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39In this paper I address the question of whether the fact that our colour experiences have a finer‐grained content than our ordinary colour concepts allow us to represent should be taken as a threat to theories of the conceptual content of experience. In particular, I consider and criticise McDowell's response to that argument and propose a possible development of it. As a consequence, I claim that the role of the argument from the finer‐grained content of experience has to be redefined. In parti…Read more
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Self-Knowing InterpretersIn Julie Kirsch Patrizia Pedrini (ed.), Third-Person Self-Knowledge, Self-Interpretation, and Narrative, Springer Verlag. 2018.
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6PrefaceIn Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, Volker Munz & Annalisa Coliva (eds.), Mind, Language and Action: Proceedings of the 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium, De Gruyter. 2015.
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75Some Observations on François Recanati’s Mental FilesDisputatio 5 (36): 107-117. 2013.Coliva-Belleri_Some-observations-on-François-Recanatis-Mental-Files
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52SkepticismRoutledge. 2021.Skepticism is one of the perennial problems of philosophy: from antiquity, to the early modern period of Descartes and Hume, and right through to the present day. It remains a fundamental and widely studied topic and, as Annalisa Coliva and Duncan Pritchard show in this book, it presents us with a paradox with important ramifications not only for epistemology but also for many other core areas of philosophy. In this book they provide a thorough grounding in contemporary debates about skepticism,…Read more
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61How to perceive reasonsEpisteme 13 (1): 77-88. 2016.This paper deals with the question whether, and to what extent, perceptions can provide a justification for our empirical beliefs. In particular, it addresses the issue of whether they need to be conceptualized by a subject in order to play a justificatory role. It is argued that the conditions under which a subject can have perceptual representational contents and those under which those representational contents can play a justificatory role differ. The upshot is that perception can provide ju…Read more
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203In the last few years there has been a resurgence of interest in Moore’s Proof of the existence of an external world, which is now often rendered as follows:1 (I) Here’s a hand (II) If there is a hand here, there is an external world Therefore (III) There is an external world The contemporary debate has been mostly triggered by Crispin Wright’s influential—conservative —“Facts and certainty” and further fostered by Jim Pryor’s recent—liberal—“What’s wrong with Moore’s argument?”.2 This debate is…Read more
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76Stebbing, Moore (and Wittgenstein) on common sense and metaphysical analysisBritish Journal for the History of Philosophy 29 (5): 914-934. 2021.Susan Stebbing is often portrayed as indebted to G. E. Moore for her ideas concerning the relationship between common sense and philosophy and about analysis. By focusing mostly on her article “The...
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290Self-knowledge and commitmentsSynthese 171 (3). 2009.In this paper I provide an outline of a new kind of constitutive account of self-knowledge. It is argued that in order for the model properly to explain transparency, a further category of propositional attitudes—called “commitments”—has to be countenanced. It is also maintained that constitutive theories can’t remain neutral on the issue of the possession of psychological concepts, and a proposal about the possession of the concept of belief is sketched. Finally, it is claimed that in order for…Read more
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28Perceiving reasons?Iride: Filosofia e Discussione Pubblica 25 (1): 119-134. 2012.The paper analyses the discussion in the last decades on whether perceptions can, as such, justify empirical beliefs, and develops it along two fundamental lines: the nature of perceptual content and the nature of the justifications in play. Starting with Sellars' attack on the «Myth of the given», it examines Davidson's, McDowell's, Peacocke's and Burge's positions. On the one hand, it contends that also creatures that aren't endowed with the relevant concepts can have genuine perceptions; on t…Read more
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52Moore and Wittgenstein: scepticism, certainty, and common sensePalgrave-Macmillan. 2010.Does scepticism threaten our common sense picture of the world? Does it really undermine our deep-rooted certainties? Answers to these questions are offered through a comparative study of the epistemological work of two key figures in the history of analytic philosophy, G. E. Moore and Ludwig Wittgenstein.
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56Transparency and Self-Knowledge, by Alex ByrneMind 130 (519): 1039-1049. 2021.Transparency and Self-Knowledge, by ByrneAlex. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Pp. 227.
