-
20Discussione su "Ruling Passions. A Theory of Practical Reasoning" di Simon BlackburnIride: Filosofia e Discussione Pubblica 13 (2): 411-432. 2000.
-
168Morality as practical knowledgeAnalytic Philosophy 53 (1): 61-70. 2012.In his original essay, The Form of Practical Knowledge, Stephen Engstrom argues for placing Kant’s ethics in the tradition of practical cognitivism. My remarks are intended to highlight the merits of his interpretation in contrast to intuitionism and constructivism, understood as ways of appropriating Kant’s legacy. In particular, I will focus on two issues: first, the special character of practical knowledge—as opposed to theoretical knowledge and craft expertise; and second, the apparent tensio…Read more
-
79Blackburn sulla questione normativa”Iride: Filosofia e Discussione Pubblica 30. 2000.Se è un difetto della ragione essere incapaci di adottare certi mezzi, allo stesso modo è un difetto della ragione essere incapaci di adottare certi fini, dicono i kantiani. Secondo Blackburn questa tesi non-strumentalista deve la sua apparente validità ad una fallacia modale. Dal condizionale «Se si adotta il fine X, è necessario adottare il mezzo Y», si deriva il conseguente «Si deve adottare il mezzo Y», ci si interroga sulla natura del modale che occorre nel conseguente, poi si ricostruisce …Read more
-
92Breaking ties: The significance of choice in symmetrical moral dilemmasDialectica 60 (2). 2006.In symmetrical moral dilemmas, the agent faces a choice between two incompatible actions, which are equally justified on the basis of the same value. These cases are generally discounted as spurious or irrelevant on the assumption that, when there is no failure of commensurability, choice between symmetrical requirements is indifferent and can be determined by randomization. Alternatively, this article argues that the appeal to randomization allows the agent to overcome a deliberative impasse, b…Read more
-
106Starting Points: Kantian Constructivism ReassessedRatio Juris 27 (3): 311-329. 2014.G. A. Cohen and J. Raz object that Constructivism is incoherent because it crucially deploys unconstructed elements in the structure of justification. This paper offers a response on behalf of constructivism, by reassessing the role of such unconstructed elements. First, it argues that a shared conception of rational agency works as a starting point for the justification, but it does not play a foundational role. Second, it accounts for the unconstructed norms that constrains the activity of con…Read more
-
176In this book, I consider whether the hypothesis of moral dilemmas undermines ethics' pretensions to objectivity. I argue against the view that moral dilemmas challenge the very possibility of ethical theory, as a practical and theoretical enterprise. By examining Kantian, Intuitionist and Utilitarian arguments about moral dilemmas, I show that no ethical theory is capable of avoiding them. I further argue that an adequate ethical theory should admit dilemmas. Dilemmas do not reveal a logical or …Read more
-
31La mente morale. Un invito alla rilettura di Iris MurdochIride: Filosofia e Discussione Pubblica 17 (1): 47-64. 2004.Iris Murdoch's conception of the moral mind, deliberation and agency.
-
48Emotions and the Categorical Authority of Moral ReasonIn Morality and the Emotions, Oxford University Press. pp. 62. 2011.
-
158Morality and the Emotions (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2011.What is their relation to practical rationality? Are they roots of our identity or threats to our autonomy? This volume is born out of the conviction that philosophy provides a distinctive approach to these problems.
-
20I dilemmi morali e l'integritàIride: Filosofia e Discussione Pubblica 12 (2): 291-312. 1999.A constructivist account of moral dilemmas and integrity
-
The Claims of Reason: Engstrom’s account of practical knowledgeIris. European Journal of Philosophy and Public Debate 3 197-203. 2011.
-
930Constructivism in metaethicsStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2011.Constructivism in ethics is the view that insofar as there are normative truths, for example, truths about what we ought to do, they are in some sense determined by an idealized process of rational deliberation, choice, or agreement. As a “first-order moral account”--an account of which moral principles are correct-- constructivism is the view that the moral principles we ought to accept or follow are the ones that agents would agree to or endorse were they to engage in a hypothetical or idealiz…Read more
-
172Moral Objectivity: A Kantian Illusion?Journal of Value Inquiry 49 (1-2): 31-45. 2015.Some moral claims strike us as objective. It is often argued that this shows morality to be objective. Moral experience – broadly construed – is invoked as the strongest argument for moral realism, the thesis that there are moral facts or properties.See e.g. Jonathan Dancy, “Two conceptions of Moral Realism,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 60 : 167–187. Realists, however, cannot appropriate the argument from moral experience. In fact, constructivists argue that to validate the ways we e…Read more
-
4Change in view: sensitivity to facts in prospective rationalityIn Giancarlo Marchetti, Hilary Putnam, Donald Davidson, Sharyn Clough & Ruth Anna Putnam (eds.), La contingenza dei fatti e l'oggettivita dei valori, Mimesis. pp. 137-158. 2013.In this chapter, I offer a constructivist account of practical reasoning as both generative and transformative in response to calls from philosophers as diverse as Iris Murdoch and Gilbert Harman, who have urged the development of a more nuanced picture of reasoning that incorporates revisionary and revelatory changes in viewpoint. Within this context, I describe sensitivity to facts as a form of emotional engagement that is also partially constitutive of facts. I consider both the epistemologic…Read more
-
1Defeaters and Practical KnowledgeSynthese, DOI: 10.1007/S11229-016-1095-Z 195 (7). 2018.This paper situates the problem of defeaters in a larger debate about the source of normative authority. It argues in favour of a constructivist account of defeasibility, which appeals to the justificatory role of moral principles. The argument builds upon the critique of two recent attempts to deal with defeasibility: first, a particularist account, which disposes of moral principles on the ground that reasons are holistic; and second, a proceduralist view, which addresses the problem of d…Read more
