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Phenomenology of the Aftermath: Ethical Theory and the Intelligibility of Moral ExperiencePoznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 94 185-212. 2007.
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Compassion and Practical Reason: The Perspective of the VulnerableIn Carolyn Price & Justin Caouette (eds.), The Moral Psychology of Compassion, Springer. pp. 77-94. 2018.
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125Rawls on the Objectivity of Practical ReasonCroatian Journal of Philosophy 1 (3): 307-329. 2001.This article argues that Rawls’ history of ethics importantly contributes to the advancement of ethical theory, in that it correctly situates Kantian constructivism as an alternative to both sentimentalism and rational Intuitionism, and calls attention to the standards of objectivity in ethics. The author shows that by suggesting that both Intuitionist and Humean doctrines face the charge of heteronomy, Rawls appearsto adopt a Kantian conception of practical reason. Furthermore, Rawls follows Ka…Read more
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266Respect and Membership in the Moral CommunityEthical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (2). 2007.Some philosophers object that Kant's respect cannot express mutual recognition because it is an attitude owed to persons in virtue of an abstract notion of autonomy and invite us to integrate the vocabulary of respect with other persons-concepts or to replace it with a social conception of recognition. This paper argues for a dialogical interpretation of respect as the key-mode of recognition of membership in the moral community. This interpretation highlights the relational and practical nature…Read more
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9La mente moral. Una invitación a la relectura de Iris MurdochDaimon: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 60 39-54. 2013.Este artículo sostiene que Iris Murdoch se opone al no-cognitivismo porque este no tiene en cuenta los fenómenos morales dinámicos que son clave en cualquier exploración filosófica de la vida moral adecuada, es decir, la experiencia subjetiva de la moralidad, la diferencia y el cambio. El argumento de Murdoch pone en cuestión la dicotomía hecho/valor y cognitivo/emotivo, y propone un modelo de la mente complejo, sensible al tiempo y dinámico que se centra en el cambioy la transición. En este mod…Read more
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130The appeal of Kantian intuitionismEuropean Journal of Philosophy 17 (1): 152-158. 2009.No Abstract
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21Review of Charles Larmore The Autonomy of Morality (review)Philosophical Review 118 (4): 536-540. 2009.
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2Constrained by reason, transformed by love: Murdoch on the standard of proofIn Gary Browning (ed.), Murdoch on Truth and Love, Springer Verlag. 2018.According to Iris Murdoch, the chief experience in morality is loving attention. Her view calls into question the Kantian account of the standard of moral authority, and ultimately denies that reason might provide moral discernment, validate moral experience or drive us toward moral progress. Like Kant, Murdoch defines the moral experience as the subjective experience of freedom, which resists any reductivist approach. Unlike Kant, she thinks that this free agency is unprincipled. Some of her ar…Read more
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260Value in the guise of regretPhilosophical Explorations 3 (2). 2000.According to a widely accepted philosophical model, agent-regret is practically significant and appropriate when the agent committed a mistake, or she faced a conflict of obligations. I argue that this account misunderstands moral phenomenology because it does not adequately characterize the object of agent-regret. I suggest that the object of agent-regret should be defined in terms of valuable unchosen alternatives supported by reasons. This model captures the phenomenological varieties of regr…Read more
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62Review of Virginia held, The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, Global (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (6). 2006.
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72Respect and Obligation: The Scope of Kant’s ConstructivismIn Stefano Bacin, Alfredo Ferrarin, Claudio La Rocca & Margit Ruffing (eds.), Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht. Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, De Gruyter. pp. 29-40. 2013.
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1“Practical Necessity: the Subjective Experience”In W. Huemer & B. Centi (eds.), Value and Ontology, Ontos-verlag. 2009.
