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Kant and Sidgwick on the objectivity and practical reasonIn Tyler Paytas & Tim Henning (eds.), Kantian and Sidgwickian Ethics: The Cosmos of Duty Above and the Moral Law Within, Routledge. 2020.This paper compares Kant’s and Sidgwick’s arguments in defense of objective practical knowledge. While Kant focuses on practical truths in terms of practical laws governing the mind in action, Sidgwick is concerned with practical truths about action. This is a crucial difference in the understanding of practical knowledge, which is matched by a different understanding of moral phenomenology and of the significance of subjective experience in accounting for the authority of moral obligations. Key…Read more
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16Love’s Luck-Knot. Emotional vulnerability and symmetrical accountabilityAngelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities 1 (25): 1-25. 2020.Spurred by Judith Butler’s seminal work, Pamela Anderson finds herself challenged to rethink her ontological assumptions, away from the traditional conceptions of the self. This essay is an attempt to face this challenge upfront, and come to terms with the kind of vulnerability that Anderson wants to vindicate. I start with distinguishing different contrastive but interlocking pairs of concepts of vulnerability: the ontological and the ethical, the pathogenic and the self-enhancing, the inherent…Read more
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1Kant on RecognitionHandbuch Anerkennung Springer Reference Geisteswissenschaften. 2020.This entry concerns Kant's conception of moral recognition, mutual recognition, and dignity.
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Constrained by reason, transformed by love: Murdoch on the standard of proofIn Gary Browning (ed.), Murdoch on Truth and Love, Springer Verlag. 2018.According to Iris Murdoch, the chief experience in morality is the recognition of others, and this is the experience of loving attention. Love is an independent source of moral authority, distinct from the authority of reason. It is independent because it can be attained through moral experiences that are not certified by reason and cannot be achieved by rational deliberation. This view of love calls into question a cluster of concepts, such as rational agency and principled action, which figure…Read more
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1Change in view: sensitivity to facts in prospective rationalityIn Giancarlo Marchetti, Hilary Putnam, Donald Davidson, Sharyn Clough & Ruth Anna Putnam (eds.), La contingenza dei fatti e l'oggettivita dei valori, Mimesis. pp. 137-158. 2013.Rational agents often make progress by revisiting their previous judgments about what to believe and what to do. In fact, practical reasoning in general may be thought to be a complex activity by which we bring what matters into view. On this construal of practical reasoning, the process of revision takes center stage, and it often includes (even though it is not limited to) rethinking and re-describing the facts of the matter. Sensitivity to facts is thus an important aspect of practical and th…Read more
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643On Stephen Engstrom, The Form of Practical KnowledgeIris. European Journal of Philosophy and Public Debate 3 (6): 191-203. 2011.
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1Compassion and Practical Reason: The Perspective of the VulnerableIn Carolyn Price & Justin Caouette (ed.), The Moral Psychology of Compassion. pp. 77-94. 2018.Contemporary moral philosophers and philosophers of the emotions widely agree that Kant’s discussion of compassion is an unfortunate byproduct of his rationalistic and legalistic account of ethics. In fact, Kant departs from the solid established rationalist tradition not only in distancing himself from dogmatic and perfectionist rationalism but also in claiming that there is a practical use of reason, which commits him to acknowledge that reason directly guides rational agents by furnishing the…Read more
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132Kantian Constructivism and the Moral ProblemPhilosophia 44 (4): 1229-1246. 2016.According to the standard objection, Kantian constructivism implicitly commits to value realism or fails to warrant objective validity of normative propositions. This paper argues that this objection gains some force from the special case of moral obligations. The case largely rests on the assumption that the moral domain is an eminent domain of special objects. But for constructivism there is no moral domain of objects prior to and independently of reasoning. The argument attempts to make some …Read more
Carla Bagnoli
University of Modena and Reggio Emilia
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University of Modena and Reggio EmiliaProfessor
Areas of Specialization
Meta-Ethics |
Philosophy of Action |
Value Theory |
Normative Ethics |