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9La mente moral. Una invitación a la relectura de Iris MurdochDaimon: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 60 39-54. 2013.Este artículo sostiene que Iris Murdoch se opone al no-cognitivismo porque este no tiene en cuenta los fenómenos morales dinámicos que son clave en cualquier exploración filosófica de la vida moral adecuada, es decir, la experiencia subjetiva de la moralidad, la diferencia y el cambio. El argumento de Murdoch pone en cuestión la dicotomía hecho/valor y cognitivo/emotivo, y propone un modelo de la mente complejo, sensible al tiempo y dinámico que se centra en el cambioy la transición. En este mod…Read more
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60The Autonomy of MoralityPhilosophical Review 118 (4): 536-540. 2009.Critical review of Charles Larmore The Autonomy of Morality
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59IntroductionCroatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (3): 311-316. 2004.This volume collects articles in realism, anti-realism, and constructivism.
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274Respect and loving attentionCanadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (4): 483-516. 2003.On Kant's view, the feeling of respect is the mark of moral agency, and is peculiar to us, animals endowed with reason. Unlike any other feeling, respect originates in the contemplation of the moral law, that is, the idea of lawful activity. This idea works as a constraint on our deliberation by discounting the pretenses of our natural desires and demoting our selfish maxims. We experience its workings in the guise of respect. Respect shows that from the agent's subjective perspective, morality …Read more
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2Constrained by reason, transformed by love: Murdoch on the standard of proofIn Gary Browning (ed.), Murdoch on Truth and Love, Springer Verlag. 2018.According to Iris Murdoch, the chief experience in morality is loving attention. Her view calls into question the Kantian account of the standard of moral authority, and ultimately denies that reason might provide moral discernment, validate moral experience or drive us toward moral progress. Like Kant, Murdoch defines the moral experience as the subjective experience of freedom, which resists any reductivist approach. Unlike Kant, she thinks that this free agency is unprincipled. Some of her ar…Read more
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259Value in the guise of regretPhilosophical Explorations 3 (2). 2000.According to a widely accepted philosophical model, agent-regret is practically significant and appropriate when the agent committed a mistake, or she faced a conflict of obligations. I argue that this account misunderstands moral phenomenology because it does not adequately characterize the object of agent-regret. I suggest that the object of agent-regret should be defined in terms of valuable unchosen alternatives supported by reasons. This model captures the phenomenological varieties of regr…Read more
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50Deliberare, comparare, misurareRagion Pratica: Rivista semestrale 26 65-80. 2007.© Carla Bagnoli DELIBERARE, COMPARARE, MISURARE É opinione ampiamente condivisa che l’incommensurabilità e la commensurabilità sono ipotesi sulla natura del valore che pongono delle condizioni pesanti sulla deliberazione e sulla nostra capacità di compiere scelte ragionate. Pragmatisti e pluralisti si sono adoperati ad argomentare che la commensurabilità non è un requisito necessario alla scelta razionale. In questo articolo sosterrò che vi è un argomento ancora più radicale di quello pluralista…Read more
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41Review: David Archard, Monique Deveaux, Neil Manson, and Daniel Weinstock, eds., Reading Onora O’Neill (review)Ethics 125 (4): 1184-1189. 2015.
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90Phenomenology of the aftermath: Ethical theory and the intelligibility of moral experienceIn Sergio Tenenbaum (ed.), Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 185-212. 2007.
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24Reflective EfficacyRivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 9 (1): 67-72. 2018.: The purpose of this paper is to highlight some difficulties of Neil Sinhababu’s Humean theory of agency, which depend on his radically reductivist approach, rather than to his Humean sympathies. The argument is that Sinhababu’s theory builds upon a critique of reflective agency which is based on equivocation and misunderstandings of the Kantian approach. Ultimately, the objection is that his reductivist view is unequipped to address the rclassical problems of rational deliberation and agential…Read more
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103The alleged paradox of moral perfectionIn Elvio Baccarini (ed.), Rationality in Belief and Action,, Rijeka. 2006.Some contemporary philosophers, notably B. Williams and S. Wolf, argue that moral perfection is not just an unsustainable ideal, but also an unreasonable one in that it thwarts and demotes all the various elements that contribute to personal well-being. More importantly, moral perfection seems to imply the denial of an identifiable personal self; hence the paradox of moral perfection. I argue that this alleged paradox arises because of a misunderstanding of the role of moral ideals, of their ove…Read more
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161Review of Christine M. Korsgaard, The Constitution of Agency: Essays on Practical Reason and Moral Psychology (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (6). 2009.