-
10Constructivism about Practical KnowledgeIn Constructivism in Ethics, Cambridge University Press. pp. 153-182. 2013.It is largely agreed that if constructivism contributes anything to meta-ethics it is by proposing that we understand ethical objectivity “in terms of a suitably constructed point of view that all can accept” (Rawls 1980/1999: 307). Constructivists defend this “practical” conception of objectivity in contrast to the realist or “ontological” conception of objectivity, understood as an accurate representation of an independent metaphysical order. Because of their objectivist but not realist commit…Read more
-
5Kant in Metaethics: The Paradox of Moral Autonomy, Solved by PublicityIn M. Altman (ed.), Kant Handbook, Palgrave. pp. 355-377. 2017.This chapter aims to situate Kant’s account of practical reason in metaethical debates. First, it explains the reasons why it is legitimate and instructive to discuss Kant’s relevance in contemporary metaethics, hence addressing some issues about the intended scope of metaethics and its relation to practical reason and psychology. Second, it defends an interpretation of Kant’s conception of autonomy, which avoids some paradoxes traditionally associated with self-legislation. Third, it shows that…Read more
-
77The Mafioso Case: Autonomy and Self-respectEthical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (5): 477-493. 2009.This article argues that immoralists do not fully enjoy autonomous agency because they are not capable of engaging in the proper form of practical reflection, which requires relating to others as having equal standing. An adequate diagnosis of the immoralist’s failure of agential authority requires a relational account of reflexivity and autonomy. This account has the distinctive merit of identifying the cost of disregarding moral obligations and of showing how immoralists may become susceptible…Read more
-
16The Form of Practical Knowledge, by Stephen Engstrom. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009, 260 pp. ISBN 978‐0‐674‐03287‐3 hb $49.95 (review)European Journal of Philosophy 20 (2): 340-345. 2012.Critical Review of 'The Form of Practical Knowledge', by Stephen Engstrom.
-
60Self-Deception and Agential Authority. Constitutivist AccountHumana Mente 5 (20): 93-116. 2012.This paper takes a constitutivist approach to self-deception, and argues that this phenomenon should be evaluated under several dimensions of rationality. The constitutivist approach has the merit of explaining the selective nature of self-deception as well as its being subject to moral sanction. Self-deception is a pragmatic strategy for maintaining the stability of the self, hence continuous with other rational activities of self-constitution. However, its success is limited, and it costs are …Read more
-
Sidgwick and Kant on Practical Knowledge and Rational ActionIn Tyler Paytas & Tim Henning (eds.), Kantian and Sidgwickian Ethics: The Cosmos of Duty Above and the Moral Law Within, Routledge. pp. 61-83. 2020.In this chapter, I compare and contrast Kant’s and Sidgwick’s arguments in defense of moral cognition as objective practical knowledge. Kant focuses on practical truths in terms of practical laws governing the mind in action, while Sidgwick is concerned with practical truths about action. I argue that this is a crucial difference in the understanding of practical knowledge, which is matched by a different understanding of moral phenomenology and of the significance of subjective experience in ac…Read more
-
2Equal Standing and Proper Reliance on OthersTheoria 86 (6): 821-425. 2020.According to a traditional account, moral cognition is an achievement gained over time by sharing a practice under the guidance and the example of the wise, in analogy with craft and apprenticeship. This model captures an important feature of practical reason, that is, its incompleteness, and highlights our dependence on others in obtaining moral knowledge, coherently with the socially extended mind agenda and recent findings in empirical psychology. Insofar as it accords to exemplars dec…Read more
-
5Vulnerability and the Incompleteness of Practical ReasonIn Christine Strahele (ed.), Vulnerability in Context, Routledge. pp. 13-32. 2016.In this chapter, I examine the concept of vulnerability as a complex constitutive feature of human agency and argue that it is both a constraint on and a resource for practical reasoning. When discussed as an ontological feature of human agency, vulnerability is primarily understood as an aspect of embodiment, which is problematic in different respects. First, in relation to the situatedness of human agency, vulnerability indicates that human agents are subjected to contextual contingencies. Sec…Read more
-
Desideri e necessità: sull’incompletezza della ragione praticaIn Matteo Galletti (ed.), La mente morale. Persone, ragioni, virtù, Edizioni Di Storia E Letteratura. pp. 83-99. 2014.This essay is a constructivist account of the role of desires in practical reasoning.
-
The Supervenience Dilemma Explained AwayIn Bartosz Brożek, Antonino Rotolo & Jerzy Stelmach (eds.), Supervenience and Normativity, Springer. 2017.
-
1Kant on RecognitionHandbuch Anerkennung Springer Reference Geisteswissenschaften. 2020.This entry concerns Kant's conception of moral recognition, mutual recognition, and dignity.
-
73Rooted in the Past, Hooked in the Present: Vulnerability to Contingency and Immunity to RegretPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3): 763-770. 2016.The perspective of deliberative choice is constitutively from here. This simple truth carries significant implications for our agency and integrity, some of which are the focus of Wallace's thought-provoking essay. Wallace is concerned with the discrepancy between our present attachments and the rational justification of past decisions, which threatens our personal and moral integrity. In what follows, I raise some questions about Wallace's claim that attachments make us immune to regret and, ul…Read more
Carla Bagnoli
University of Modena and Reggio Emilia
-
University of Modena and Reggio EmiliaProfessor
Areas of Specialization
Meta-Ethics |
Philosophy of Action |
Value Theory |
Normative Ethics |