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9La mente moral. Una invitación a la relectura de Iris MurdochDaimon: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 60 39-54. 2013.Este artículo sostiene que Iris Murdoch se opone al no-cognitivismo porque este no tiene en cuenta los fenómenos morales dinámicos que son clave en cualquier exploración filosófica de la vida moral adecuada, es decir, la experiencia subjetiva de la moralidad, la diferencia y el cambio. El argumento de Murdoch pone en cuestión la dicotomía hecho/valor y cognitivo/emotivo, y propone un modelo de la mente complejo, sensible al tiempo y dinámico que se centra en el cambioy la transición. En este mod…Read more
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130The appeal of Kantian intuitionismEuropean Journal of Philosophy 17 (1): 152-158. 2009.No Abstract
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22Review of Charles Larmore The Autonomy of Morality (review)Philosophical Review 118 (4): 536-540. 2009.
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2Constrained by reason, transformed by love: Murdoch on the standard of proofIn Gary Browning (ed.), Murdoch on Truth and Love, Springer Verlag. 2018.According to Iris Murdoch, the chief experience in morality is loving attention. Her view calls into question the Kantian account of the standard of moral authority, and ultimately denies that reason might provide moral discernment, validate moral experience or drive us toward moral progress. Like Kant, Murdoch defines the moral experience as the subjective experience of freedom, which resists any reductivist approach. Unlike Kant, she thinks that this free agency is unprincipled. Some of her ar…Read more
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260Value in the guise of regretPhilosophical Explorations 3 (2). 2000.According to a widely accepted philosophical model, agent-regret is practically significant and appropriate when the agent committed a mistake, or she faced a conflict of obligations. I argue that this account misunderstands moral phenomenology because it does not adequately characterize the object of agent-regret. I suggest that the object of agent-regret should be defined in terms of valuable unchosen alternatives supported by reasons. This model captures the phenomenological varieties of regr…Read more
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62Review of Virginia held, The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, Global (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (6). 2006.
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72Respect and Obligation: The Scope of Kant’s ConstructivismIn Stefano Bacin, Alfredo Ferrarin, Claudio La Rocca & Margit Ruffing (eds.), Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht. Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, De Gruyter. pp. 29-40. 2013.
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1“Practical Necessity: the Subjective Experience”In W. Huemer & B. Centi (eds.), Value and Ontology, Ontos-verlag. 2009.
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24Reflective EfficacyRivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 9 (1): 67-72. 2018.: The purpose of this paper is to highlight some difficulties of Neil Sinhababu’s Humean theory of agency, which depend on his radically reductivist approach, rather than to his Humean sympathies. The argument is that Sinhababu’s theory builds upon a critique of reflective agency which is based on equivocation and misunderstandings of the Kantian approach. Ultimately, the objection is that his reductivist view is unequipped to address the rclassical problems of rational deliberation and agential…Read more
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60The Autonomy of MoralityPhilosophical Review 118 (4): 536-540. 2009.Critical review of Charles Larmore The Autonomy of Morality
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59IntroductionCroatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (3): 311-316. 2004.This volume collects articles in realism, anti-realism, and constructivism.
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277Respect and loving attentionCanadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (4): 483-516. 2003.On Kant's view, the feeling of respect is the mark of moral agency, and is peculiar to us, animals endowed with reason. Unlike any other feeling, respect originates in the contemplation of the moral law, that is, the idea of lawful activity. This idea works as a constraint on our deliberation by discounting the pretenses of our natural desires and demoting our selfish maxims. We experience its workings in the guise of respect. Respect shows that from the agent's subjective perspective, morality …Read more
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15The Appeal of Kantian Intuitionism (review)European Journal of Philosophy 17 (1): 152-158. 2009.A critical review of R. Audi
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50Deliberare, comparare, misurareRagion Pratica: Rivista semestrale 26 65-80. 2007.© Carla Bagnoli DELIBERARE, COMPARARE, MISURARE É opinione ampiamente condivisa che l’incommensurabilità e la commensurabilità sono ipotesi sulla natura del valore che pongono delle condizioni pesanti sulla deliberazione e sulla nostra capacità di compiere scelte ragionate. Pragmatisti e pluralisti si sono adoperati ad argomentare che la commensurabilità non è un requisito necessario alla scelta razionale. In questo articolo sosterrò che vi è un argomento ancora più radicale di quello pluralista…Read more
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19Review: David Archard, Monique Deveaux, Neil Manson, and Daniel Weinstock, eds., Reading Onora O’Neill (review)Ethics 125 (4): 1184-1189. 2015.
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90Phenomenology of the aftermath: Ethical theory and the intelligibility of moral experienceIn Sergio Tenenbaum (ed.), New Trends in Moral Psychology, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 185-212. 2007.
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158Morality and the Emotions (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2011.What is their relation to practical rationality? Are they roots of our identity or threats to our autonomy? This volume is born out of the conviction that philosophy provides a distinctive approach to these problems.
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20I dilemmi morali e l'integritàIride: Filosofia e Discussione Pubblica 12 (2): 291-312. 1999.A constructivist account of moral dilemmas and integrity
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The Claims of Reason: Engstrom’s account of practical knowledgeIris. European Journal of Philosophy and Public Debate 3 197-203. 2011.
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5Moral Perception and Knowledge by PrinciplesIn Jill Graper Hernandez (ed.), The New Intuitionism, Continuum. pp. 84-105. 2012.
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65La pretesa di oggettività in eticaIn Gabriele Usberti (ed.), Modelli di oggettività, Bompiani. 2000.Sembra esserci almeno un punto di accordo tra i filosofi morali: i giudizi etici, così come li usiamo nelle nostre conversazioni quotidiane, condividono una certa aspirazione all’oggettività. Vi è invece un disaccordo piuttosto acerbo rispetto alla questione se questa aspirazione sia giustificata o non sia invece una mera pretesa. Il disaccordo filosofico riguarda, cioè, la questione se i giudizi etici debbano e possano aspirare all’oggettività. Ma ancor più fondamentale è il disaccordo rispetto…Read more
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48A Philosophy to Live By: Engaging Iris Murdoch, by Maria AntonaccioMind 124 (495): 894-898. 2015.
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93Counting without Numbers: A Non‐aggregative Account of the Puzzle of AltruismJournal of Social Philosophy 44 (2): 124-126. 2013.
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58Morality as Compromise vs. Morality as a ConstraintInternational Journal of Applied Philosophy 28 (1): 159-169. 2014.
Carla Bagnoli
University of Modena and Reggio Emilia
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University of Modena and Reggio EmiliaProfessor
Areas of Specialization
Meta-Ethics |
Philosophy of Action |
Value Theory |
Normative Ethics |