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7Practical Knowledge and Linguistic CompetenceIn Annalisa Coliva, Paolo Leonardi & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Eva Picardi on Language, Analysis and History, Palgrave. pp. 337-356. 2018.This chapter examines the distinction between practical and propositional knowledge. It then considers the objections put forward by Stanley and Williamson and finds them wanting. Afterwards, it presents Chomsky’s position on linguistic competence as a form of propositional knowledge. It criticizes both the theoretical and the empirical arguments Chomsky puts forward in favor of his view and presents some observations in favor of the idea that linguistic competence is ultimately practical. In so…Read more
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63Testimonial hingesPhilosophical Issues 29 (1): 53-68. 2019.The paper presents an extension of the kind of hinge epistemology proposed in Extended Rationality. A Hinge Epistemology (Coliva 2015) to the case of testimonial justification. This extension stems naturally from a reinterpretation of the classic dispute between reductionists and anti-reductionists with respect to testimonial justification. The interesting and novel aspect of that reinterpretation is that it brings to light the deep analogy between that classic dispute and the contemporary debat…Read more
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803Philosophical Progress, Skepticism, and DisagreementIn Maria Baghramian, J. Adam Carter & Rach Cosker-Rowland (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Disagreement, Routledge. forthcoming.This chapter serves as an opinionated introduction to the problem of convergence (that there is no clear convergence to the truth in philosophy) and the problem of peer disagreement (that disagreement with a peer rationally demands suspending one’s beliefs), and some of the issues they give rise to, namely, philosophical skepticism and progress in philosophy. After introducing both topics and surveying the various positions in the literature we explore the prospects of an alternative, hinge-theo…Read more
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121Peacocke's self-knowledgeRatio 21 (1). 2008.knowledge. His proposal relies on the claim that first-order mental..
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1Proof of an external world: transmission failure, begging the question or dialectical ineffectiveness? Moore, Wright and PryorIn Annalisa Coliva & Eva Picardi (eds.), Wittgenstein Today, Il Poligrafo. pp. 411--29. 2004.
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6Peacocke's self‐knowledgeRatio (Misc.) 21 (1): 13-27. 2008.The paper reviews Christopher Peacocke's account of self‐knowledge. His proposal relies on the claim that first‐order mental states may be given to a subject so as to function as reasons, from his point of view, for the corresponding self‐ascriptions. Peacocke's Being Known elicits two different views of how that may be the case: a given propositional attitude is considered to be conscious if, on the one hand, there is something it is like to have it; and, on the other, if it can occupy a subjec…Read more
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13IndexIn Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, Volker Munz & Annalisa Coliva (eds.), Mind, Language and Action: Proceedings of the 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium, De Gruyter. pp. 601-610. 2015.
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29Replies to CommentatorsAnalysis 82 (3): 514-525. 2022.As is predictable, several comments raise issues about our characterization of relativism. We will focus on these first before discussing Paul Boghossian’s comm.
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75Extended Rationality: A Hinge EpistemologyPalgrave-Macmillan. 2015.Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology provides a novel account of the structure of epistemic justification. Its central claim builds upon Wittgenstein's idea in On Certainty that epistemic justifications hinge on some basic assumptions and that epistemic rationality extends to these very hinges. It exploits these ideas to address major problems in epistemology, such as the nature of perceptual justifications, external world skepticism, epistemic relativism, the epistemic status of basic log…Read more
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171Moore's Proof And Martin Davies's Epistemic ProjectsAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1): 101-116. 2010.In the recent literature on Moore's Proof of an external world, it has emerged that different diagnoses of the argument's failure are prima facie defensible. As a result, there is a sense that the appropriateness of the different verdicts on it may depend on variation in the kinds of context in which the argument is taken to be a move, with different characteristic aims. In this spirit, Martin Davies has recently explored the use of the argument within two different epistemic projects called res…Read more
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38The thesis addresses the issues of error through misidentification and immunity to error through misidentification in relation to the problem of the first person. First, it provides an explanation of error through misidentification. Secondly, it shows that there are two possible ways of understanding immunity to error through misidentification. It is then argued that the first understanding of immunity to error through misidentification leads to what is labelled "the trilemma about the self". Th…Read more
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48Guest Editors' PrefaceDiscipline Filosofiche 22 (2): 5-6. 2012.This is the guest editors' preface to the Discipline Filosofiche special issue on Knowledge and Justification.
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Lo scetticismo sull'esistenza del mondo esternoIn Annalisa Coliva (ed.), Filosofia analitica: temi e problemi, Carocci. pp. 255--280. 2007.
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
History of Western Philosophy |
Philosophy, Misc |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
History of Western Philosophy |
Philosophy, Misc |