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393"How does it work" versus "what are the laws?": Two conceptions of psychological explanationIn Robert A. Wilson & Frank C. Keil (eds.), The Shadows and Shallows of Explanation, Mit Press. 2000.In the beginning, there was the DN (Deductive Nomological) model of explanation, articulated by Hempel and Oppenheim (1948). According to DN, scientific explanation is subsumption under natural law. Individual events are explained by deducing them from laws together with initial conditions (or boundary conditions), and laws are explained by deriving them from other more fundamental laws, as, for example, the simple pendulum law is derived from Newton's laws of motion.
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226Representations, Targets, and AttitudesMIT Press. 1996."This is an important new Cummins work.
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417Connectionism and the rationale constraint on cognitive explanationsPhilosophical Perspectives 9 105-25. 1995.
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166The role of representation in connectionist explanation of cognitive capacitiesIn William Ramsey, Stephen P. Stich & D. M. Rumelhart (eds.), Philosophy and Connectionist Theory, Lawrence Erlbaum. pp. 91--114. 1991.
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3Interpretational semanticsIn Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Mental Representation: A Reader, Blackwell. 1994.This is a condensed version of the material in chapters 8-10 in Meaning and Mental Representation (MIT, 1989). It is an explanation and defence of a theory of content for the mind considered as a symbolic computational process. It is a view i abandoned shortly thereafter when I abandoned symbolic computatioalism as a viable theory of cognition.
Davis, California, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
| Philosophy of Mind |
| Philosophy of Biology |
| Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
| 17th/18th Century Philosophy |
Areas of Interest
| Philosophy of Mind |
| Philosophy of Biology |
| Philosophy of Cognitive Science |