Venanzio Raspa

This chapter offers a review of the interpretations of imaginary logic that have appeared over the last hundred years. The early readers of Vasil’ev’s work can be grouped as displaying one or another of two tendencies, either sharp criticism (e.g. K. A. Smirnov) or notable appreciation (e.g. N. N. Luzin). After two decades of silence, Russian and Polish scholars began to write about Vasil’ev. But in order to appreciate his logical ideas, the development of non-classical logics, like many-valued and paraconsistent logics, as well as a revalorization and formalization of syllogistic, have been necessary. Some scholars interpret imaginary logic in a many-valued key, either as a forerunner of many-valued logic or in terms of a reconstruction of imaginary logic as a many-valued one (L. Chwistek. H. Greniewski, A. I. Mal’tsev, T. Kwiatkowski, G. L. Kline, N. Rescher, M. Jammer). In the 1970s, the paraconsistent interpretation was proposed by A. I. Arruda and was further developed by several scholars (L. Z. Puga, Newton C. A. da Costa, A. S. Karpenko, V. L. Vasyukov, O. Bueno, I. M. L. D’Ottaviano). Others interpreted Vasil’ev as a founder of intensional logics (G. Priest and R. Routley), as a theoretician of logical pluralism and of impossible worlds. Another line of interpretation reconstructs Vasil’ev’s logic in terms of a syllogistic adapted to modern standards (V. A. Smirnov, T. P. Kostiuk, V. I. Markin, D. Zaitsev, A. Kouznetsov, W. Suchoń). Finally, systematic historical investigations about Vasil’ev have also emerged (V. A. Bazhanov, F. Cavaliere, R. Vergauwen, E. A. Zaytsev, W. Stelzner). The chapter closes with the proposal to use some formalized reconstructions of imaginary logic as an adequate logical basis for Meinong’s object theory.

This chapter deals with attempts, contemporary with Vasil’ev’s own, to develop non-Aristotelian logics that present affinities with imaginary logic. Already in Aristotle’s work there are passages that press in the direction of a non-Aristotelian logic, in so far as they show that the syllogism is independent of the principle of contradiction. Some Aristotelian scholars like Heinrich Maier and Isaac Husik had drawn attention to such passages. Husik in particular proposes, on the basis of them and of Herbert Spencer’s philosophy, a hypothetical logic in which the syllogism is independent of the principle of contradiction; judgments are allowed that assert contradictory predicates of the same subject; contradictory objects are subjects of true propositions; and a hypothetical world is assumed, for which such a different logic would be valid. Jan Łukasiewicz was familiar with Maier and Husik’s works. He subjects to rigorous critique the Aristotelian principle of contradiction, claiming that it is uncertain, that it is not a simple, ultimate and necessary principle, and that in relation to contradictory objects it is actually false. Łukasiewicz took the notion of contradictory objects from Meinong, according to whom such objects — which are overdetermined objects of higher order in which a surplus of determinations inheres, amongst which there is a relation of incompatibility — can occur as genuine subjects in true propositions. The chapter concludes with an outline of the controversy between Meinong and Russell, with which Łukasiewicz was thoroughly acquainted, and his proposal of a non-Aristotelian logic in which the principle of contradiction is insignificant.

This chapter offers an outline of Vasil’ev’s life and works, especially of his activities as a historian and man of letters. Vasil’ev grew up in a stimulating, highly cultured family environment. Already as a boy, he showed interest in literature and during his university years, while studying medicine, he also dedicated himself to poetry by publishing a collection of lyrics, Longing for Eternity (1904). Such poems constitute a first step towards imaginary logic. Later, Vasil’ev enrolled in the Faculty of Philology and History at the University of Kazan and in 1906 he discussed a thesis on history, although he continued to deal with poetry and literature (Verhaeren, Swinburne, Gogol). Between 1908 and 1913 he developed his logical ideas, spent two study stays in Germany and began teaching at the University of Kazan. During these years, he published his major articles in logic. In 1912, in an essay on Tolstoy and Solovyov, he set forth his ethical conceptions. But with the outbreak of the First World War his life took a dramatic turn. In 1916, the first symptoms of that mental illness which was to afflict him for the rest of his life manifested themselves. In 1917 he was in Moscow during the October Revolution. In later years, mental breakdowns alternated with periods of teaching at the university, but in 1922 he was definitively interned in a psychiatric hospital where he remained until his death in 1940.

