• C.F. Delaney, "Science, Knowledge, and Mind: A Study in the Philosophy of C.S. Peirce" (review)
    Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 29 (3): 457. 1993.
  •  408
    Peirce, Levi, and the aims of inquiry
    Philosophy of Science 54 (2): 256-265. 1987.
    Isaac Levi uses C. S. Peirce's fallibilism as a foil for his own "epistemological infallibilism". I argue that Levi's criticisms of Peirce do not hit their target, and that the two pragmatists agree on the fundamental issues concerning background knowledge, certainty, revision of belief, and the aims of inquiry
  •  81
    Narrative evidence and evidence‐based medicine
    Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 16 (2): 392-397. 2010.
  •  32
  • : C.S. Peirce is infamous for his assertion that the ideas of truth and belief are out of place in vital or ethical matters. We must go on instinct and custom. But he also asserts that his view of truth is applicable to ethics - a true belief about what is right or wrong is the belief that would stand up to all deliberation, experience and argument. I shall resolve this tension in Peirce's work in favor of the cognitivist reading. That is, I shall argue that Peirce presents us with an attractive…Read more
  •  82
    Ramsey's Cognitivism: Truth, Ethics and the Meaning of Life
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 78 251-263. 2016.
    Frank Ramsey is usually taken to be an emotivist or an expressivist about the good: he is usually taken to bifurcate inquiry into fact-stating and non-fact stating domains, ethics falling into the latter. In this paper I shall argue that whatever the very young Ramsey's view might have been, towards the end of his short life, he was coming to a through-going and objective pragmatism about all our beliefs, including those about the good, beauty, and even the meaning of life. Ethical beliefs are n…Read more
  •  535
    The pragmatist view of politics is at its very heart epistemic, for it treats morals and politics as a kind of deliberation or inquiry, not terribly unlike other kinds of inquiry. With the exception of Richard Rorty, the pragmatists argue that morals and politics, like science, aim at the truth or at getting things right and that the best method for achieving this aim is a method they sometimes call the scientific method or the method of intelligence – what would now be termed deliberative democ…Read more
  •  166
    Klein on James on the Will to Believe
    Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 5 (1): 118-28. 2015.
    This commentary explores the disagreement between Alex Klein and Cheryl Misak about the core insights of American Pragmatism, against a background of agreement. Both take the history of early American pragmatism to be a vital part of the history of analytic philosophy, not a radical break with it. But Misak argues that James seeks to loosen the usual epistemic standards so that religious and scientific belief can both be justified by a unitary set of evidentiary rules, and Klein argues that Jame…Read more
  •  110
    The American Pragmatists
    Oxford University Press. 2013.
    Cheryl Misak presents a history of the great American philosophical tradition of pragmatism, from its inception in the 1870s to the present day. She traces the connections between classical American pragmatism and contemporary analytic philosophy, and draws out the continuing influence of pragmatist ideas in the recent history of philosophy
  •  118
    Critical Notice
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (3): 365-379. 1992.
  •  218
    Pragmatism on solidarity, bullshit, and other deformities of truth
    Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1): 111-121. 2008.
    No Abstract
  • Pragmatism
    Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 37 (3): 416-427. 2001.
  •  626
    The Subterranean Influence of Pragmatism on the Vienna Circle: Peirce, Ramsey, Wittgenstein
    Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 4 (5). 2016.
    An underappreciated fact in the history of analytic philosophy is that American pragmatism had an early and strong influence on the Vienna Circle. The path of that influence goes from Charles Peirce to Frank Ramsey to Ludwig Wittgenstein to Moritz Schlick. That path is traced in this paper, and along the way some standard understandings of Ramsey and Wittgenstein, especially, are radically altered.
  •  76
    Review of T. L. short, Peirce's Theory of Signs (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (7). 2007.
  •  90
    A Culture of Justification: The Pragmatist’s Epistemic Argument for Democracy
    Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 5 (1): 94-105. 2008.
  •  105
    Pragmatism and Pluralism
    Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 41 (1). 2005.
  •  101
    Language and Experience for Pragmatism
    European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 6 (2). 2014.
    It is sometimes said that contemporary pragmatists place too much emphasis on language and not enough on experience. This objection might hold for the pragmatism of Richard Rorty and his students, but it does not hold for the pragmatism of C. S. Peirce, William James, and John Dewey. I shall argue that we should return to the classical pragmatists and their truth-and-experience position. Indeed, an important insight at the very heart of pragmatism is that language and experience cannot be pulled…Read more
  • Hookway, C., "Peirce" (review)
    Mind 95 (n/a): 138. 1986.
  •  173
    The Pragmatic Maxim
    The Harvard Review of Philosophy 17 (1): 76-87. 2010.
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  •  104
    Rescher and Objective Pragmatism
    Contemporary Pragmatism 2 (2): 25-33. 2005.
    Nicholas Rescher embraces a more objectivist, realist, analytic pragmatism than the pragmatism which has been in vogue in the last two decades. He rejects any pragmatism for which there is no truth, reality, or objectivity but only conversations or solidarity within this or that vocabulary. Rescher has argued that pragmatism, far from being anti-realist, provides the only good argument for realism and for our ability to operate the causal model of inquiry about the real world. I examine this kin…Read more
  •  134
    Book-Reviews
    Mind 95 (377): 138-140. 1986.
  •  128
    Pragmatism and bivalence
    International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 4 (2): 171-179. 1990.
    The success of the pragmatic account of truth is often thought to founder on the principle of bivalence—the principle which holds that every genuine statement in the indicative mood is either true or false. For pragmatists must, it seems, claim that the principle does not hold for theoretical statements and observation statements about the past. That is, it seems that pragmatists must deny objective truth‐values to these perfectly respectable sorts of hypotheses. In this paper, after examining t…Read more
  •  273
    Icu psychosis and patient autonomy: Some thoughts from the inside
    Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 30 (4). 2005.
    I shall draw on my experience of being an ICU patient to make some practical, ethical, and philosophical points about the care of the critically ill. The recurring theme in this paper is ICU psychosis. I suggest that discharged patients ought to be educated about it; I discuss the obstacles in the way of accurately measuring it; I argue that we must rethink autonomy in light of it; and I suggest that the self disintegrates in the face of it.
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