Corentin Tresnie

This paper focuses on the model of sense-perception constructed in the works of the fifth-century Neoplatonic philosopher Proclus. It attempts to provide a satisfactory explanation of Proclus' claim that sense-perception is actually a derivative of opinion, which is a rational, incorporeal activity. Proclus denies that sense-perception can suffice to provide any knowledge of the outside world, as it is particular, external, and receptive only to change. The process of sensitive cognition operates through four distinct levels of sense-perception, of decreasing passivity and division. They all still require the guiding influence of opinion, which articulates its own kind of logoi. These allow the soul to recognize forms in the world of becoming; a task sense-perception is unable to complete on its own. Such a conception has pedagogical consequences, as learning must happen despite the entropic tendencies of sense-perception, which can also be used to pass on enlightening opinions on an infra-rational level.

In 1583 the Italian botanist and physician Andrea Cesalpino (1524-1603) published De Plantis Libri XVI, made of 16 books (libri), considered to be the first treatise where botany is treated independently from medicine. In so doing, he broke with a long tradition inherited in Western science from Antiquity and perpetuated during the Middle Age through the early Renaissance. De Plantis lays the foundations of scientific systematics through a new focus on plant morphology and natural similarities and became a milestone in the history of Western botany. It is a precious testimony to the evolution of botanical and physiological knowledge in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance and illustrates the role of Aristotelian philosophy in 16th-century knowledge. The volume includes an introductory essay about Cesalpino's philosophy and botany, a critical edition of the Latin text, a translation, a commentary, and indexes. It should interest scholars in Renaissance studies, historians, and philosophers of science and medicine, as well as botanists and plant scientists curious about the history of plant sciences.

Chez Plotin, le paradoxe est l’énonciation d’une ou plusieurs vérités démontrables mais difficiles à croire. Il permet une mise à distance par rapport au langage, qui ouvre la voie à son examen approfondi et à son dépassement. Proclus reprend et développe ce rôle du paradoxe, en insistant sur sa fonction d’étonnement, censé susciter la motivation de l’interlocuteur ou du lecteur, même quand il ignore son ignorance. Celui-ci est alors poussé à approfondir le raisonnement, voire à susciter lui-même des apories afin de résoudre le problème. Damascius reprend ce dernier point, sans mention du paradoxe, au service d’une enquête philosophique avancée qui le mène au renoncement à la connaissance plutôt qu’à l’enseignement.

Andrea Cesalpino was a major scholar of botany during the Renaissance, known for being the first systematist and for developing accurate observations of plant morphology and anatomy. As a philosopher, he endorsed Aristotelianism. In the first book of the De plantis libri XVI (1583), Cesalpino presented his theses on the anatomy and physiology of plants. He mixed new considerations of the functions of plants, based on his observations, while trying to remain faithful to the Aristotelian doctrine of the vegetative soul. In this chapter, we aim to answer the following questions. To what extent do Cesalpino’s theses on the growth, nutrition, reproduction, movement, and sensation of plants agree with or differ from those of Aristotle, Theophrastus, and Pseudo-Aristotle—author of the apocryphal treatise De plantis—whose texts were authoritative for Aristotelianism at the time? How does Aristotelianism influence Cesalpino’s botanical theses, and conversely, how do certain botanical theses defended by Cesalpino challenge Aristotelian ideas? To find solutions to these questions, we show how Cesalpino problematized and attempted to resolve discrepancies between the metaphysical and the scientific dimensions concerning the vegetative functions ofplants.

Humility is usually seen as a moral as well as epistemic virtue. Proclus’ Commentary on the First Alcibiades is a notable exception. This text describes the choice of Alcibiades as a pupil by Socrates, the first steps of their pedagogical interaction, but also the theoretical principles that are in the background. Proclus gives a remarkable importance to what one might call epistemic pride, which consist in loftiness (φρόνημα), contempt (καταφρονεῖν, etc.) and love of honour (φιλοτιμία). First, this article offers a lexical study of the relevant notions. Then, it proceeds to reconstruct Proclus’ argument by analyzing the three above-mentioned components and their relations with one another, focusing on what is especially elaborated in the extant pages of the Commentary, namely the fact that pride is a mark of the pupil’s potential. This allows to show how such a choice can be related to the more general dynamic of the purification of Alcibiades’ pride through the Socratic method. Lastly, the paper goes back to the initial philosophical question of the pedagogical value of epistemic humility and pride.

In his Commentaries, Proclus describes the ways in which a teacher can awaken the desire for knowledge and philosophy in a given soul, and help this soul to make cognitive and moral progress. He considers such an intervention to be a case of providence, analogous to both the action of divine Pronoia and the care of one’s personal daemon. As the soul being thus educated is still unaware of the merits of rational thought, the teacher needs to use the emotions of his student to stimulate him; he might even want to generate desirable emotions in his soul. I focus here on two emotions: wonder and shock. The first serves to stimulate interest while preserving autonomy. The second allows deeper commitment at the price of reduced autonomy of the pupil. Both are complementary aspects of philosophical perplexity.