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1Joseph Heath, Communicative Action and Rational Choice Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 22 (1): 41-43. 2002.
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3Choosing Well: Value Pluralism and Patterns of ChoiceIn Thom Brooks (ed.), New Waves in Ethics, . 2011.What should I do? Philosophical reflection on this question has raised a variety of puzzles concerning the nature of ethics and of practical reasoning. In this paper, I focus on some new complications raised by current discussions concerning value pluralism, incomparability, and the nature of all-things-considered judgments. I suggest that part of the debate has proceeded in a way that obscures aspects of how we make good decisions in the face of a plurality of values (and identities) pulling…Read more
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153Taking on intentionsRatio 22 (2): 157-169. 2009.I propose a model of intention formation and argue that it illuminates and does justice to the complex and interesting relationships between intentions on the one hand and practical deliberation, evaluative judgements, desires, beliefs, and conduct on the other. As I explain, my model allows that intentions normally stem from pro-attitudes and normally control conduct, but it is also revealing with respect to cases in which intentions do not stem from pro-attitudes or do not control conduct. Mor…Read more
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97A shallow route to environmentally friendly happiness: Why evidence that we are shallow materialists need not be bad news for the environment(alist)Ethics, Place and Environment 13 (1). 2010.It is natural to assume that we would not be willing to compromise the environment if the conveniences and luxuries thereby gained did not have a substantial positive impact on our happiness. But there is room for skepticism and, in particular, for the thesis that we are compromising the environment to no avail in that our conveniences and luxuries are not having a significant impact on our happiness, making the costs incurred for them a waste. One way of defending the no-avail thesis fits neatl…Read more
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134Standards, Advice, and Practical ReasonJournal of Moral Philosophy 3 (1): 57-67. 2006.Is there a mode of sincere advice in which the standards of the adviser are put aside in favor of the standards of the advisee? I consider two sorts of cases that appear to be such that the adviser is evaluating things from within the advisee’s system of standards even though this system conflicts with her own; and I argue that these cases are best interpreted in ways that dissolve this appearance. I then argue that the nature of sincere advice precludes an adviser’s putting aside her own system…Read more
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173Morality and psychologyPhilosophy Compass 2 (1). 2006.This article briefly discusses the connection between moral philosophy and moral psychology, and then explores three intriguing areas of inquiry that fall within the intersection of the two fields. The areas of inquiry considered focus on (1) debates concerning the nature of moral judgments and moral motivation; (2) debates concerning good and bad character traits and character-based explanations of actions; and (3) debates concerning the role of moral rules in guiding the morally wise agent.
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62Going from Bad (Or Not so Bad) to Worse: On Harmful Addictions and HabitsAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 42 (4). 2005.None
Salt Lake City, Utah, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Action |
Applied Ethics |
Meta-Ethics |