-
1920Constructivism in Ethics (edited book)Cambridge University Press. 2013.Are there such things as moral truths? How do we know what we should do? And does it matter? Constructivism states that moral truths are neither invented nor discovered, but rather are constructed by rational agents in order to solve practical problems. While constructivism has become the focus of many philosophical debates in normative ethics, meta-ethics and action theory, its importance is still to be fully appreciated. These new essays written by leading scholars define and assess this new a…Read more
-
51
-
Structural Modes of Recognition and Virtual Forms of Empowerment: Towards a New Antimafia CultureIn R. Pickering-Iazzi (ed.), The Italian Antimafia, New Media, and the Culture of Legality. pp. 39-61. 2017.As rational agents, we are engaged in practices of mutual accountability. We produce reasons that explain and justify what we do. In producing reasons, we address demands of explanation and justification. Where do such demands come from? This is one of the central questions of this chapter. My contention is that in the attempt to make sense of and justify their actions, rational subjects construct reasons in an ideal dialogue with others. In the practice of exchanging reasons, rational subjects …Read more
-
3Reasons in Moral PhilosophyIn Colin Aitken, Amalia Amaya, Kevin D. Ashley, Carla Bagnoli, Giorgio Bongiovanni, Bartosz Brożek, Cristiano Castelfranchi, Samuele Chilovi, Marcello Di Bello, Jaap Hage, Kenneth Einar Himma, Lewis A. Kornhauser, Emiliano Lorini, Fabrizio Macagno, Andrei Marmor, J. J. Moreso, Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco, Antonino Rotolo, Giovanni Sartor, Burkhard Schafer, Chiara Valentini, Bart Verheij, Douglas Walton & Wojciech Załuski (eds.), Handbook of Legal Reasoning and Argumentation, Springer Verlag. pp. 35-46. 2011.The concept of reason is pervasive in our ordinary practices, but there is a large and divisive disagreement about their role in the foundation and explanation of morality. Such disagreement depends on three related issues, which concern the definition of “moral reasons,” their sources and functions. This chapter first takes into account material and formal definitions of moral reasons and clarifies the role of reasons in the explanation and justification of intentional action. Second, it addres…Read more
-
Reasons in moral philosophyIn G. Bongiovanni, Don Postema, A. Rotolo, G. Sartor, C. Valentini & D. Walton (eds.), Handbook in Legal Reasoning and Argumentation, Springer. 2011.
-
1Disclaiming responsibility, voicing disagreements, negotiating boundariesOxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility 7 (1): 283-305. 2021.This essay introduces the novel category of “disclaimers” – distinctive normative acts which challenge third-party attributions of responsibility in a community governed by norms of mutual accountability. While the debate focuses on evasive and wrongful refusals to take responsibility for one’s wrongs, this essay argues that disclaimers are fundamental modes of exercising normative powers, whose main functions are demanding recognition, responding to wrongs, voicing disagreement, exiting alienat…Read more
-
71Ethical objectivity: The test of timeRatio 32 (4): 325-338. 2019.A constructivist defense of ethical objectivity in contrast to debunking arguments.
-
Perché punire il colpevole? Un approccio filosofico alla responsabilità penaleIn Maria Zanichelli (ed.), Il diritto visto da fuori: scienziati, intellettuali, artisti si interrogano sul senso della giuridicità oggi, Zanichelli. pp. 19-28. 2020.A reflection on the justification of punishment.
-
24Constrained by Reason, Transformed by Love: Murdoch on the Standard of ProofIn Gary Browning (ed.), Murdoch on Truth and Love, Springer Verlag. pp. 63-88. 2018.According to Iris Murdoch, the chief experience in morality is loving attention. Her view calls into question the Kantian account of the standard of moral authority, and ultimately denies that reason might provide moral discernment, validate moral experience, or drive us toward moral progress. Like Kant, Murdoch defines the moral experience as the subjective experience of freedom, which resists any reductivist approach. Unlike Kant, she thinks that this free agency is unprincipled. Some of her a…Read more
-
32Normativity and emotional vulnerabilityPhilosophy and Social Criticism 46 (2): 141-151. 2020.Are the emotions relevant for the theory of value and normativity? Is there a set of morally correct arrangements of emotions? Current debates are often structured as though there were only two theoretical options to approach these questions, a sentimentalist theory of some sort, which emphasizes the role of emotions in forming ethical behaviour and practical thought, and intellectualist rationalism, which denies that emotions can help at all in generating normativity and contributing to moral v…Read more
-
“Reflective Efficacy. On Neil Sinhababu Humean Nature"Rivista Italiana di Filosofia E Psicologia 1 (9): 67-72. 2018.This is a contribution to the symposium on Neil Sinhababu Humean Nature.
