James Robert Brown

I reply to a number of papers (published in Croatian Journal of Philosophy 7 [2007], 29-92 and in this issue) that stem from a conference in Rijeka on thought experinlents. These are papers by Ana Butković, Dave Davies, Boris Grozdanoff, Dunja Jutronić, Nenad Miščević, Ksenija Puškarić, and Irina Starikova. Their criticisms of my views are diverse, but one theme, perhaps inevitably, dominates the criticisms: the unworkability of my Platonism. I try to defend this and to adequately answer other criticisms, as well.

The best philosophy of science during the last generation has been highly historical; and the best history of science, highly philosophical. No one has better exemplified this intimate relationship between history and philosophy than has Robert E. Butts in his work. Through out his numerous writings, science, its philosophy, and its history have been treated as a seamless web. The result has been a body of work that is sensitive in its conception, ambitious in its scope, and illuminat ing in its execution. Not only has his work opened new paths of inquiry, but his enthusiasm for the discipline, his encouragement of others (particularly students and younger colleagues), and his tireless efforts to build an international community of scholars, have stimulated the growth of HPS throughout Europe and North America. Many of the essays in this volume reflect that influence. Our title, of course, is deliberately ambiguous. The essays herein are by colleagues and former students, all of us wishing to honour an intimate friend. Happy Birthday, Bob! IX INTRODUCTION The essays herein cover a variety of concerns: from Descartes to reduction, from Galileo to gambling, from Freud's psychoanalysis to Kant's thing-in-itself. But under this diversity there is an approach common to them all. Things are largely done with a concern for and a sensitivity to historical matters (including contemporary history, of course).

Science as Salvation: a Modern Myth and its Meaning, Mary Midgley, 1994. London, Routledge x +256pp., Hb 04 15062713, £35; Pb 04 15107733, £8.99 Philosophical Naturalism, David Papineau, 1993 Oxford, Basil Blackwell xii +219pp., Hb 0631189025, £40; Pb 0631189033, £14.99 F. H. Bradley, Writings on Logic and Metaphysics, James W. Allard & Guy Stock (Eds), 1994. Oxford, Clarendon Press xv+357pp, Hb 0–198–24445–2, £40.00; Pb 0–198–24438‐X, £14.95 Invariance and Heuristics: Essays in Honour of Heinz Post, Steven French & Harmke Kamminga (Eds), 1993 Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 148 Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht Beyond Reason: Essays on the Philosophy of Paul Feyerabend, GONZALO MUNÉVAR (Ed.), 1991. Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers xxi + 535pp., hb, ISBN 0–7923–1272–4, £104.20 World Changes: Thomas Kuhn and the Nature of Science, Paul Horwich (Ed.), 1993. Cambridge, MA, Bradford Books/mit Press vi + 356pp., pb, ISBN 0262581388, £14.95 Realism Rescued: How Scientific Progress is Possible, Jerold L. Aronson, Rom Harré & Eileen Cornell Way, 1994 London, Duckworth vii +213pp., Hb 0715624768, £30.00 Scientific Nihilism: On the Loss and Recovery of Physical Explanation, Daniel Athearn, 1994. State University of New York Press, Albany ix + 387pp., Hb ISBN 0–7914–1807–3, £52 Theism, Atheism, and Big Bang Cosmology, William Lane Craig & Quentin Smith, 1993. Oxford, Clarendon Press x +342pp., Hb 0198263481, £35; Pb 019826383X, £13.95.

Philosophers and mathematicians have different ideas about the difference between pure and applied mathematics. This should not surprise us, since they have different aims and interests. For mathematicians, pure mathematics is the interesting stuff, even if it has lots of physics involved. This has the consequence that picturesque examples play a role in motivating and justifying mathematical results. Philosophers might find this upsetting, but we find a parallel to mathematician’s attitudes in ethics, which, I argue, is a much better model for how philosophers should think about these issues.

Feynman diagrams are now iconic. Like pictures of the Bohr atom, everyone knows they have something important to do with physics. Those who work in quantum field theory, string theory, and other esoteric fields of physics use them extensively. In spite of this, it is far from clear what they are or how they work. Are they mere calculating tools? Are they somehow pictures of physical reality? Are they models in any interesting sense? Or do they play some other kind of role?It is safe to say they are linked to some sort of calculation tool, but after that it is far from clear. If you ask me how to get from Toronto to Montreal, I could respond two ways: I could tell you to drive north until you...

Feynman diagrams have fascinated physicists and philosophers since they were introduced to the world about 70 years ago. Clearly, they help in calculation; they have allowed nearly impossible problems to be solved with relative ease. This is agreed by all, but that is probably where the consensus ends. Are they pictures of physical processes? Are they just devices for keeping track of mathematical formulae, that do the real work? Are they some sort of mix of both?They are almost as famous as representations of the Bohr atom, even though most people could not give even a sketchy account of what they do. In spite of this they have taken on a role as a cultural icon. Feynman used them to decorate his own van....