The aim of this paper is to apply Meinong’s theory of signs to an analysis of literary texts. The focus lies on words and sentences which, according to Meinong, expressing fantasy experiences when they occur in literary texts. He distinguishes between “serious-like” and “shadow-like” fantasy experiences. The former can be detached from their fictional context, i.e., they are also understandable in other contexts. The latter, instead, are dependent on their fictional contexts. This implies that shadow-like fantasy experiences are less specific than serious-like ones. The objects presented by these experiences are the meanings of the signs involved. The definiteness of the experience is related to the completeness of the object; consequently, objects involved in shadow-like experiences are incomplete. In addition to be incomplete, fictional objects can be defined as non-existent objects of higher order, which come into the world through linguistic expression and are tied to the context(s) in which the fantasy has placed them.

Der Aufsatz stellt Ehrenfels’ Schönheitsbegriff als den eigentlichen Gegenstand der Ästhetik dar. Gegen den ästhetischen Skeptizismus, nach dem wir die Schönheit Gegenständen zuschreiben, die sich sehr voneinander unterscheiden und nur den Namen „schön“ gemein haben, behauptet Ehrenfels, dass nicht die äußeren physischen Gegenstände schön sind, sondern die Phantasiegebilde, die von jenen hervorgerufen werden. Es gebe eine absolute Schönheit als „Einheit in der Mannigfaltigkeit“, die in jedem „wahrhaft schönen“ Gegenstand der Kunst oder der Natur enthalten sei und jedem Menschen „unbedingt wohlgefallen müsse“.

Es gibt Gegenstände, von denen gilt, daß es dergleichen Gegenstände nicht gibt. Dieser Satz hat dem Österreicher Alexius Meinong nicht nur Berühmtheit, sondern auch vernichtende Urteile beschert. Hindern konnten sie ihn jedoch keinesfalls daran, die weltweit bekannte Schule der Grazer Gegenstandstheorie zu etablieren. Wertphilosophische, erkenntnistheoretische sowie psychologische Schriften und die Gründung des ersten experimentalpsychologischen Laboratoriums in Österreich komplettieren das Schaffen dieses Philosophen. Meinongs Lebensgeschichte ist die Verquickung der Geschichte seiner Publikationen und der akademischen Aktivitäten seiner kleinen Schule von Schülern. Platz für private Belange schien in jenem Leben, das sich nahezu vier Jahrzehnte in der steiermärkischen Universitätsstadt Graz abspielte, kaum zu sein. Eine äußerst starke Sehschwäche, die Meinong vor Kollegen, Freunden und sogar seiner Frau auf ungewöhnliche Weise zu verbergen suchte, lastete schwer auf ihm. In der ersten vollständigen Biographie Meinongs zeichnet Evelyn Dölling das leidenschaftliche Ringen dieses Denkers um höchste wissenschaftliche Präzision nach. Aus der Recherche des umfangreichen Nachlaßmaterials sowie der zahlreichen Korrespondenzen entsteht ein Bild von Meinongs Familienleben und seinen Beziehungen zu Freunden, wie man es so bislang nicht kannte.

