Corentin Tresnie

While Neoplatonists have little to say on the topic of conflict and violence in their ethics or political philosophy, they use these concepts in order to discuss other issues. Plotinus considers violence as a way of testing one’s alignment with the cosmic order set by Providence. Porphyry and Iamblichus shift the emphasis to withdrawal from the body and universal cosmodicy, neutralizing the special role of violence. Proclus walks in their footsteps, but also gives a new epistemological meaning to conflict: civil war within the soul is a necessary condition for learning and doing philosophy.

Andrea Cesalpino (1519-1603) practised botany and medicine. Between the study of plants and the human body, he established a series of analogies based on the Aristotelian comparison of plants and animals from the point of view of the soul and that of Theophrastus from the point of view of anatomy of their parts. However, Cesalpino goes further than his ancient predecessors by linking the parts of plants to explanations in terms of functions. The nutrition, reproduction and growth of plants lead him to ask about the nature of their soul: do the totipotency of parts, the divisibility of plants, their plasticity and their ability to allow cuttings imply the divisibility of the soul of plants? These questions require the articulation of the metaphysics of the soul and a science of life and lead to the attribution of analogies between plants and humans three epistemic roles (descriptive, heuristic and problematic). _ Andrea Cesalpino (1519-1603) a pratiqué la botanique et la médecine. Entre l’étude des plantes et celle du corps humain, il établit une série d’analogies fondées sur la comparaison aristotélicienne des plantes et des animaux du point de vue de l’âme et celle de Théophraste du point de vue de l’anatomie de leurs parties. Toutefois, Cesalpino va plus loin que ses prédécesseurs antiques en liant les parties des plantes à des explications en termes de fonctions. La nutrition, la reproduction et la croissance des plantes le conduisent en effet à s’interroger sur la nature de leur âme : la totipotence des parties, la divisibilité des plantes, leur plasticité et leur faculté de bouturage impliquent-elles la divisibilité de l’âme des plantes ? Ces questions requièrent d’articuler la métaphysique de l’âme et une science de la vie et amènent à attribuer aux analogies entre les plantes et les hommes trois rôles épistémiques (descriptif, heuristique et problématique).

Cet article étudie le statut de la méthode de division par rapport aux autres partie de la dialectique selon le philosophe néoplatonicien Proclus, ainsi que les usages qu'il propose de cette méthode dans les différentes sciences qu'il distingue : mathématiques, physique, théologie. Proclus hérite en effet des conceptions divergentes de la division qu'on peut trouver dans les traditions (médio)platonicienne, aristotélicienne et stoïcienne. On constate à la fois une inconstance dans l'acception précise du terme de "division", et une cohérence générale dans l'acte qu'il désigne, à savoir une distinction entre des contenus (concepts, notions, propositions, hypothèses) ne disposant pas encore d'une définition scientifique.

Porphyry’s Life of Plotinus and Iamblichus’ Pythagorean Life display several passages in strong opposition to one another. At least in some significant cases, it is possible to show that the ethical stance adopted by each character corresponds to a position of his biographer about questions that divide Porphyry and Iamblichus. Thus, both texts can be considered as a way for these philosophers to implicitly make a point against each other, concerning matters such as the attitude one must have towards the body, one’s birth, health, passions and death; the possibility of the soul’s progression and liberation from the body; the traditional Greek religion and in particular rites of divination and sacrifice; and what makes a good philosophical education. These are all important issues of a long standing polemic between Porphyry and Iamblichus. While this does not make them mere mouthpieces, one should therefore take into account that the Plotinus and Pythagoras described in these texts carry important concerns of their authors, who carefully choose the episodes they narrate according to their agenda.

This paper focuses on the model of sense-perception constructed in the works of the fifth-century Neoplatonic philosopher Proclus. It attempts to provide a satisfactory explanation of Proclus' claim that sense-perception is actually a derivative of opinion, which is a rational, incorporeal activity. Proclus denies that sense-perception can suffice to provide any knowledge of the outside world, as it is particular, external, and receptive only to change. The process of sensitive cognition operates through four distinct levels of sense-perception, of decreasing passivity and division. They all still require the guiding influence of opinion, which articulates its own kind of logoi. These allow the soul to recognize forms in the world of becoming; a task sense-perception is unable to complete on its own. Such a conception has pedagogical consequences, as learning must happen despite the entropic tendencies of sense-perception, which can also be used to pass on enlightening opinions on an infra-rational level.

