perspectives. Proceedings of the 37th International Wittgenstein Symposium, De Gruyter. pp. 277-288. 2016.
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Joint Commitments and Group Identification in Human-Robot InteractionIn Raul Hakli & Johanna Seibt (eds.), Sociality and Normativity for Robots. Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality., Springer. 2017.
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46Practical intentionality: from Brentano to the phenomenology of the Munich and Göttingen CirclesIn Dan Zahavi (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the History of Phenomenology, Oxford University Press. pp. 604-622. 2018.The aim of this chapter is to mine, reconstruct, and evaluate the phenomenological notion of practical intentionality. It is claimed that the phenomenologists of the Munich and Göttingen Circles substantially modify the idea of practical intentionality originally developed by Franz Brentano. This development, it is further contended, anticipates the switch that occurred within contemporary theory of action from a belief-desire to a belief-desire-intention model of deliberation. While Brentanoâ s…Read more
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43Edmund Husserl: Untersuchungen zur Urteilstheorie . Texte aus dem Nachlass ( 1893 – 1918 ), ed. Robin Rollinger (review)Husserl Studies 27 (2): 161-166. 2011.
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47Emotional Self-Knowledge (edited book)Routledge. 2023.This volume sheds light on the affective dimensions of self-knowledge and the roles that emotions and other affective states play in promoting or obstructing our knowledge of ourselves. It is the first book specifically devoted to the issue of affective self-knowledge. The relation between self-knowledge and human emotions is an often emphasized, but poorly articulated one. While philosophers of emotion tend to give affectivity a central role in making us who we are, the philosophical literature…Read more
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La nozione di Aussersein nella teoria degli oggetti di Alexius MeinongRivista di Estetica 44 (3). 2004.
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14Group identification, joint attention, and preferences: a cluster of minimal pre-conditions for joint actionsPhilosophical Psychology. forthcoming.An important thesis discussed in the literature on shared agency is that group identification motivates pre-school children to act together. This paper aims at further illuminating this thesis by clarifying what triggers the process of group identification in young children. It is argued that joint attention, among other functions in supporting joint actions, can reveal to the co-attenders that they share some preferences. Since sharing preferences has been established by the literature to be a …Read more
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7Else Voigtländer on Social Self-feelingsIn Íngrid Vendrell Ferran (ed.), Else Voigtländer: Self, Emotion, and Sociality, Springer, Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences. pp. 125-139. 2023.This article reconstructs and systematically assesses Else’s Voigtländer’s theory of self-feelings. In the first section, I introduce the reader to the basic ideas of this theory by supporting the exegetical claim that the notion of self-feeling encompasses two distinct kinds of experiences: (i) a subject’s long-standing and enduring self-feeling, which is innate and biologically grounded, should be distinguished from (ii) the plurality of episodic self-feelings (or self-conscious emotions) this…Read more
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31Correction to: Social epistemological conception of delusionSynthese 199 (1): 1853-1854. 2021.The article Social epistemological conception of delusion, written by Kengo Miyazon and Alessandro Salice, was originally published electronically on the publisher’s internet portal on 17 September 2020 without open access.
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85Envy and usEuropean Journal of Philosophy 27 (1): 227-242. 2018.Within emotion theory, envy is generally portrayed as an antisocial emotion because the relation between the envier and the rival is thought to be purely antagonistic. This paper resists this view by arguing that envy presupposes a sense of us. First, we claim that hostile envy is triggered by the envier's sense of impotence combined with her perception that an equality principle has been violated. Second, we introduce the notion of â hetero-induced self-conscious emotionsâ by focusing on the pa…Read more
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48Introduction: Social Ontology, Culture and InstitutionsTopoi 35 (1): 267-270. 2016.status: published.
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66Being one of us. Group identification, joint actions, and collective intentionalityPhilosophical Psychology 33 (1): 42-63. 2020.1. Philosophical arguments (Schweikard & Schmid, 2013) and empirical evidence (Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005) support the idea that the capacity to engage in joint actions is a ke...
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37There are No Primitive We-IntentionsReview of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4): 695-715. 2015.John Searle’s account of collective intentions in action appears to have all the theoretical pros of the non-reductivist view on collective intentionality without the metaphysical cons of committing to the existence of group minds. According to Searle, when we collectively intend to do something together, we intend to cooperate in order to reach a collective goal. Intentions in the first-person plural form therefore have a particular psychological form or mode, for the we-intender conceives of h…Read more
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53Husserl on shared intentionality and normativityContinental Philosophy Review 56 (3): 343-359. 2023.The paper offers a systematic reconstruction of the relations that, in Husserl’s work, bind together our shared social world (“the spiritual world”) with shared intentionality. It is claimed that, by sharing experiences, persons create social reasons and that these reasons impose a normative structure on the social world. Because there are two ways in which persons can share experiences (depending on whether these experiences rest on mutual communication or on group’s identity), social normativi…Read more
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16Editorial: Self-conscious emotions and group-identification - theoretical, empirical, and normative questionsFrontiers in Psychology 13. 2022.
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40Actions, Values, and States of Affairs in Hildebrand and ReinachStudia Phaenomenologica 15 259-280. 2015.The present article discusses Dietrich von Hildebrand’s theory of action as presented in his Die Idee der sittlichen Handlung, and focuses on the moral relevance Hildebrand assigns to diff erent kinds of motivations. The act of will which leads to a moral action, Hildebrand claims, can be “founded” or “motivated” in different ways and, in particular, it can be motivated by an act of cognizing or by an act of value-taking. The act of cognizing grasps the state of aff airs that the action strives …Read more
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568Towards a wide approach to improvisationIn J. McGuirk, S. Ravn & S. Høffding (eds.), Improvisation: The Competence(s) of Not Being in Control, Routledge. 2021.This paper pursues two main aims. First, it distinguishes two kinds of improvisation: expert and inexpert. Expert improvisation is a (usually artistic) practice that the agent consciously sets as their goal and is evaluated according to (usually artistic) standards of improvisation. Inexpert improvisation, by contrast, supports and structures the agent’s action as it moves them towards their (usually everyday life) goals and is evaluated on its success leading the agent to the achievement of tho…Read more
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The Austrian Contribution to Analytic Philosophy (review)History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 12. 2009.
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Discipline Filosofiche (2018-2): Philosophical Perspectives on Affective Experience and Psychopathology (edited book)Quodlibet. 2018.
Alessandro Salice
University College Cork