Dieses Buch präsentiert die seit Langem erwartete kritische Edition der zuvor unveröffentlichten Vorlesungsnotizen Kazimierz Twardowskis aus seiner Zeit an der Universität Wien (1894/95). Bezüglich seines Umfangs und Themas sowie seiner Sprache ist dieser Text einzigartig im Œuvre Twardowskis. Bekannt vor allem für seine ebenso wichtige wie kurze Abhandlung Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen (1894), entwickelt er im Logik-Manuskript seine Thesen viel detaillierter und in überarbeiteter Form. Die restlichen seiner Werke sind in polnischer Sprache verfasst und damit für viele Leser nur schwer zugänglich. Diese Edition ist von großem Interesse für alle Philosophen, die zur Wiener Wissenschaftsphilosophie vor dem Wiener Kreis forschen, für alle, die sich für die frühe Phänomenologie und Husserls Denken interessieren, und besonders für Spezialisten der österreichischen Philosophie und der kontinentalen Tradition analytischer Philosophie, für die dieser Text eine unverzichtbare Quelle darstellt.

The paper investigates the system of 'Imaginary Logic' created by the Russian logician N.A. Vasil'ev (1880-1940), considered by some to be a forerunner of paraconsistent or intuitionistic logics. It is shown how he constructs a logic without the law of contradiction redefining the concept of negation. Vasil'ev singles out two levels of logic, an external one which is absolute and one depending on commitments in relation to cognizable objects which is not absolute. His reconstruction of the syllogism shows the viability of his system and indicates how, indeed, he may be called an initiator of nonclassical logics.

At first, I explain how Bergmann reads Meinong. As regards his method, Bergmann’s stated aim is to examine Meinong’s thought through all the stages of its development; but he is very selective in choosing exactly what to consider, not just within each of Meinong’s texts, but equally among his texts – indeed he completely ignores Meinong’s mature works. Moreover, he often alters Meinong’s thought by translating it into his foil ontology. As regards the content, Bergmann interprets Meinong as a reist and a nominalist. I try to show that such a view is not correct. I then discuss this interpretation by focusing on which Meinong Bergmann reads, that is, which writings he refers to and at the same time which of Meinong’s theories he criticizes. I sketch the four phases of the development of Meinong’s thought distinguished by Bergmann: his first theory of relations, the theory of the objects of higher order, of objectives, and finally object theory. I present Bergmann’s critique and compare his distinction of different degrees of independence, which establish differences of status among categories of existents, with Meinong’s distinction between kinds of being. Finally, taking into account also Meinong’s mature work, I offer an assessment of Bergmann’s proposal to rethink object theory. Considering Meinong’s theory of incomplete objects, I show that Bergmann would have found in Meinong an ally not only in the battle against representationalism, as he maintains, but also in that against nominalism.

A lie is neither a false proposition, nor a mistake, nor a mere fiction; it is a type of fiction, an act, and precisely an intentional act. An act calls for a subject, and therefore a lie is inseparable from its subject. Together, they make up a real object: it has to be real, since a lie produces effects, and the cause-effect relationship only holds between real beings. Like every real object, a lie unfolds in a context. But there is more: it identifies a context. Laz nije ni pogresna tvrdnja, ni greska, niti pak puka fikcija; ona predstavlja odredjeni tip fikcije, cin - tacnije - intencionalni cin. Cinu je potreban subjekat, te je stoga laz neodvojiva od svog subjekta. Oni zajedno cine stvaran objekat: on mora biti stvaran,buduci da laz proizvodi posledice, a odnos uzroka i posledice vazi jedino izmedju stvarnih bica. Kao i svaki objekat, laz se obelodanjuje u kontekstu. Ali to nije sve, ona identifikuje kontekst.

