Piers Benn

In considering the debate about the meaning of ‘disease’, the positions are generally presented as falling into two categories: naturalist, e.g., Boorse, and normativist, e.g., Engelhardt and many others. This division is too coarse, and obscures much of what is going on in this debate. I therefore propose that accounts of the meaning of ‘disease’ be assessed according to Hare's (1997) taxonomy of evaluative terms. Such an analysis will allow us to better understand both individual positions and their interrelationships. Most importantly, it will show that it is unlikely that there is a single unique disease-concept at issue. Rather, different authors are, for the most part, considering different concepts.

This paper attempts to clarify what is, and is not, meant by claiming that special moral considerations apply to sexual behaviour that cannot apply to other areas of life. It then poses the problem by reference to virtue ethics, asking whether there are any virtues or vices specific to sex, which go beyond general considerations like justice and benevolence. This leads to a mostly sympathetic treatment of Scruton’s Aristotelian derivation of sexual morality, which stresses how some behaviour and fantasies are debarred by a stable disposition to seek erotic flourishing. However, doubts are raised about some of the supposed implications of this account, and it is suggested that a better way to understand the moral distinctness of sex is to focus on the goods, rather than the evils, that arise uniquely in the erotic sphere.

‘Twelve Step' recovery programmes such as Alcoholics Anonymous teach that an alcoholic, or other addict, has a disease, and needs to accept that she is ‘powerless' over her addiction before recovery can begin. However, the disease model of addiction has been criticised on the grounds that some addicts recover without external intervention. This critique is questionable, not because such recovery does not occur, but because many genuine diseases are self-limiting. However, the disease model is better criticised on other grounds. Central here is the idea of powerlessness. This article explores various supposed instances of powerlessness, including that induced by extreme fear, provocation and obsessive-compulsive disorder. It is argued that while addiction is a genuine phenomenon, it is strictly inaccurate to describe it as a lack of power. However, there is a deeper sense in which the autonomy of addicts is compromised, although this does not show that addiction is a disease

This paper discusses the moral responsibility of psychopaths for their anti-social actions. Starting from P. F. Strawson's discussion of our participant reactive attitudes, which stresses their indispensability for meaningful human relations, the paper contrasts a variety of "normal" wrongdoers with psychopaths. It suggests that the latter are often seriously deficient in their capacity to entertain these attitudes, and that their resulting lack of proper self-evaluation may explain both their callousness and their imprudence. It is then argued that only creatures able to entertain participant reactive attitudes can be proper objects of those attitudes, since these reactions have a communicative core whose expression has a point only in a shared moral world. For this reason, if psychopaths are incapable of moral understanding, they may not be proper targets of anger and resentment. This, however, may have an illiberal implication, in possibly excluding psychopaths from possessing certain rights.

This article analyses some familiar arguments both for, and against, same-sex civil marriage. I argue that it is not enough to defend gay marriage by a simple appeal to equality, unless one addresses the view that same-sex marriage would be contrary to the objective nature and purpose of marriage. I illustrate the ways in which a stand-off is reached in discussions of this particular matter. I also suggest that there is a mystery about what the from a faithful relationship to marriage amounts to, but that part of the answer is that marriage embodies a state-recognized social transition. This is underpinned by the interest that society has in marriage, largely owing to its facilitating a stable environment for children. However, I suggest that marriage also properly functions as a way to uphold commitment and love, and conclude that that there is no good reason not to uphold those things in same-sex relationships. But I concede that religious organisations with theological objections to same-sex marriage should not be obliged to conduct gay weddings

This introduction to ethics judiciously combines moral theory with applied ethics to give an opportunity for students to develop acute thinking About Ethical Matters.; The Author Begins Motivating A Concern For moral discourse by dispelling often met objections over relativism and subjectivity. interweaving normative and meta-ethical considerations, a convincing modern account of moral thinking emerges.; Moral theories - consequentialism, Kantianism, contractualism - are explained and illustrated in a way that holds the reader's attention, and students of ethics will take away a perceptive and practical understanding of the nature of moral reasoning and an ability, on such matters, to think afresh for themselves

© 2013 The Editors of The Philosophical QuarterlyThis is a profound and important book. A large part of its aim is to puncture the ‘charm of disenchantment’ which oozes from reductive scientific accounts of the human condition, and restore our intuitions of human uniqueness, freedom, the sacred and the transcendental. It explores many features of this disenchantment, such as our habits of overconsumption and pleasure‐seeking, and the assault on subjectivity exemplified in fashion, pornography, faceless architecture, the desecration of the earth, and even fast food. Taking the human face as the paradigm of meaning, the author leads us on a tour of the destructive and de‐personalising temptations that surround us, and blot out the Face of God from our awareness.It is an ambitious enterprise. The prose is rich and suggestive, displaying in many short phrases a range of perceptive insights that it might have taken a less deft...

Contemporary moral philosophy rightly gives an important place not only to theories of right action, but to the nature and value of our interpersonal moral attitudes, including such reactions as resentment, admiration and forgiveness. Whilst these concerns have always been of interest to theologians and psychologists, their philosophical importance partly derives from wider concerns about the nature of persons. The recent resurgence, for instance, of retributivist theories of punishment, which are finding favour among many philosophical writers, largely bases itself on the idea that a range of ‘participant reactive attitudes’ is both socially indispensable and morally legitimate. In this web of interpersonal responses is forgiveness, which cannot properly be examined without discussion of other responses such as indignation, anger and even hatred

Most of us care about certain people and things, and some of these concerns become personal commitments, involving our values, our relationships, our work and our religious or political stances. But what is commitement, and why should it matter? Is social commitment - for example, to the family - being eroded by individualism or ironic detachment? And how should we deal with the potential tension between devotion to a life-stance, and the doubts prompted by pursuit of rational integrity? In this work, Piers Benn delves into the relationship between commitment and meaningful life, and asks whether commitment must be based on truth to provide such meaning. He also explores obstacles to commitment such as boredom, sloth and indifference. Drawing on his own experience of dithering and procrastination, he suggests that a sceptical, cautious attitude to important matters can be both a virtue and a real obstacle to human fulfillment