-
1The practical significance of the categorical imperativeOxford Studies in Normative Ethics 11 (1): 177-198. 2021.On a standard interpretation, the aim of the formula of universal law is to provide a decision procedure for determining the deontic status of actions. By contrast, this chapter argues for the practical significance of the CI centering on Kant’s account of the dynamics of incentives. This approach avoids some widespread misconceptions about how the CI operates and false expectations about what it promises and delivers. In particular, it explains how it differs from deductive practical inferences…Read more
-
62Review of Virginia held, The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, Global (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (6). 2006.
-
72Respect and Obligation: The Scope of Kant’s ConstructivismIn Stefano Bacin, Alfredo Ferrarin, Claudio La Rocca & Margit Ruffing (eds.), Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht. Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, De Gruyter. pp. 29-40. 2013.
-
1“Practical Necessity: the Subjective Experience”In W. Huemer & B. Centi (eds.), Value and Ontology, Ontos-verlag. 2009.
-
24Reflective EfficacyRivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 9 (1): 67-72. 2018.: The purpose of this paper is to highlight some difficulties of Neil Sinhababu’s Humean theory of agency, which depend on his radically reductivist approach, rather than to his Humean sympathies. The argument is that Sinhababu’s theory builds upon a critique of reflective agency which is based on equivocation and misunderstandings of the Kantian approach. Ultimately, the objection is that his reductivist view is unequipped to address the rclassical problems of rational deliberation and agential…Read more
-
60The Autonomy of MoralityPhilosophical Review 118 (4): 536-540. 2009.Critical review of Charles Larmore The Autonomy of Morality
-
59IntroductionCroatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (3): 311-316. 2004.This volume collects articles in realism, anti-realism, and constructivism.
-
275Respect and loving attentionCanadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (4): 483-516. 2003.On Kant's view, the feeling of respect is the mark of moral agency, and is peculiar to us, animals endowed with reason. Unlike any other feeling, respect originates in the contemplation of the moral law, that is, the idea of lawful activity. This idea works as a constraint on our deliberation by discounting the pretenses of our natural desires and demoting our selfish maxims. We experience its workings in the guise of respect. Respect shows that from the agent's subjective perspective, morality …Read more
-
15The Appeal of Kantian Intuitionism (review)European Journal of Philosophy 17 (1): 152-158. 2009.A critical review of R. Audi
-
50Deliberare, comparare, misurareRagion Pratica: Rivista semestrale 26 65-80. 2007.© Carla Bagnoli DELIBERARE, COMPARARE, MISURARE É opinione ampiamente condivisa che l’incommensurabilità e la commensurabilità sono ipotesi sulla natura del valore che pongono delle condizioni pesanti sulla deliberazione e sulla nostra capacità di compiere scelte ragionate. Pragmatisti e pluralisti si sono adoperati ad argomentare che la commensurabilità non è un requisito necessario alla scelta razionale. In questo articolo sosterrò che vi è un argomento ancora più radicale di quello pluralista…Read more
-
19Review: David Archard, Monique Deveaux, Neil Manson, and Daniel Weinstock, eds., Reading Onora O’Neill (review)Ethics 125 (4): 1184-1189. 2015.
-
90Phenomenology of the aftermath: Ethical theory and the intelligibility of moral experienceIn Sergio Tenenbaum (ed.), New Trends in Moral Psychology, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 185-212. 2007.
-
52Claiming Responsibility for Action Under DuressEthical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (4): 851-868. 2018.This paper argues that to understand the varieties of wrongs done in coercion, we should examine the dynamic normative relation that the coercer establishes with the coerced. The case rests on a critical examination of coercion by threat, which is proved irreducible to psychological inducement by overwhelming motives, obstruction of agency by impaired consent or deprivation of genuine choice. In contrast to physical coercion, coercion by threat requires the coercee’s participation in deliberatio…Read more
-
103The alleged paradox of moral perfectionIn Elvio Baccarini (ed.), Rationality in Belief and Action,, Rijeka. 2006.Some contemporary philosophers, notably B. Williams and S. Wolf, argue that moral perfection is not just an unsustainable ideal, but also an unreasonable one in that it thwarts and demotes all the various elements that contribute to personal well-being. More importantly, moral perfection seems to imply the denial of an identifiable personal self; hence the paradox of moral perfection. I argue that this alleged paradox arises because of a misunderstanding of the role of moral ideals, of their ove…Read more
-
161Review of Christine M. Korsgaard, The Constitution of Agency: Essays on Practical Reason and Moral Psychology (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (6). 2009.
Carla Bagnoli
University of Modena and Reggio Emilia
-
University of Modena and Reggio EmiliaProfessor
Areas of Specialization
Meta-Ethics |
Philosophy of Action |
Value Theory |
Normative Ethics |