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Robert Charles Cummins

University of California, Davis
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    36
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    3

 More details
  • University of California, Davis
    Department of Philosophy
    Unknown
Homepage
Davis, California, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Biology
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
17th/18th Century Philosophy
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Biology
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
  • All publications (36)
  • Why there is no symbol grounding problem?
    In Robert Cummins (ed.), Representations, Targets, and Attitudes, Mit Press. 1996.
    Symbols and Symbol Systems
  •  144
    Philosophy and AI: Essays at the Interface (edited book)
    MIT Press. 1991.
    Philosophy and AI presents invited contributions that focus on the different perspectives and techniques that philosophy and AI bring to the theory of...
    Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence, MiscellaneousComputationalism in Cognitive ScienceEpistemolog…Read more
    Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence, MiscellaneousComputationalism in Cognitive ScienceEpistemology of Specific Domains, Misc
  •  93
    Causes and representation
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1): 76-76. 1980.
    Philosophy of Cognitive SciencePhilosophy of Consciousness
  •  457
    The Modularity of Mind
    with Jerry Fodor
    Philosophical Review 94 (1): 101. 1983.
    Modularity in Cognitive Science
  •  393
    "How does it work" versus "what are the laws?": Two conceptions of psychological explanation
    In Robert A. Wilson & Frank C. Keil (eds.), The Shadows and Shallows of Explanation, Mit Press. 2000.
    In the beginning, there was the DN (Deductive Nomological) model of explanation, articulated by Hempel and Oppenheim (1948). According to DN, scientific explanation is subsumption under natural law. Individual events are explained by deducing them from laws together with initial conditions (or boundary conditions), and laws are explained by deriving them from other more fundamental laws, as, for example, the simple pendulum law is derived from Newton's laws of motion.
    Psychological ExplanationExplanation and Laws of Nature
  •  223
    Representations, Targets, and Attitudes
    MIT Press. 1996.
    "This is an important new Cummins work.
    Naturalizing Mental Content, MiscSymbols and Symbol Systems
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