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123Rawls on the Objectivity of Practical ReasonCroatian Journal of Philosophy 1 (3): 307-329. 2001.This article argues that Rawls’ history of ethics importantly contributes to the advancement of ethical theory, in that it correctly situates Kantian constructivism as an alternative to both sentimentalism and rational Intuitionism, and calls attention to the standards of objectivity in ethics. The author shows that by suggesting that both Intuitionist and Humean doctrines face the charge of heteronomy, Rawls appearsto adopt a Kantian conception of practical reason. Furthermore, Rawls follows Ka…Read more
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259Respect and Membership in the Moral CommunityEthical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (2). 2007.Some philosophers object that Kant's respect cannot express mutual recognition because it is an attitude owed to persons in virtue of an abstract notion of autonomy and invite us to integrate the vocabulary of respect with other persons-concepts or to replace it with a social conception of recognition. This paper argues for a dialogical interpretation of respect as the key-mode of recognition of membership in the moral community. This interpretation highlights the relational and practical nature…Read more
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10Breaking Ties: The Significance of Choice in Symmetrical Moral DilemmasDialectica 60 (2): 157-170. 2006.In symmetrical moral dilemmas, the agent faces a choice between two incompatible actions, which are equally justified on the basis of the same value. These cases are generally discounted as spurious or irrelevant on the assumption that, when there is no failure of commensurability, choice between symmetrical requirements is indifferent and can be determined by randomization. Alternatively, this article argues that the appeal to randomization allows the agent to overcome a deliberative impasse, b…Read more
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130The appeal of Kantian intuitionismEuropean Journal of Philosophy 17 (1): 152-158. 2009.No Abstract
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20Review of Charles Larmore The Autonomy of Morality (review)Philosophical Review 118 (4): 536-540. 2009.
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Compassion and Practical Reason: The Perspective of the VulnerableIn Carolyn Price & Justin Caouette (eds.), The Moral Psychology of Compassion, Springer. pp. 77-94. 2018.
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59Review of Virginia held, The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, Global (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (6). 2006.
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71Respect and Obligation: The Scope of Kant’s ConstructivismIn Stefano Bacin, Alfredo Ferrarin, Claudio La Rocca & Margit Ruffing (eds.), Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht. Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, De Gruyter. pp. 29-40. 2013.
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1“Practical Necessity: the Subjective Experience”In W. Huemer & B. Centi (eds.), Value and Ontology, Ontos-verlag. 2009.
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9La mente moral. Una invitación a la relectura de Iris MurdochDaimon: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 60 39-54. 2013.Este artículo sostiene que Iris Murdoch se opone al no-cognitivismo porque este no tiene en cuenta los fenómenos morales dinámicos que son clave en cualquier exploración filosófica de la vida moral adecuada, es decir, la experiencia subjetiva de la moralidad, la diferencia y el cambio. El argumento de Murdoch pone en cuestión la dicotomía hecho/valor y cognitivo/emotivo, y propone un modelo de la mente complejo, sensible al tiempo y dinámico que se centra en el cambioy la transición. En este mod…Read more
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60The Autonomy of MoralityPhilosophical Review 118 (4): 536-540. 2009.Critical review of Charles Larmore The Autonomy of Morality
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59IntroductionCroatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (3): 311-316. 2004.This volume collects articles in realism, anti-realism, and constructivism.
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272Respect and loving attentionCanadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (4): 483-516. 2003.On Kant's view, the feeling of respect is the mark of moral agency, and is peculiar to us, animals endowed with reason. Unlike any other feeling, respect originates in the contemplation of the moral law, that is, the idea of lawful activity. This idea works as a constraint on our deliberation by discounting the pretenses of our natural desires and demoting our selfish maxims. We experience its workings in the guise of respect. Respect shows that from the agent's subjective perspective, morality …Read more
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176In this book, I consider whether the hypothesis of moral dilemmas undermines ethics' pretensions to objectivity. I argue against the view that moral dilemmas challenge the very possibility of ethical theory, as a practical and theoretical enterprise. By examining Kantian, Intuitionist and Utilitarian arguments about moral dilemmas, I show that no ethical theory is capable of avoiding them. I further argue that an adequate ethical theory should admit dilemmas. Dilemmas do not reveal a logical or …Read more
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31La mente morale. Un invito alla rilettura di Iris MurdochIride: Filosofia e Discussione Pubblica 17 (1): 47-64. 2004.Iris Murdoch's conception of the moral mind, deliberation and agency.
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48Emotions and the Categorical Authority of Moral ReasonIn Morality and the Emotions, Oxford University Press. pp. 62. 2011.
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157Morality and the Emotions (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2011.What is their relation to practical rationality? Are they roots of our identity or threats to our autonomy? This volume is born out of the conviction that philosophy provides a distinctive approach to these problems.
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20I dilemmi morali e l'integritàIride: Filosofia e Discussione Pubblica 12 (2): 291-312. 1999.A constructivist account of moral dilemmas and integrity
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The Claims of Reason: Engstrom’s account of practical knowledgeIris. European Journal of Philosophy and Public Debate 3 197-203. 2011.
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5Moral Perception and Knowledge by PrinciplesIn Jill Hernandez (ed.), The New Intuitionism, Continuum. pp. 84-105. 2011.
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65La pretesa di oggettività in eticaIn Gabriele Usberti (ed.), Modelli di oggettività, Bompiani. 2000.Sembra esserci almeno un punto di accordo tra i filosofi morali: i giudizi etici, così come li usiamo nelle nostre conversazioni quotidiane, condividono una certa aspirazione all’oggettività. Vi è invece un disaccordo piuttosto acerbo rispetto alla questione se questa aspirazione sia giustificata o non sia invece una mera pretesa. Il disaccordo filosofico riguarda, cioè, la questione se i giudizi etici debbano e possano aspirare all’oggettività. Ma ancor più fondamentale è il disaccordo rispetto…Read more
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47A Philosophy to Live By: Engaging Iris Murdoch, by Maria AntonaccioMind 124 (495): 894-898. 2015.
Carla Bagnoli
University of Modena and Reggio Emilia
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University of Modena and Reggio EmiliaProfessor
Areas of Specialization
Meta-Ethics |
Philosophy of Action |
Value Theory |
Normative Ethics |