Sonia Sedivy

This paper argues that a Wittgensteinian understanding of language as an integral dimension of human forms of life speaks against the view that our relationship to texts is interpretive in nature. Wittgenstein’s re-orientation to language entails that meaning is immediate rather than interpretive, and that our works don’t stop short of the facts. The aim of this paper is to show that the immediate mutuality of meanings and facts carries over to our textual practices so that our texts make available immediate unities of meanings and narrative facts. Wittgenstein’s reflections on following rules, customs or forms of life allow us to steer a careful course between the view that a text is determined by the author’s intentions and a relativism of variable interpretations that results from denying the relevance of authorial intentions. For example, Stanley Fish holds that meanings vary insofar as they are “predetermined’ by our “presuppositions” – our interests, goals and assumptions. But Wittgenstein’s work suggests that following rules, and hence grasping meanings, does not involve something as variable as individual “presuppositions.” Rather, our training into forms of life opens up a second-nature where grasp of both facts and meanings is immediate. This allows us to re-affirm the view that there are textual facts that do not depend on interpretation; that there is a difference between apprehending the facts of a text and going on to provide further interpretations of those facts. The ‘co-constitution’ of meanings and facts does not foreclose interpretive practices but allocates them to their proper sphere – as practices that we may wish to undertake in order to go beyond the initial immediate openness of the world of a text. We can test this view by considering the way our changing forms of forms affect the way we read a text such as Jane Austen’s Mansfied Park.