Humility is usually seen as a moral as well as epistemic virtue. Proclus’ Commentary on the First Alcibiades is a notable exception. This text describes the choice of Alcibiades as a pupil by Socrates, the first steps of their pedagogical interaction, but also the theoretical principles that are in the background. Proclus gives a remarkable importance to what one might call epistemic pride, which consist in loftiness (φρόνημα), contempt (καταφρονεῖν, etc.) and love of honour (φιλοτιμία). First, …
Read moreHumility is usually seen as a moral as well as epistemic virtue. Proclus’ Commentary on the First Alcibiades is a notable exception. This text describes the choice of Alcibiades as a pupil by Socrates, the first steps of their pedagogical interaction, but also the theoretical principles that are in the background. Proclus gives a remarkable importance to what one might call epistemic pride, which consist in loftiness (φρόνημα), contempt (καταφρονεῖν, etc.) and love of honour (φιλοτιμία). First, this article offers a lexical study of the relevant notions. Then, it proceeds to reconstruct Proclus’ argument by analyzing the three above-mentioned components and their relations with one another, focusing on what is especially elaborated in the extant pages of the Commentary, namely the fact that pride is a mark of the pupil’s potential. This allows to show how such a choice can be related to the more general dynamic of the purification of Alcibiades’ pride through the Socratic method. Lastly, the paper goes back to the initial philosophical question of the pedagogical value of epistemic humility and pride.