In 1583 the Italian botanist and physician Andrea Cesalpino (1524-1603) published De Plantis Libri XVI, made of 16 books (libri), considered to be the first treatise where botany is treated independently from medicine. In so doing, he broke with a long tradition inherited in Western science from Antiquity and perpetuated during the Middle Age through the early Renaissance. De Plantis lays the foundations of scientific systematics through a new focus on plant morphology and natural similarities and became a milestone in the history of Western botany. It is a precious testimony to the evolution of botanical and physiological knowledge in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance and illustrates the role of Aristotelian philosophy in 16th-century knowledge. The volume includes an introductory essay about Cesalpino's philosophy and botany, a critical edition of the Latin text, a translation, a commentary, and indexes. It should interest scholars in Renaissance studies, historians, and philosophers of science and medicine, as well as botanists and plant scientists curious about the history of plant sciences.

Chez Plotin, le paradoxe est l’énonciation d’une ou plusieurs vérités démontrables mais difficiles à croire. Il permet une mise à distance par rapport au langage, qui ouvre la voie à son examen approfondi et à son dépassement. Proclus reprend et développe ce rôle du paradoxe, en insistant sur sa fonction d’étonnement, censé susciter la motivation de l’interlocuteur ou du lecteur, même quand il ignore son ignorance. Celui-ci est alors poussé à approfondir le raisonnement, voire à susciter lui-même des apories afin de résoudre le problème. Damascius reprend ce dernier point, sans mention du paradoxe, au service d’une enquête philosophique avancée qui le mène au renoncement à la connaissance plutôt qu’à l’enseignement.

Andrea Cesalpino was a major scholar of botany during the Renaissance, known for being the first systematist and for developing accurate observations of plant morphology and anatomy. As a philosopher, he endorsed Aristotelianism. In the first book of the De plantis libri XVI (1583), Cesalpino presented his theses on the anatomy and physiology of plants. He mixed new considerations of the functions of plants, based on his observations, while trying to remain faithful to the Aristotelian doctrine of the vegetative soul. In this chapter, we aim to answer the following questions. To what extent do Cesalpino’s theses on the growth, nutrition, reproduction, movement, and sensation of plants agree with or differ from those of Aristotle, Theophrastus, and Pseudo-Aristotle—author of the apocryphal treatise De plantis—whose texts were authoritative for Aristotelianism at the time? How does Aristotelianism influence Cesalpino’s botanical theses, and conversely, how do certain botanical theses defended by Cesalpino challenge Aristotelian ideas? To find solutions to these questions, we show how Cesalpino problematized and attempted to resolve discrepancies between the metaphysical and the scientific dimensions concerning the vegetative functions ofplants.

In his Commentaries, Proclus describes the ways in which a teacher can awaken the desire for knowledge and philosophy in a given soul, and help this soul to make cognitive and moral progress. He considers such an intervention to be a case of providence, analogous to both the action of divine Pronoia and the care of one’s personal daemon. As the soul being thus educated is still unaware of the merits of rational thought, the teacher needs to use the emotions of his student to stimulate him; he might even want to generate desirable emotions in his soul. I focus here on two emotions: wonder and shock. The first serves to stimulate interest while preserving autonomy. The second allows deeper commitment at the price of reduced autonomy of the pupil. Both are complementary aspects of philosophical perplexity.

Humility is usually seen as a moral as well as epistemic virtue. Proclus’ Commentary on the First Alcibiades is a notable exception. This text describes the choice of Alcibiades as a pupil by Socrates, the first steps of their pedagogical interaction, but also the theoretical principles that are in the background. Proclus gives a remarkable importance to what one might call epistemic pride, which consist in loftiness (φρόνημα), contempt (καταφρονεῖν, etc.) and love of honour (φιλοτιμία). First, this article offers a lexical study of the relevant notions. Then, it proceeds to reconstruct Proclus’ argument by analyzing the three above-mentioned components and their relations with one another, focusing on what is especially elaborated in the extant pages of the Commentary, namely the fact that pride is a mark of the pupil’s potential. This allows to show how such a choice can be related to the more general dynamic of the purification of Alcibiades’ pride through the Socratic method. Lastly, the paper goes back to the initial philosophical question of the pedagogical value of epistemic humility and pride.