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387Norms of TrustIn Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar & Adrian Haddock (eds.), Social Epistemology, Oxford University Press. 2008.Should we tell other people the truth? Should we believe what other people tell us? This paper argues that something like these norms of truth-telling and belief govern our production and receipt of testimony in conversational contexts. It then attempts to articulate these norms and determine their justification. More fully specified these norms prescribe that speakers tell the truth informatively, or be trustworthy, and that audiences presume that speakers do this, or trust. These norms of trus…Read more
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371Two-Stage Reliabilism, Virtue Reliabilism, Dualism and the Problem of SufficiencySocial Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 2 (8): 121-138. 2013.Social epistemology should be truth-centred, argues Goldman. Social epistemology should capture the ‘logic of everyday practices’ and describe socially ‘situated’ reasoning, says Fuller. Starting from Goldman’s vision of epistemology, this paper aims to argue for Fuller’s contention. Social epistemology cannot focus solely on the truth because the truth can be got in lucky ways. The same too could be said for reliability. Adding a second layer of epistemic evaluation helps only insofar as the re…Read more
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253The social character of testimonial knowledgeJournal of Philosophy 97 (11): 581-601. 2000.Through communication, we form beliefs about the world, its history, others and ourselves. A vast proportion of these beliefs we count as knowledge. We seem to possess this knowledge only because it has been communicated. If those justifications that depended on communication were outlawed, all that would remain would be body of illsupported prejudice. The recognition of our ineradicable dependence on testimony for much of what we take ourselves to know has suggested to many that an epistemologi…Read more
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246David Hume's reductionist epistemology of testimonyPacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (4). 1998.David Hume advances a reductionist epistemology of testimony: testimonial beliefs are justified on the basis of beliefs formed from other sources. This reduction, however, has been misunderstood. Testimonial beliefs are not justified in a manner identical to ordinary empirical beliefs; it is true, they are justified by observation of the conjunction between testimony and its truth, it is the nature of the conjunctions that has been misunderstood. The observation of these conjunctions provides us…Read more
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51Testimonial KnowledgeActa Analytica 15 (24): 127-138. 2000.The motivation for adopting reductive and anti-reductive theories of testimonial warrant is considered. Whilst both well-motivated neither position can adequately capture the dynamic aspect of the individual knowers relationship to the wider community of knowledge. A hybrid theory of testimony is proposed that attempts to do just this.
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275On Telling and TrustingMind 116 (464): 875-902. 2007.A key debate in the epistemology of testimony concerns when it is reasonable to acquire belief through accepting what a speaker says. This debate has been largely understood as the debate over how much, or little, assessment and monitoring an audience must engage in. When it is understood in this way the debate simply ignores the relationship speaker and audience can have. Interlocutors rarely adopt the detached approach to communication implied by talk of assessment and monitoring. Audiences tr…Read more
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268A genealogy of trustEpisteme 4 (3): 305-321. 2007.In trusting a speaker we adopt a credulous attitude, and this attitude is basic: it cannot be reduced to the belief that the speaker is trustworthy or reliable. However, like this belief, the attitude of trust provides a reason for accepting what a speaker says. Similarly, this reason can be good or bad; it is likewise epistemically evaluable. This paper aims to present these claims and offer a genealogical justification of them
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199Understanding knowledge transmissionRatio 19 (2). 2006.We must allow that knowledge can be transmitted. But to allow this is to allow that an individual can know a proposition despite lacking any evidence for it and reaching belief by an unreliable means. So some explanation is required as to how knowledge rather than belief is transmitted. This paper considers two non-individualistic explanations: one in terms of knowledge existing autonomously, the other in terms of it existing as a property of communities. And it attempts to decide what is at iss…Read more
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74Relativism and our warrant for scientific theoriesInternational Journal of Philosophical Studies 12 (3). 2004.We depend upon the community for justified belief in scientific theory. This dependence can suggest that our individual belief in scientific theory is justified because the community believes it to be justified. This idea is at the heart of an anti-realist epistemology according to which there are no facts about justification that transcend a community's judgement thereof. Ultimately, knowledge and justified belief are simply social statuses. When conjoined with the lemma that communities can di…Read more
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69Epistemology of TestimonyIn Östman & Verschueren (eds.), Handbook of Pragmatics, John Benjamins. 2011.
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457The moral obligations of trustPhilosophical Explorations 17 (3): 332-345. 2014.Moral obligation, Darwall argues, is irreducibly second personal. So too, McMyler argues, is the reason for belief supplied by testimony and which supports trust. In this paper, I follow Darwall in arguing that the testimony is not second personal ?all the way down?. However, I go on to argue, this shows that trust is not fully second personal, which in turn shows that moral obligation is equally not second personal ?all the way down?
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160On the Rationality of our Response to TestimonySynthese 131 (3): 353-370. 2002.The assumption that we largely lack reasons for accepting testimony has dominated its epistemology. Given the further assumption that whatever reasons we do have are insufficient to justify our testimonial beliefs, many conclude that any account of testimonial knowledge must allow credulity to be justified. In this paper I argue that both of these assumptions are false. Our responses to testimony are guided by our background beliefs as to the testimony as a type, the testimonial situation, the t…Read more
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81A Virtue Theory of TestimonyProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (2pt2): 189-211. 2014.This paper aims to outline, evaluate, and ultimately reject a virtue epistemic theory of testimony before proposing a virtue ethical theory. Trust and trustworthiness, it is proposed, are ethical virtues; and from these ethical virtues, epistemic consequences follow
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Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics and Epistemology |