•  40
    Just War, Regular War, and Perpetual Peace
    Kant-Studien 107 (1): 179-195. 2016.
    Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 107 Heft: 1 Seiten: 179-195.
  •  16
    In Force and Freedom: Kant's Legal and Political Philosophy, Harvard University Press. pp. 389-399. 2009.
  •  2
    Equality, Responsibility, and the Law
    Cambridge University Press. 1998.
    This book examines responsibility and luck as these issues arise in tort law, criminal law, and distributive justice. The central question is: whose bad luck is a particular piece of misfortune? Arthur Ripstein argues that there is a general set of principles to be found that clarifies responsibility in those cases where luck is most obviously an issue: accidents, mistakes, emergencies, and failed attempts at crime. In revealing how the problems that arise in tort and criminal law as well as dis…Read more
  •  11
    Prohibition and preemption
    Legal Theory 5 (3): 235-263. 1999.
  •  99
    Commodity Fetishism
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (4). 1987.
    Criticism and sarcasm are interspersed with description and analysis throughout Marx's work. Most of the criticism is aimed at one or another side of a single target: what Marx sees as capitalism's pretensions of freedom, equality, and prosperity in the face of exploitation and recurrent crises. But the remarks on commodity fetishism in the first volume of Capital seem to be directed at a different target. Here Marx tells us that a commodity is ‘a queer thing, abounding in metaphysical subtletie…Read more
  •  57
    Three duties to rescue: Moral, civil, and criminal (review)
    Law and Philosophy 19 (6): 751-779. 2000.
    No Abstract
  •  53
    Practical Rationality and Preference: Essays for David Gauthier (edited book)
    with Christopher W. Morris
    Cambridge University Press. 2001.
    What are preferences and are they reasons for action? Is it rational to cooperate with others even if that entails acting against one's preferences? The dominant position in philosophy on the topic of practical rationality is that one acts so as to maximize the satisfaction of one's preferences. This view is most closely associated with the work of David Gauthier, and in this collection of essays some of the most innovative philosophers working in this field explore the controversies surrounding…Read more
  •  26
    Law and Disagreement
    Philosophical Review 110 (4): 611. 2001.
    The most obvious way of settling disagreements peacefully is to take a vote. Yet, as Jeremy Waldron points out, the attitudes of philosophers and political theorists towards majority voting have ranged from indifference to hostility. Piled on top of all this scorn for legislation comes further scorn from social choice theorists, who insist that majority rule is useless as a means of making decisions.
  •  23
    Reclaiming Proportionality
    Journal of Applied Philosophy 34 (1): 1-18. 2017.
  •  235
    Foundationalism in political theory
    Philosophy and Public Affairs 16 (2): 115-137. 1987.
  • Moral, Social, and Political Philosophy Phl 277y
    Custom Publishing Service, University of Toronto Bookstores. 1999.
  •  6
    The Jurisprudence Annual Lecture 2015—Means and Ends
    Jurisprudence 6 (1): 1-23. 2015.
    Legal doctrine often focuses on means rather than ends. In an action for breach of contract, the court asks only whether promisor performed as promised, and takes no account of what either promisor or promisee expected to gain by the transaction. The criminal law inquires into how the criminal was trying to accomplish some purpose, not what the purpose was. Most crimes are committed to get money, a purpose of which the law otherwise approves. This focus on means is often said to be superficial, …Read more
  •  62
    Law students are usually told that the purpose of damages is to make it as if a wrong had never happened.3 Although torts professors are good at explaining this idea to their students, it is the source of much academic perplexity. Money cannot really make serious losses go away, and it seems a cruel joke to say that money can make an injured person “whole.” Worse still, if money could make an injured person whole, injuring someone and then paying them seems just as good as not injuring them at a…Read more
  •  1
    Self-certification and the Moral Aims of the Law
    Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 25 (1): 201-217. 2012.
    In Legality, Scott Shapiro introduces what he calls the “Planning Theory of Law.” Shapiro introduces the idea of a plan with examples from outside of the law. He then must provide an account of what is distinctive about law, such that the other plan-based social orders are not also legal systems. He gives two answers: first, a legal system is organized by a moral aim. Second, a legal system is self-certifying. I examine these in turn, and argue that each can only characterize what is distinctive…Read more
  •  5
    Law and Morality: Readings in Legal Philosophy
    University of Toronto Press. 2001.
    Filling a long-standing need for a Canadian textbook in the philosophy of law, this anthology includes articles, readings, and cases in legal philosophy to give students the conceptual tools necessary to consider the general problems of jurisprudence.
  •  55
    Ronald Dworkin (edited book)
    Cambridge University Press. 2007.
    Ronald Dworkin occupies a distinctive place in both public life and philosophy. In public life, he is a regular contributor to The New York Review of Books and other widely read journals. In philosophy, he has written important and influential works on many of the most prominent issues in legal and political philosophy. In both cases, his interventions have in part shaped the debates he joined. His opposition to Robert Bork's nomination for the United States Supreme Court gave new centrality to …Read more
  •  2
    In an Age of Mass Torts
    with Benjamin C. Zipursky
    In Gerald J. Postema (ed.), Philosophy and the Law of Torts, Cambridge University Press. pp. 214. 2001.
  • Equality, Responsibility and the Law
    Philosophical Quarterly 51 (205): 566-568. 2001.
  • Philosophy of Tort Law
    In Jules Coleman & Scott J. Shapiro (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence & Philosophy of Law, Oxford University Press. 2002.