James Robert Brown

An academic paper, like a good story, has a beginning, a middle, and an end. But they don’t have to be in that order. Instead of laying out reasonable assumptions, followed by a careful argument that arrives at a plausible finish, I will start with an implausible conclusion, then try to justify it. This order might diminish the theatrical effect, since there is no build up to a dramatic finale, but it gains in clarity of purpose. My conclusion is this: We should eliminate all patents and other forms of intellectual property rights in medical research. All research should be publicly funded, all testing and analyses done by public agencies, and all research results publicly owned. Most countries in...

Theories often run into paradoxes. Some of these are outright contradictions, sending the would-be champions of the theory back to the drawing board. Others are paradoxical in the sense of being bizarre and unexpected. The latter are sometimes mistakenly thought to be instances of the former. That is, they are thought to be more than merely weird; they are mistakenly thought to be self-refuting. Showing that they are not self-contradictory but merely a surprise is often a challenge. Notions of explanation and understanding are often at issue. For instance, we might explain—or explain away—a paradox by invoking some mechanism provided by the theory and showing how it does not really lead to a logically incoherent..

Thought experiments provide us with scientific understanding and theoretical advances which are sometimes quite significant, yet they do this without new empirical input, and possibly without any empirical input at all. How is this possible? The challenge to empiricism is to give an account which is compatible with the traditional empiricist principle that all knowledge is based on sensory experience. Thought experiments present an enormous challenge to empiricist views of knowledge; so much so that some of us have thrown in the towel and embraced good old fashioned platonism. I'll try to explain why one brand of empiricism, namely John Norton's argument view of thought experiments, won't work.

Sergio Sismondo's “Boundary Work and the Science Wars” nicely exemplifies a hotly debated central issue. One side, let me call them the rationalists, tries to explain episodes in the history of science in terms of reason. They claim that scientists, past and present, believe what they do because of the evidence that they have at the time. The other side, following Sismondo, let me call them STSers, claim that social and other non-cognitive factors are the frequent causes of belief. This disagreement naturally leads to a meta-level debate. Rationalists, such as myself, try to give reasons for believing the STSers are wrong-headed in their approach. And Sismondo replies with the claim that whether I realize it or not I am really doing boundary work – an explanation of my activity in terms of social factors.

There is sufficient evidence that intellectual property rights are corrupting medical research. One could respond to this from a moral or from an epistemic point of view. I take the latter route. Often in the sciences factual discoveries lead to new methodological norms. Medical research is an example. Surprisingly, the methodological change required will involve political change. Instead of new regulations aimed at controlling the problem, the outright socialization of research seems called for, for the sake of better science. I appeal to an analogy between socialized medicine and socialized research. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario M5R 2M8, Canada; e‐mail: [email protected].