Corentin Tresnie

In his Commentaries, Proclus describes the ways in which a teacher can awaken the desire for knowledge and philosophy in a given soul, and help this soul to make cognitive and moral progress. He considers such an intervention to be a case of providence, analogous to both the action of divine Pronoia and the care of one’s personal daemon. As the soul being thus educated is still unaware of the merits of rational thought, the teacher needs to use the emotions of his student to stimulate him; he might even want to generate desirable emotions in his soul. I focus here on two emotions: wonder and shock. The first serves to stimulate interest while preserving autonomy. The second allows deeper commitment at the price of reduced autonomy of the pupil. Both are complementary aspects of philosophical perplexity.

Humility is usually seen as a moral as well as epistemic virtue. Proclus’ Commentary on the First Alcibiades is a notable exception. This text describes the choice of Alcibiades as a pupil by Socrates, the first steps of their pedagogical interaction, but also the theoretical principles that are in the background. Proclus gives a remarkable importance to what one might call epistemic pride, which consist in loftiness (φρόνημα), contempt (καταφρονεῖν, etc.) and love of honour (φιλοτιμία). First, this article offers a lexical study of the relevant notions. Then, it proceeds to reconstruct Proclus’ argument by analyzing the three above-mentioned components and their relations with one another, focusing on what is especially elaborated in the extant pages of the Commentary, namely the fact that pride is a mark of the pupil’s potential. This allows to show how such a choice can be related to the more general dynamic of the purification of Alcibiades’ pride through the Socratic method. Lastly, the paper goes back to the initial philosophical question of the pedagogical value of epistemic humility and pride.