The essay gives an account of the aesthetics of the Graz school, focusing on the standpoint of the object as well as on that of emotions. Meinong’s reflection on aesthetics stems from a psychological background and comes subsequently to an ontological grounding. After examining the notions of imagination, phantasy-representation, relation and complexion, I show how the theory of production of representations, as well as that of higher-order objects, develops under the impulse of Ehrenfels’ concept of Gestalt qualities; both these theories may be applied to aesthetics in the explanation of artistic creation and of aesthetic objects. Meinong identifies the specific object of aesthetics with the “objective” and distinguishes aesthetic feelings, which are true feelings, from imaginary ones. Witasek develops a psychological aesthetics built on the conceptual framework of Meinongian philosophy: aesthetic properties are ideal and extra-objective, they connect the aesthetic object to the subject’s mental attitude; an aesthetic object is an object endowed with aesthetic properties, such as beauty, which depends on the degree of pleasure or displeasure the object may induce in the subject. Witasek, though, parts from Meinong on both the conception of aesthetic objects and of imaginary feelings. In the last sections, I review the reactions to Witasek’s aesthetics, both positive and negative, within the Graz school itself (in particular Schwarz’ and Saxinger’s ideas on phantasy-feelings, and Ameseder’s on value beauty), and I sketch Ehrenfels’ and Veber’s aesthetic views.

Meinongs Untersuchungen über Phantasie, Phantasieerlebnisse und Vorstellungsproduktion sind ein wichtiger Bestandteil seiner Konzeption des Fiktiven. Nach Meinong verweist die Phantasie auf ihr Korrelat, das er in „Phantasie-Vorstellung und Phantasie“ (1889) mit den Phantasievorstellungen identifiziert. Solche Vorstellungen sind, da sie produziert werden, nicht einfach, sondern aus mehreren, miteinander in Beziehung gesetzten Elementen zusammengesetzt. Zur Erklärung, wie Phantasievorstellungen produziert werden, entwickelt Meinong die Theorie der Vorstellungsproduktion. Bei der Entwicklung dieser Theorie stellt der Essay „Über Gegenstände höherer Ordnung“ (1899) eine wichtige Etappe dar. Diese Lehre bedeutet einerseits eine Vertiefung der Relationstheorie und andrerseits bietet die Bearbeitung des Begriffs der Fundierung die Erklärung, wie sich Superiora auf Inferiora aufbauen. Das psychologische Gegenstück der Fundierung ist die Vorstellungsproduktion, insofern diese erklärt, wie die Vorstellung eines Gegenstandes höherer Ordnung aus Vorstellungen von Gegenständen niedrigerer Ordnung hervorgeht. Die weitere Entwicklung von Meinongs Denken in Über Annahmen (1902, 1910) führt zur Erweiterung des Tätigkeitsbereichs der Phantasie auf das ganze psychische Leben sowohl durch die Entdeckung einer Art psychischer Erlebnisse in den Annahmen, die im Bereich des Denkens eine ähnliche Rolle spielen wie die Phantasievorstellungen im Bereich des Vorstellens, als auch durch die Entdeckung von Phantasiekorrelaten für Gefühle und Begehrungen, so daß die Phantasie das Unterscheidungskriterium innerhalb der Erlebnisse wird. Eine reichhaltige Forschungsperspektive öffnet die Betrachtung der ernstartigen und schattenhaften Phantasieerlebnisse in Über emotionale Präsentation (1917).

Łukasiewicz distinguishes three formulations of the principle of contradiction in Aristotle’s works: ontological, logical, and psychological. The first two formulations are equivalent though not synonymous, but neither of them is equivalent to the psychological one, which expresses not a principle but only an empirical law. Furthermore, the principle of contradiction is neither a simple and ultimate law nor is it necessary for conducting an inference, because the syllogism is independent of it. The further explanation of this concept leads Łukasiewicz to formulate the idea of a non-Aristotelian logic, that is, a logic operating without the principle of contradiction. If the principle of contradiction shall be valid, it must be proved. A proof can be supplied only on the basis of a definition of object, as something that cannot have and not have the same property at the same time. However, this definition does not hold for all objects, i.e., for contradictory objects. In virtue of its ontological character the Aristotelian principle of contradiction is then different from that of symbolic logic.

