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93Making a clean break: Addiction and Ulysses contractsBioethics 22 (1). 2008.I examine current models of self-destructive addictive behaviour, and argue that there is an important place for Ulysses contracts in coping with addictive behaviour that stems from certain problematic preference structures. Given the relevant preference structures, interference based on a Ulysses contract need not involve questionably favouring an agent’s past preferences over her current preferences, but can actually be justified in terms of the agent’s current concerns and commitments.
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130Environmental preservation and second-order procrastinationPhilosophy and Public Affairs 35 (3). 2007.I argue that procrastination with respect to environmental preservation is in the class of procrastination problems that are particularly difficult to overcome because of the presence of factors that support second-order procrastination. If my reasoning is correct, then second-order procrastination can help explain the distressing fact — assuming it is a fact — that, despite widespread professions of serious concern, the issue of environmental preservation is not getting as much of our attentio…Read more
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148The Voices of ReasonAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 42 (1). 2005.It is widely held that instrumental reasoning to a practical conclusion is parasitic on non-instrumental practical reasoning. This conclusion is based on the claim that when there is no reason to adopt a certain end, there is no reason to take the means (qua means) to that end. But, as will be argued, while there is a sense of reason according to which the previous statement is true, there is another sense according to which it is false. Furthermore, in both of the relevant senses of reason, it …Read more
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51Add to Cart: Environmental ‘Amenities’ and Cost-Benefit AnalysisIn W. Kabasenche, M. O'Rourke & M. Slater (eds.), Topics in Contemporary Philosophy 9: The Environment, Mit Press. 2012.This chapter discusses the utility of cost-benefit analysis in decision making, specifically environmental decision making. For the purposes of the discussion here, it uses a type of CBA that incorporates two controversial characteristics, namely, the assumption of comparability and the willingness-to-pay measure. The chapter aims to show that the recognition of a well motivated holistic decision-making strategy can shed light on debates regarding CBA. This strategy is concerned with patterns of…Read more
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1There Are Preferences and Then There Are PreferencesIn Barbara Montero and Mark D. White (ed.), Economics and the Mind, . 2007.This paper draws a distinction between two closely related conceptions of 'preference' that is of great significance relative to a set of interrelated debates in rational choice theory. The distinction is particularly illuminating in relation to the idea that there is a rational defect inherent in individuals with intransitive preferences and, relatedly, in democratic collectives. I use the distinction to show that things are more complicated than they seem.
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92Review of Phillipa Foot's Natural Goodness (Oxford: Clarendon press 2001) (review)Utilitas 17 (3): 359-361. 2005.
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1Joseph Heath, Communicative Action and Rational Choice Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 22 (1): 41-43. 2002.
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3Choosing Well: Value Pluralism and Patterns of ChoiceIn Thom Brooks (ed.), New Waves in Ethics, Palgrave-macmillan. 2011.What should I do? Philosophical reflection on this question has raised a variety of puzzles concerning the nature of ethics and of practical reasoning. In this paper, I focus on some new complications raised by current discussions concerning value pluralism, incomparability, and the nature of all-things-considered judgments. I suggest that part of the debate has proceeded in a way that obscures aspects of how we make good decisions in the face of a plurality of values (and identities) pulling…Read more
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157Taking on intentionsRatio 22 (2): 157-169. 2009.I propose a model of intention formation and argue that it illuminates and does justice to the complex and interesting relationships between intentions on the one hand and practical deliberation, evaluative judgements, desires, beliefs, and conduct on the other. As I explain, my model allows that intentions normally stem from pro-attitudes and normally control conduct, but it is also revealing with respect to cases in which intentions do not stem from pro-attitudes or do not control conduct. Mor…Read more
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105A shallow route to environmentally friendly happiness: Why evidence that we are shallow materialists need not be bad news for the environment(alist)Ethics, Place and Environment 13 (1). 2010.It is natural to assume that we would not be willing to compromise the environment if the conveniences and luxuries thereby gained did not have a substantial positive impact on our happiness. But there is room for skepticism and, in particular, for the thesis that we are compromising the environment to no avail in that our conveniences and luxuries are not having a significant impact on our happiness, making the costs incurred for them a waste. One way of defending the no-avail thesis fits neatl…Read more
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137Standards, Advice, and Practical ReasonJournal of Moral Philosophy 3 (1): 57-67. 2006.Is there a mode of sincere advice in which the standards of the adviser are put aside in favor of the standards of the advisee? I consider two sorts of cases that appear to be such that the adviser is evaluating things from within the advisee’s system of standards even though this system conflicts with her own; and I argue that these cases are best interpreted in ways that dissolve this appearance. I then argue that the nature of sincere advice precludes an adviser’s putting aside her own system…Read more
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Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Action |
Applied Ethics |
Meta-Ethics |