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32Respect and Loving AttentionCanadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (4): 483-515. 2003.On Kant's view, the feeling of respect is the mark of moral agency, and is peculiar to us, animals endowed with reason. Unlike any other feeling, respect originates in the contemplation of the moral law, that is, the idea of lawful activity. This idea works as a constraint on our deliberation by discounting the pretenses of our natural desires and demoting our selfish maxims. We experience its workings in the guise of respect. Respect shows that from the agent's subjective perspective, morality …Read more
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15The Appeal of Kantian Intuitionism (review)European Journal of Philosophy 17 (1): 152-158. 2009.A critical review of R. Audi
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354The Authority of ReflectionTheoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 22 (1): 43-52. 2007.This paper examines Moran’s argument for the special authority of the first-person, which revolves around the Self/Other asymmetry and grounds dichotomies such as the practical vs. theoretical, activity vs. passivity, and justificatory vs. explanatory reasons. These dichotomies qualify the self-reflective person as an agent, interested in justifying her actions from a deliberative stance. The Other is pictured as a spectator interested in explaining action from a theoretical stance. The self-ref…Read more
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92Counting without Numbers: A Non‐aggregative Account of the Puzzle of AltruismJournal of Social Philosophy 44 (2): 124-126. 2013.
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58Morality as Compromise vs. Morality as a ConstraintInternational Journal of Applied Philosophy 28 (1): 159-169. 2014.
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75IntroductionTopoi 21 (1-2): 1-10. 2002.The articles of this volume address only some aspects of Nozick's philosophy: his conception of argument, knowledge, rationality, and identity. In examining Nozick's approach to these topics, one has to take issue, ultimately, with his peculiar conception of philosophy whose manifesto appears at the outset of Philosophical Explanations and is echoed in the introduction to philosophical method of Invariances . To transform philosophy into a science or build an impeccable deductive system was not …Read more
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31Reasoning: A Social Picture, written by Anthony Simon LadenJournal of Moral Philosophy 13 (5): 603-606. 2016.
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“Reason and Ethics”In Maria Cristina Amoretti & Nicla Vassallo (eds.), Reason and Rationality, Ontos Verlag. 2012.
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36L'autorità Della MoraleFeltrinelli. 2007.Capitolo I Il rispetto e l'ideale morale 1.1. Angeli, bruti e agenti 1.2. Il rispetto dell'altro 1.3. Il rispetto di sé 1.4. Auto−riflessione e auto−legislazione 1.5. Autonomia e individualità 1.6. Il rispetto e l'attenzione 1.7. Il rispetto e l'amore.
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19Discussione su "Ruling Passions. A Theory of Practical Reasoning" di Simon BlackburnIride: Filosofia e Discussione Pubblica 13 (2): 411-432. 2000.
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168Morality as practical knowledgeAnalytic Philosophy 53 (1): 61-70. 2012.In his original essay, The Form of Practical Knowledge, Stephen Engstrom argues for placing Kant’s ethics in the tradition of practical cognitivism. My remarks are intended to highlight the merits of his interpretation in contrast to intuitionism and constructivism, understood as ways of appropriating Kant’s legacy. In particular, I will focus on two issues: first, the special character of practical knowledge—as opposed to theoretical knowledge and craft expertise; and second, the apparent tensio…Read more
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79Blackburn sulla questione normativa”Iride: Filosofia e Discussione Pubblica 30. 2000.Se è un difetto della ragione essere incapaci di adottare certi mezzi, allo stesso modo è un difetto della ragione essere incapaci di adottare certi fini, dicono i kantiani. Secondo Blackburn questa tesi non-strumentalista deve la sua apparente validità ad una fallacia modale. Dal condizionale «Se si adotta il fine X, è necessario adottare il mezzo Y», si deriva il conseguente «Si deve adottare il mezzo Y», ci si interroga sulla natura del modale che occorre nel conseguente, poi si ricostruisce …Read more
Carla Bagnoli
University of Modena and Reggio Emilia
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University of Modena and Reggio EmiliaProfessor
Areas of Specialization
Meta-Ethics |
Philosophy of Action |
Value Theory |
Normative Ethics |