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24Reflective EfficacyRivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 9 (1): 67-72. 2018.: The purpose of this paper is to highlight some difficulties of Neil Sinhababu’s Humean theory of agency, which depend on his radically reductivist approach, rather than to his Humean sympathies. The argument is that Sinhababu’s theory builds upon a critique of reflective agency which is based on equivocation and misunderstandings of the Kantian approach. Ultimately, the objection is that his reductivist view is unequipped to address the rclassical problems of rational deliberation and agential…Read more
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79Blackburn sulla questione normativa”Iride: Filosofia e Discussione Pubblica 30. 2000.Se è un difetto della ragione essere incapaci di adottare certi mezzi, allo stesso modo è un difetto della ragione essere incapaci di adottare certi fini, dicono i kantiani. Secondo Blackburn questa tesi non-strumentalista deve la sua apparente validità ad una fallacia modale. Dal condizionale «Se si adotta il fine X, è necessario adottare il mezzo Y», si deriva il conseguente «Si deve adottare il mezzo Y», ci si interroga sulla natura del modale che occorre nel conseguente, poi si ricostruisce …Read more
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92Breaking ties: The significance of choice in symmetrical moral dilemmasDialectica 60 (2). 2006.In symmetrical moral dilemmas, the agent faces a choice between two incompatible actions, which are equally justified on the basis of the same value. These cases are generally discounted as spurious or irrelevant on the assumption that, when there is no failure of commensurability, choice between symmetrical requirements is indifferent and can be determined by randomization. Alternatively, this article argues that the appeal to randomization allows the agent to overcome a deliberative impasse, b…Read more
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106Starting Points: Kantian Constructivism ReassessedRatio Juris 27 (3): 311-329. 2014.G. A. Cohen and J. Raz object that Constructivism is incoherent because it crucially deploys unconstructed elements in the structure of justification. This paper offers a response on behalf of constructivism, by reassessing the role of such unconstructed elements. First, it argues that a shared conception of rational agency works as a starting point for the justification, but it does not play a foundational role. Second, it accounts for the unconstructed norms that constrains the activity of con…Read more
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176In this book, I consider whether the hypothesis of moral dilemmas undermines ethics' pretensions to objectivity. I argue against the view that moral dilemmas challenge the very possibility of ethical theory, as a practical and theoretical enterprise. By examining Kantian, Intuitionist and Utilitarian arguments about moral dilemmas, I show that no ethical theory is capable of avoiding them. I further argue that an adequate ethical theory should admit dilemmas. Dilemmas do not reveal a logical or …Read more
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31La mente morale. Un invito alla rilettura di Iris MurdochIride: Filosofia e Discussione Pubblica 17 (1): 47-64. 2004.Iris Murdoch's conception of the moral mind, deliberation and agency.
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48Emotions and the Categorical Authority of Moral ReasonIn Morality and the Emotions, Oxford University Press. pp. 62. 2011.
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158Morality and the Emotions (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2011.What is their relation to practical rationality? Are they roots of our identity or threats to our autonomy? This volume is born out of the conviction that philosophy provides a distinctive approach to these problems.
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20I dilemmi morali e l'integritàIride: Filosofia e Discussione Pubblica 12 (2): 291-312. 1999.A constructivist account of moral dilemmas and integrity
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The Claims of Reason: Engstrom’s account of practical knowledgeIris. European Journal of Philosophy and Public Debate 3 197-203. 2011.
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5Moral Perception and Knowledge by PrinciplesIn Jill Graper Hernandez (ed.), The New Intuitionism, Continuum. pp. 84-105. 2012.
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65La pretesa di oggettività in eticaIn Gabriele Usberti (ed.), Modelli di oggettività, Bompiani. 2000.Sembra esserci almeno un punto di accordo tra i filosofi morali: i giudizi etici, così come li usiamo nelle nostre conversazioni quotidiane, condividono una certa aspirazione all’oggettività. Vi è invece un disaccordo piuttosto acerbo rispetto alla questione se questa aspirazione sia giustificata o non sia invece una mera pretesa. Il disaccordo filosofico riguarda, cioè, la questione se i giudizi etici debbano e possano aspirare all’oggettività. Ma ancor più fondamentale è il disaccordo rispetto…Read more
Carla Bagnoli
University of Modena and Reggio Emilia
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University of Modena and Reggio EmiliaProfessor
Areas of Specialization
Meta-Ethics |
Philosophy of Action |
Value Theory |
Normative Ethics |