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116Cashing out the money-pump argumentPhilosophical Studies (6): 1-5. 2016.The money-pump argument figures as the staple argument in support of the view that cyclic preferences are irrational. According to a prominent way of understanding the argument, it is grounded in the assumption that it is irrational to make choices that lead one to a dispreferred alternative. My aim in this paper is to motivate diffidence with respect to understanding the money-pump argument in this way by suggesting that if it is so understood, the argument emerges as question-begging and as a …Read more
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89Instrumentally Rational Myopic PlanningPhilosophical Papers 33 (2): 133-145. 2004.Abstract I challenge the view that, in cases where time for deliberation is not an issue, instrumental rationality precludes myopic planning. I show where there is room for instrumentally rational myopic planning, and then argue that such planning is possible not only in theory, it is something human beings can and do engage in. The possibility of such planning has, however, been disregarded, and this disregard has skewed related debates concerning instrumental rationality
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1The Moral GripDissertation, University of Pittsburgh. 2001.Implicit in common views about morality is the assumption that the grip of morality is inescapable in the sense that moral considerations give reasons for acting to everyone. On the basis of this assumption, it is claimed that there is a necessity associated with behaving morally, even when we are not compelled to do so, and that while one may reasonably dismiss certain non-moral requirements with a "So what?" one cannot reasonably offer this in response to a statement about the dictates of mora…Read more
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150Addiction, procrastination, and failure points in decision-making systemsBehavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (4): 439-440. 2008.Redish et al. suggest that their failures-in-decision-making framework for understanding addiction can also contribute to improving our understanding of a variety of psychiatric disorders. In the spirit of reflecting on the significance and scope of their research, I briefly develop the idea that their framework can also contribute to improving our understanding of the pervasive problem of procrastination.
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51Rehabilitating human natureBioethics 24 (9): 461-469. 2009.I review the main models of disability and introduce a line of reasoning that has been neglected in the debate concerning disability and disadvantage. My reasoning suggests that while disablism can and should be combated, success will require more challenging transformations than those featured in the literature
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James R. Wible, The Economics of Science: Methodology and Epistemology as if Economics Really MatteredInternational Studies in the Philosophy of Science 12 (3): 281. 1998.
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162Environmental Damage and the Puzzle of the Self-TorturerPhilosophy and Public Affairs 34 (1): 95-108. 2005.I show, building on Warren Quinn's puzzle of the self-torturer, that destructive conduct with respect to the environment can flourish even in the absence of interpersonal conflicts. As Quinn's puzzle makes apparent, in cases where individually negligible effects are involved, an agent, whether it be an individual or a unified collective, can be led down a course of destruction simply as a result of following its informed and perfectly understandable but intransitive preferences. This is relevan…Read more
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162The real puzzle of the self-torturer: uncovering a new dimension of instrumental rationalityCanadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5-6): 562-575. 2015.The puzzle of the self-torturer raises intriguing questions concerning rationality, cyclic preferences, and resoluteness. Interestingly, what makes the case puzzling has not been clearly pinpointed. The puzzle, it seems, is that a series of rational choices foreseeably leads the self-torturer to an option that serves his preferences worse than the one with which he started. But this is a very misleading way of casting the puzzle. I pinpoint the real puzzle of the self-torturer and, in the proces…Read more
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141Temptation and DeliberationPhilosophical Studies 131 (3): 583-606. 2006.There is a great deal of plausibility to the standard view that if one is rational and it is clear at the time of action that a certain move, say M1, would serve one’s concerns better than any other available move, then one will, as a rational agent, opt for move M1. Still, this view concerning rationality has been challenged at least in part because it seems to conflict with our considered judgments about what it is rational to do in cases of temptation that share the structure of Warren Quin…Read more
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Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Action |
Applied Ethics |
Meta-Ethics |