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3Reasons in Moral PhilosophyIn Colin Aitken, Amalia Amaya, Kevin D. Ashley, Carla Bagnoli, Giorgio Bongiovanni, Bartosz Brożek, Cristiano Castelfranchi, Samuele Chilovi, Marcello Di Bello, Jaap Hage, Kenneth Einar Himma, Lewis A. Kornhauser, Emiliano Lorini, Fabrizio Macagno, Andrei Marmor, J. J. Moreso, Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco, Antonino Rotolo, Giovanni Sartor, Burkhard Schafer, Chiara Valentini, Bart Verheij, Douglas Walton & Wojciech Załuski (eds.), Handbook of Legal Reasoning and Argumentation, Springer Verlag. pp. 35-46. 2011.The concept of reason is pervasive in our ordinary practices, but there is a large and divisive disagreement about their role in the foundation and explanation of morality. Such disagreement depends on three related issues, which concern the definition of “moral reasons,” their sources and functions. This chapter first takes into account material and formal definitions of moral reasons and clarifies the role of reasons in the explanation and justification of intentional action. Second, it addres…Read more
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Reasons in moral philosophyIn G. Bongiovanni, Don Postema, A. Rotolo, G. Sartor, C. Valentini & D. Walton (eds.), Handbook in Legal Reasoning and Argumentation, Springer. 2011.
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1Disclaiming responsibility, voicing disagreements, negotiating boundariesOxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility 7 (1): 283-305. 2021.This essay introduces the novel category of “disclaimers” – distinctive normative acts which challenge third-party attributions of responsibility in a community governed by norms of mutual accountability. While the debate focuses on evasive and wrongful refusals to take responsibility for one’s wrongs, this essay argues that disclaimers are fundamental modes of exercising normative powers, whose main functions are demanding recognition, responding to wrongs, voicing disagreement, exiting alienat…Read more
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71Ethical objectivity: The test of timeRatio 32 (4): 325-338. 2019.A constructivist defense of ethical objectivity in contrast to debunking arguments.
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Perché punire il colpevole? Un approccio filosofico alla responsabilità penaleIn Maria Zanichelli (ed.), Il diritto visto da fuori: scienziati, intellettuali, artisti si interrogano sul senso della giuridicità oggi, Zanichelli. pp. 19-28. 2020.A reflection on the justification of punishment.
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24Constrained by Reason, Transformed by Love: Murdoch on the Standard of ProofIn Gary Browning (ed.), Murdoch on Truth and Love, Springer Verlag. pp. 63-88. 2018.According to Iris Murdoch, the chief experience in morality is loving attention. Her view calls into question the Kantian account of the standard of moral authority, and ultimately denies that reason might provide moral discernment, validate moral experience, or drive us toward moral progress. Like Kant, Murdoch defines the moral experience as the subjective experience of freedom, which resists any reductivist approach. Unlike Kant, she thinks that this free agency is unprincipled. Some of her a…Read more
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32Normativity and emotional vulnerabilityPhilosophy and Social Criticism 46 (2): 141-151. 2020.Are the emotions relevant for the theory of value and normativity? Is there a set of morally correct arrangements of emotions? Current debates are often structured as though there were only two theoretical options to approach these questions, a sentimentalist theory of some sort, which emphasizes the role of emotions in forming ethical behaviour and practical thought, and intellectualist rationalism, which denies that emotions can help at all in generating normativity and contributing to moral v…Read more
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“Reflective Efficacy. On Neil Sinhababu Humean Nature"Rivista Italiana di Filosofia E Psicologia 1 (9): 67-72. 2018.This is a contribution to the symposium on Neil Sinhababu Humean Nature.
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1The practical significance of the categorical imperativeOxford Studies in Normative Ethics 11 (1): 177-198. 2021.On a standard interpretation, the aim of the formula of universal law is to provide a decision procedure for determining the deontic status of actions. By contrast, this chapter argues for the practical significance of the CI centering on Kant’s account of the dynamics of incentives. This approach avoids some widespread misconceptions about how the CI operates and false expectations about what it promises and delivers. In particular, it explains how it differs from deductive practical inferences…Read more
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Autonomy, Emotional Vulnerability and the Dynamics of PowerIn Sandrine Berges & Alberto L. Siani (eds.), Women Philosophers on Autonomy: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, Routledge. pp. 208-225. 2018.Traditionally, philosophers have focused on whether and how emotions threaten autonomy, insofar as they lie outside the sphere of rational agency. That is, they have conceptualized emotional vulnerability as passivity. Second, they have considered how emotions are insensitive to rational judgment, focusing on cases in which emotions are dissonant or recalcitrant. Third, in recognizing the motivational force of emotions, philosophers have tracked their negative impact on rational deliberation. In…Read more
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109Authority as a contingency planPhilosophical Explorations 22 (2): 130-145. 2019.Humean constructivists object to Kantian constructivism that by endorsing the constitutivist strategy, which grounds moral obligations in rational agency, this position discounts the impact of cont...
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Responsabilità, reciprocità e cooperazioneRivista di Filosofia 99 469-475. 2018.This article accounts for the relation among the concepts of mutual accountability, cooperation, and reciprocity.