In Meinong’s object theory there is, alongside a classificatory aspect, one having to do with degrees, increase and variation. This other aspect comes out of Meinong’s intention of extending his object theory’s aprioristic method to the empirical world. The forms of ‘more’ and ‘less’ concerning psychical experiences are first investigated; they consist in degrees of certainty of judgment and of shadiness (Schattenhaftigkeit) and seriousness (Ernstartigkeit) of imaginary representations and assumptions. Secondly, forms of variability regarding objects are shown, specifically the incompleteness (Unvollständigkeit) of the objects of representations and the subfactuality (Untertatsächlichkeit) of the objectives, i.e., the objects of judgments and assumptions. There is a correspondence between such variability in objects and a variability in psychical experiences. Finally, an application of such concepts to fictional objects is proposed.

In this paper I trace a theoretical path along Meinong’s works, by means of which the notion of aesthetic object as well as the changes this notion undergoes along Meinong’s output will be highlighted. Focusing especially on "Über emotionale Präsentation", I examine, on the one hand, the cognitive function of emotions, on the other hand, the objects apprehended by aesthetic emotions, i.e. aesthetic objects. These are ideal objects of higher order, which have, even though not primarily, the capacity to attract aesthetic experiences to themselves. Hence, they are connected to emotions, being what is presented by them. These results are achieved on the basis of a fundamental analogy between the domain of value and the aesthetic domain. Finally, the notion of an absolute beauty is discussed.

Focusing mainly on Meinong’s "Über emotionale Präsentation" and Veber’s "Die Natur des Sollens", I examine their respective conceptions of ought. Meinong has not written a specific work on the ought, he deals with it as a part of his value theory. In "Über emotionale Präsentation" the ought is a property of being, which cannot be viewed as separated from a desiring subject. The ought is an ideal object of higher order; it concerns neither factuality nor non-factuality, but subfactuality, that is the realm of possibility. In "Die Natur des Sollens", Veber proposes a structured theory of ought, which is grounded on Meinongian concepts. The ought is the object of a volition, it is a genuine object, even though ideal. I conclude by portraying the differences between Veber's and Meinong's conceptions of the ought.

According to Alexius Meinong, in order to give a philosophical explanation of the world we need to consider both existent and nonexistent objects, lest we fall into the "prejudice in favour of the real". The paper starts by examining some basic concepts of object theory seen as an existence-free science (modes of being, principle of independence of so-being from being, "Aussersein" and Meinong's paradox). There follows an exposition of Bertrand Russell's position, characterized by a "robust sense of reality", and afterwards an analysis of differences and similarities between the two philosophers. The paper ends with a short account of Meinongian semantics and a comparison between object theory and metaphysics.

Il lavoro si interroga principalmente sul significato di «verità effettuale della cosa». Dopo aver esaminato la nozione di vero da un punto di vista semantico e gnoseologico – nel primo senso, è vero, secondo Machiavelli, il discorso che riscontra le cose, nel secondo, il discorso che si fonda sull’esperienza, intesa come esperienza sia diretta (vissuta e osservata) che mediata (letta e ascoltata) –, giunge a definire la «verità effettuale della cosa» come «il discorso storicamente e empiricamente verificabile negli effetti, o nei fatti, che concerne la cosa in oggetto, ossia lo stato». A questo si contrappone «l’immaginazione della cosa», il discorso che, mancando del riscontro delle cose e di esperienza dello stato, non può che ricorrere all’immaginazione, la quale svolge pertanto la funzione di un surrogato. Ma l’immaginazione non è solo fonte di inganni, in un altro senso svolge un ruolo altamente positivo: l’immaginazione che muove dal riscontro permette di individuare un «rimedio» possibile per «questo guasto mondo»; e consente al principe, nella situazione contingente, di agire e apparire anche contro i dettami di una certa mortale, se necessario. L’individuazione di un rimedio possibile e l’attuazione di un agire necessario, contrapposti al pericolo incombente della rovina, richiedono la conoscenza delle regole e leggi dell’agire politico. La verità come coerenza, coerenza del discorso che risulta dall’esame dell’agire storico e politico, ossia coerenza delle argomentazioni machiavelliane che traducono in proposizioni l’agire politico, nella fattispecie, quello del principe, è condizione necessaria, anche se non sufficiente, per preservarsi dalla rovina e mantenere uno stato.

