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60Ought, Agents, and ActionsPhilosophical Review 119 (3): 1-41. 2010.According to a naive view sometimes apparent in the writings of moral philosophers, 'ought' often expresses a relation between agents and actions—the relation that obtains between an agent and an action when that action is what that agent ought to do. It is not part of this naive view that 'ought' always expresses this relation—adherents of the naive view are happy to allow that 'ought' also has an evaluative sense, on which it means, roughly, that were things ideal, some proposition would be th…Read more
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57Being for: Evaluating the semantic program of expressivism • by M ark S chroeder • C larendon P ress , 2008. XVI + 198 pp . £27.50: Summary (review)Analysis 70 (1): 101-104. 2010.My project in Being For is both constructive and negative. The main aim of the book is to take the core ideas of meta-ethical expressivism as far as they can go, and to try to develop a version of expressivism that solves many of the more straightforward open problems that have faced the view without being squarely confronted. In doing so, I develop an expressivist framework that I call biforcated attitude semantics, which I claim has the minimal structural features required in order to solve so…Read more
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56Knowledge Is Belief For Sufficient (Objective and Subjective) ReasonOxford Studies in Epistemology 5. 2015.This chapter lays out a case that with the proper perspective on the place of epistemology within normative inquiry more generally, it is possible to appreciate what was on the right track about some of the early approaches to the analysis of knowledge, and to improve on the obvious failures which led them to be rejected. Drawing on more general principles about reasons, their weight, and their relationship to justification, it offers answers to problems about defeat and the conditional fallacy …Read more
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48Book Reviews Horty , John F . Reasons as Defaults . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Pp. 272. $65.00 (cloth)Ethics 123 (1): 162-167. 2012.
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46Being for: Evaluating the semantic program of expressivism * by mark Schroeder * clarendon press, 2008. XVI + 198 pp. 27.50: Summary (review)Analysis 70 (1): 101-104. 2010.My project in Being For is both constructive and negative. The main aim of the book is to take the core ideas of meta-ethical expressivism as far as they can go, and to try to develop a version of expressivism that solves many of the more straightforward open problems that have faced the view without being squarely confronted. In doing so, I develop an expressivist framework that I call biforcated attitude semantics, which I claim has the minimal structural features required in order to solve so…Read more
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45Review of Michael Bratman, Structures of Agency: Essays (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (5). 2007.
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37Ensuring a Future for Open-Access PublishingJournal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 12 (1). 2017.
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37The Epistemic Consequences of Forced ChoiceLogos and Episteme 8 (3): 365-374. 2017.In “Stakes, Withholding, and Pragmatic Encroachment on Knowledge,” I used a variety of cases, including cases of forced choice, to illustrate my explanation of how and why some pragmatic factors, but not others, can affect whether an agent knows. In his recent contribution, Andy Mueller argues that cases of forced choice actually pose a dilemma for my account. In this paper I reply.
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30Reply to Reasons LatestersPhilosophical Studies 181 (2): 637-648. 2024.It is an honor to receive such careful and attentive criticism. In this response, I attempt to put the criticisms of the reasons latesters into the context of my argumentative aims in the book and to point toward how they might be answered.
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27Précis of Reasons FirstPhilosophical Studies 181 (2): 603-606. 2024.This is an overview of the main themes and theses of _Reasons First_ for a book symposium, and intended to be read alongside the other contributions to that symposium.
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23Being Realistic About Reasons, by T.M. Scanlon: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. x + 132, US$35 (review)Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (1): 195-198. 2015.
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20Expressing Our Attitudes: Explanation and Expression in EthicsOxford University Press UK. 2015.Expressing Our Attitudes pulls together over a decade of work by Mark Schroeder, one of the leading figures in contemporary metaethics. Two new and seven previously published papers weave treatments of propositions, truth, and the attitudes together with detailed development of competing alternative expressivist frameworks and discussion of their relative advantages. A substantial new introduction both offers new arguments of its own, and provides a map to reading these essays as a unified argum…Read more
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11Expressing Our Attitudes: Explanation and Expression in Ethics, Volume 2Oxford University Press. 2015.When the logical positivists espoused emotivism as a theory of moral discourse, they assumed that their general theories of meaning could be straightforwardly applied to the subject of metaethics. The philosophical research program of expressivism, emotivism's contemporary heir, has called this assumption into question. In this volume Mark Schroeder argues that the only plausible ways of developing expressivism or similar views require us to re-think what we may have thought that we knew about p…Read more
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1Value and the Right Kind of ReasonIn Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 5, Oxford University Press. 2010.
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Normative Ethics and MetaethicsIn Tristram Colin McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics, Routledge. pp. 674-686. 2017.
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The Humean Theory of ReasonsIn Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume Ii, Clarendon Press. 2007.
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Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Language |
Meta-Ethics |
Normative Ethics |
History of Western Philosophy, Misc |