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Nicholas Everitt

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  •  Publications
    62
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Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics and Epistemology
History of Western Philosophy
Philosophy, Misc
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics and Epistemology
History of Western Philosophy
Other Academic Areas
Philosophy, Misc
  • All publications (62)
  •  283
    Strawson on Laws and Regularities
    Analysis 51 (4). 1991.
    In his recent book The Secret Connection (Clarendon 1989), Galen Strawsonadvances what he calls 'a simple and devastating objection' to the regularitytheory of causation. I will argue that his objection, far from beingdevastating, has no force at all; and further, that if it did have force, itwould tell equally against Strawson's own preferred alternative to theregularity theory.
    Humeanism and Nonhumeanism about LawsNomological Theories of CausationCausal Reductionism
  •  2
    The Community of Knowledge
    Philosophical Books 29 (1): 34-36. 2009.
  •  2
    Theories of the Mind
    Philosophical Books 34 (1): 38-39. 2009.
  •  2
    Observation and Objectivity
    Philosophical Books 29 (3): 148-151. 2009.
  •  2
    Rationality and Theistic Belief: An Essay On Reformed Epistemology
    Philosophical Books 36 (1): 71-72. 2009.
  • Sense and Certainty: A Dissolution of Scepticism
    Philosophical Books 31 (2): 101-103. 2009.
  • Hume's “Inexplicable Mystery”: His Views on Religion
    Philosophical Books 32 (4): 216-218. 2009.
  •  7
    When Animals Dream by David M. Pena-Guzman (review)
    Philosophy Now 156 54-55. 2023.
  •  264
    Some Problems with Virtue Theory
    Philosophy 82 (2): 275-299. 2007.
    Abstract: I examine virtue theory, especially as expressed by Rosalind Hursthouse. In its canonical form, the theory claims that living a life of virtue constitutes flourishing, although it also has a possible fall-back claim that a life of virtue is a means to the end of flourishing. I argue that in both interpretations, virtue theory is mistaken. It cannot give any convincing account of how the concepts of wanting, flourishing, and the virtues are connected, nor can it deal adequately with th…Read more
    Abstract: I examine virtue theory, especially as expressed by Rosalind Hursthouse. In its canonical form, the theory claims that living a life of virtue constitutes flourishing, although it also has a possible fall-back claim that a life of virtue is a means to the end of flourishing. I argue that in both interpretations, virtue theory is mistaken. It cannot give any convincing account of how the concepts of wanting, flourishing, and the virtues are connected, nor can it deal adequately with the counter-examples of flourishing by the wicked, and torment for the virtuous. However, I allow that stripped of all its pretensions to universality, there are grounds for some people in some restricted sets circumstances, to follow the path of virtue solely because they will thereby flourish.
    EthicsObjections to Virtue Ethics, Misc
  •  23
    Truth by Simon Blackburn (review)
    Philosophy Now 141 50-51. 2020.
  •  21
    Consciousness Matters by Oliver Leech (review)
    Philosophy Now 135 45-46. 2019.
  •  42
    Inborn Knowledge (review)
    Philosophy Now 125 40-41. 2018.
  •  17
    Knowledge by Ian Evans and Nicholas D. Smith (review)
    Philosophy Now 103 44-45. 2014.
  •  46
    Berkeley’s Puzzle (review)
    Philosophy Now 115 47-47. 2016.
  •  110
    What’s Wrong with Murder? Some Thoughts on Human and Animal Killing
    International Journal of Applied Philosophy 7 (1): 47-54. 1992.
    Applied EthicsMurder
  •  100
    VIII*—Pain and Perception
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 89 (1): 113-124. 1989.
    Nicholas Everitt; VIII*—Pain and Perception, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 89, Issue 1, 1 June 1989, Pages 113–124, https://doi.org/10.1093/ar.
    Aspects of Consciousness
  •  129
    Logic and Theism: Arguments For and Against Beliefs in God - By J.J. Sobel
    Philosophical Books 47 (4): 380-382. 2006.
    Philosophy of ReligionReligious Topics
  • Theism or Atheism: The Eternal Debate, by F. F. Centore (review)
    Ars Disputandi 4. 2004.
    Philosophy of ReligionArguments Against TheismAtheism and AgnosticismThe Number of Gods
  •  124
    Why Only Perfection Is Good Enough
    Philosophical Papers 29 (3): 155-158. 2000.
    Abstract I argue that the traditional problem of evil mislocates the problem which confronts the theist. The real problem arises not from the evil in the world, but from the non-perfection of the world. Given that a perfect God could create only a perfect world, and given that the world is not in fact perfect, I construct an argument for atheism. I show that the argument is not open to the objections which theists standardly bring against the traditional objection from evil
    The Argument from EvilThe Number of Gods
  • William L. Rowe on Philosophy of Religion, edited by Nick Trakakis (review)
    Ars Disputandi 9. 2009.