The notion of identity is investigated through Aristotle and Hegel as supporters of two different ontological conceptions: pluralism of substances and relational holism. Through Aristotle, I examine both the thesis according to which the identity of an object is constituted by its properties and the difficulties which this thesis encounters. Aristotle easily defines the identity in species, in genus, and in number; some problems arise regarding the identity of individuals: for these, it is not enough to indicate the definition and the proper qualities, but matter is needed. Matter cannot, however, be a criterion for identifying duplicate objects: in this case, it plays at most the role of a “weak individuator.” A weak individuator involves relations with other entities. The use of relations in determining the identity of an entity is extensively treated by Hegel, according to whom, in order to define the identity of an object a multiplicity of particular objects is required and, therefore, relations among entities. I conclude by proposing a notion of the object understood not as an independent, separate, and autonomous item, but as a portion of the world, which is given in a phenomenological context and identifies a dialectical context.

Starting with the philosophical reflections of the Italian writer C. E. Gadda, the paper offers a criticism of the traditional concept of an individual as something which is determinate, separate and autonomous. Gadda argues that an individual should be understood as an element which is in a multiplicity of relations with the other elements of the system inside of which it exists. The idea is developed on the basis of Spinoza's 'Ethics', but it shares many affinities with Peirce's notions of an individual and of a continuum. Taking its cue from Peirce's ideas, which are here discussed in relation to Aristotle and Kant, the paper proposes to construe an individual as a continuum, that is as something which is in a continuity of reactions and relations with the objects of the phenomenological (spatial-temporal) context in which it exists and with those of the dialectical context, that is that net of objects which can be identified starting from the relational properties of the object.

Stories express hypotheses, interpretations of the world that have a certain degree of probability. To demonstrate this thesis I have adopted the notion of hypothesis, in a sense very close to the Meinongian concept of assumption, and a ‘metric’ conception of the values of the truth or falsity of a proposition – as that has been proposed in several ways by Peirce, Vasil’ev and Meinong. To show the the cognitive value of literary texts, and therefore their truth value, I take my move from chapter 9 of Aristotle’s Poetics, where he holds that poetry is imitative of reality, not in the sense of history – which relates what has happened – but rather, in so far as it expresses “the kinds of things that might happen, that is, that could happen because they are either probable or necessary.” The probable admits variations of degree. By means of an examination of the Meinongian concepts of assumption and objective (i.e. state of affairs), which also allow different modes of gradation, I introduce, with examples drawn from Dante’s Divine Comedy and The Description (Tradimento) by Machiavelli, a theory of degrees of truth that makes it possible to apply the concept of probability to literary as well as to historical texts. Finally, I connect the universal character of the literary text with the ontological notion of incomplete object and argue that a fictional object, as it is incomplete, is not an individual but a type.

The paper discusses critically the evolution of Lipps's view on logic and psychology. According to Lipps, psychology is the fundamental science on which the other sciences are grounded, and "logic is a special discipline of psychology". Husserl criticizes such conception, which falls into a confusion of domains, and proposes the idea of a pure logic on the basis of the distinction between ideal and real. Lipps replies to Husserl maintaining that the overcoming of psychologism requires both a sharp separation of object and content and a distinction of the different meanings of psychology. The latter is, according to Lipps, not an empirical science, but the science of the self, pure psychology, i.e., something like Aristotle's first philosophy; as such, psychology is the ground of logic: the laws of logic are valid both for thought and for objects, but they are facts of consciousness and hence they belong to psychology. Finally, an evaluation is given of various interpretations of Lipps's attempts to overcome psychologism.