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The spring of action: in butō improvisationIn Alessandro Bertinetto & Marcello Ruta (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Improvisation in the Arts, Routledge. 2021.This chapter discusses butō dance as an example of improvisation that challenges not only the extant philosophical definitions of improvisation, but also some fundamental presumptions about self-government and agency that are current in action theory. In the first part of the chapter, I identify the main features of butō improvisation, with regard to the nature of its basic movement, and the kind of subjectivity implicated in its generation. I then raise some questions regarding the philosophica…Read more
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60The Autonomy of MoralityPhilosophical Review 118 (4): 536-540. 2009.Critical review of Charles Larmore The Autonomy of Morality
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59IntroductionCroatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (3): 311-316. 2004.This volume collects articles in realism, anti-realism, and constructivism.
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276Respect and loving attentionCanadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (4): 483-516. 2003.On Kant's view, the feeling of respect is the mark of moral agency, and is peculiar to us, animals endowed with reason. Unlike any other feeling, respect originates in the contemplation of the moral law, that is, the idea of lawful activity. This idea works as a constraint on our deliberation by discounting the pretenses of our natural desires and demoting our selfish maxims. We experience its workings in the guise of respect. Respect shows that from the agent's subjective perspective, morality …Read more
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15The Appeal of Kantian Intuitionism (review)European Journal of Philosophy 17 (1): 152-158. 2009.A critical review of R. Audi
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50Deliberare, comparare, misurareRagion Pratica: Rivista semestrale 26 65-80. 2007.© Carla Bagnoli DELIBERARE, COMPARARE, MISURARE É opinione ampiamente condivisa che l’incommensurabilità e la commensurabilità sono ipotesi sulla natura del valore che pongono delle condizioni pesanti sulla deliberazione e sulla nostra capacità di compiere scelte ragionate. Pragmatisti e pluralisti si sono adoperati ad argomentare che la commensurabilità non è un requisito necessario alla scelta razionale. In questo articolo sosterrò che vi è un argomento ancora più radicale di quello pluralista…Read more
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19Review: David Archard, Monique Deveaux, Neil Manson, and Daniel Weinstock, eds., Reading Onora O’Neill (review)Ethics 125 (4): 1184-1189. 2015.
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90Phenomenology of the aftermath: Ethical theory and the intelligibility of moral experienceIn Sergio Tenenbaum (ed.), New Trends in Moral Psychology, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 185-212. 2007.
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52Claiming Responsibility for Action Under DuressEthical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (4): 851-868. 2018.This paper argues that to understand the varieties of wrongs done in coercion, we should examine the dynamic normative relation that the coercer establishes with the coerced. The case rests on a critical examination of coercion by threat, which is proved irreducible to psychological inducement by overwhelming motives, obstruction of agency by impaired consent or deprivation of genuine choice. In contrast to physical coercion, coercion by threat requires the coercee’s participation in deliberatio…Read more
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103The alleged paradox of moral perfectionIn Elvio Baccarini (ed.), Rationality in Belief and Action,, Rijeka. 2006.Some contemporary philosophers, notably B. Williams and S. Wolf, argue that moral perfection is not just an unsustainable ideal, but also an unreasonable one in that it thwarts and demotes all the various elements that contribute to personal well-being. More importantly, moral perfection seems to imply the denial of an identifiable personal self; hence the paradox of moral perfection. I argue that this alleged paradox arises because of a misunderstanding of the role of moral ideals, of their ove…Read more
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161Review of Christine M. Korsgaard, The Constitution of Agency: Essays on Practical Reason and Moral Psychology (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (6). 2009.
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32Respect and Loving AttentionCanadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (4): 483-515. 2003.On Kant's view, the feeling of respect is the mark of moral agency, and is peculiar to us, animals endowed with reason. Unlike any other feeling, respect originates in the contemplation of the moral law, that is, the idea of lawful activity. This idea works as a constraint on our deliberation by discounting the pretenses of our natural desires and demoting our selfish maxims. We experience its workings in the guise of respect. Respect shows that from the agent's subjective perspective, morality …Read more
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10Breaking Ties: The Significance of Choice in Symmetrical Moral DilemmasDialectica 60 (2): 157-170. 2006.In symmetrical moral dilemmas, the agent faces a choice between two incompatible actions, which are equally justified on the basis of the same value. These cases are generally discounted as spurious or irrelevant on the assumption that, when there is no failure of commensurability, choice between symmetrical requirements is indifferent and can be determined by randomization. Alternatively, this article argues that the appeal to randomization allows the agent to overcome a deliberative impasse, b…Read more
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348The Authority of ReflectionTheoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 22 (1): 43-52. 2007.This paper examines Moran’s argument for the special authority of the first-person, which revolves around the Self/Other asymmetry and grounds dichotomies such as the practical vs. theoretical, activity vs. passivity, and justificatory vs. explanatory reasons. These dichotomies qualify the self-reflective person as an agent, interested in justifying her actions from a deliberative stance. The Other is pictured as a spectator interested in explaining action from a theoretical stance. The self-ref…Read more
Carla Bagnoli
University of Modena and Reggio Emilia
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University of Modena and Reggio EmiliaProfessor
Areas of Specialization
Meta-Ethics |
Philosophy of Action |
Value Theory |
Normative Ethics |