    Philosophy of ReligionEvil
  •  145
    Quasi-Berkeleyan Idealism as Perspicuous Theism
    Faith and Philosophy 14 (3): 353-377. 1997.
    In this paper, I argue that the kind of idealism defended by Berkeley is a natural and almost unavoidable expression of his theism. Two main arguments are deployed, both starting from a theistic premise and having an idealist conclusion. The first likens the dependence of the physical world on the will of God to the dependence of mental states on a mind. The second likens divine omniscience to the kind of knowledge which it has often been supposed we have of the contents of our own minds. After …Read more
    In this paper, I argue that the kind of idealism defended by Berkeley is a natural and almost unavoidable expression of his theism. Two main arguments are deployed, both starting from a theistic premise and having an idealist conclusion. The first likens the dependence of the physical world on the will of God to the dependence of mental states on a mind. The second likens divine omniscience to the kind of knowledge which it has often been supposed we have of the contents of our own minds. After rebutting objections to these arguments, I conclude that both theists and non-idealists should be surprised and discomforted by my contentions.
    Berkeley: ImmaterialismDivine Omniscience, MiscBerkeley: Philosophy of Religion, MiscDivine Attribut…Read more
    Berkeley: ImmaterialismDivine Omniscience, MiscBerkeley: Philosophy of Religion, MiscDivine Attributes, MiscIdealism
  •  155
    The Impossibility of Miracles
    Religious Studies 23 (3). 1987.
    TAKING ONE STANDARD DEFINITION OF ’MIRACLES’ AS ’VIOLATIONS OF LAWS OF NATURE, BY A VOLITION OF GOD’, I ARGUE THAT NO REPORT ASSERTING THE OCCURRENCE OF A MIRACLE CAN BE TRUE. WHATEVER IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH A TRUTH MUST ITSELF BE FALSE, AND NO STATEMENT OF A GENUINE LAW OF NATURE CAN BE OTHER THAN TRUE. OBJECTIONS TO THE ARGUMENT, INCLUDING THOSE BY MACKIE AND SWINBURNE, ARE REBUTTED
    Miracles, Misc
  •  508
    Substance Dualism and Disembodied Existence
    Faith and Philosophy 17 (3): 333-347. 2000.
    In a number of places, Richard Swinburne has defended the logical possibility of perception without a body; and has inferred from this logical possibility that substance dualism is true. I challenge his defence of disembodied perception by arguing that a disembodied perceiver would not be able to distinguish between perceptions and hallucinations. I then claim that even if disembodied perception were possible, this could not be used to support substance dualism: such an inference would be either…Read more
    In a number of places, Richard Swinburne has defended the logical possibility of perception without a body; and has inferred from this logical possibility that substance dualism is true. I challenge his defence of disembodied perception by arguing that a disembodied perceiver would not be able to distinguish between perceptions and hallucinations. I then claim that even if disembodied perception were possible, this could not be used to support substance dualism: such an inference would be either invalid or question-begging.
    Philosophy of ReligionDualismSubstanceArguments from DisembodimentThe Soul
  •  92
    Reviews (review)
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (2): 277-279. 1987.
  •  102
    The God of metaphysics – Timothy Sprigge (review)
    Philosophical Quarterly 57 (228). 2007.
    Philosophy of Religion, Misc
  •  92
    Roger Trigg rationality and religion. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1998). Pp. VI+226. £45.00 hbk, £14.99 pbk
    Religious Studies 35 (1): 99-111. 1999.
    RationalityPhilosophy of Religion
  • The Non-Existence of God
    International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 61 (2): 127-129. 2007.
    Philosophy of Religion
  •  62
    The Community of Knowledge
    Philosophical Books 29 (1): 34-36. 1988.
    Collective Epistemology
  •  75
    Rationality and Theistic Belief: An Essay On Reformed Epistemology
    Philosophical Books 36 (1): 71-72. 1995.
    Reformed Epistemology
  •  106
    The Non-Existence of God
    Routledge London. 2003.
    Is it possible to prove or disprove God's existence? Arguments for the existence of God have taken many different forms over the centuries: in The Non-Existence of God, Nicholas Everitt considers all of the arguments and examines the role that reason and knowledge play in the debate over God's existence. He draws on recent scientific disputes over neo-Darwinism, the implication of 'big bang' cosmology, and the temporal and spatial size of the universe; and discusses some of the most recent work …Read more
    Is it possible to prove or disprove God's existence? Arguments for the existence of God have taken many different forms over the centuries: in The Non-Existence of God, Nicholas Everitt considers all of the arguments and examines the role that reason and knowledge play in the debate over God's existence. He draws on recent scientific disputes over neo-Darwinism, the implication of 'big bang' cosmology, and the temporal and spatial size of the universe; and discusses some of the most recent work on the subject, leading to a controversial conclusion
    Arguments for Theism
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