Andree Hahmann

Already in antiquity the Aristotelian Philosophy was under attack by its philosophical opponents. The Stoics can surely be counted to the most important ones. Furthermore they can be regarded as one of the most influential philosophy schools of the Hellenistic time and in the early Roman Empire and their influenceeven on modern thinkers must not be neglected. It is well known that the Stoics not only advocated a physical monism but can also be described as determinists or, from a modern point of view, even as compatibilists because they were the first who tried to harmonize moral responsibility with the thesis of a causal determinism. Therefore, the stoic concept of causality is of vast importance. In one of Seneca’s books a discussion of the Aristotelian theory of causality has come down to us. Although it is a quite short passage it proves itself to be very illuminating. This paper wants to shed light on the differences between the Aristotelian and the Stoic theory of causality and therefore help to clarify the historical background of the modern concept of causality which is of intense importance for the actual discussion about free will and determinism.

In the second half of the 18th century the voices criticizing the concept of simple substances as proposed by Leibniz and Wolff became increasingly louder. In response, Kant altered his theory of substances as first proposed in the 1750s. So for example, while his notion of substance in the Monadologia physica is simple and not merely in space, but fills space entirely, the Kantian position in the 1760s and early 1770s is quite different. This essay examines the solution Kant offers in his Inaugural Dissertation for the problems raised by critics of simple substances. It shows how Kant removes substance from space and consequently from the empirical world and makes it into a concept of the understanding which leads to the knowledge of simple substances by employment of the pure understanding.

Cicero distinguishes between two forms of divination: natural and artificial divination. Most contemporary scholars assume that Cicero presents a Stoic division and some even draw far-reaching conclusions about the scientific status of divination based on this distinction. However, his justification for the division is apparently contradictory and neither fits with Stoic nor Peripatetic claims that are found elsewhere. This paper examines the exact meaning of the division and sheds light on its Stoic and Peripatetic origin. In this way, we will not only be able to better understand the overall argument of Cicero’s De divinatione, but also to assess his real achievement as a philosophical author.

Dieser Aufsatz nimmt eine wenig beachtete Passage aus der Kritik der reinen Vernunft zum Anlass, sich der Diskussion bezüglich der einfachen Substanzen in der ersten Hälfte des 18. Jahrhunderts zu widmen. Es stellt sich heraus, dass die Frage nach den inneren und äußeren Bestimmungen der Substanz in den Kern der systematischen Substanzanalyse führt. Von welcher Art können die inneren Bestimmungen einer einfachen Substanz sein? Müssen diese von ideeller Natur sein, oder kann es sich auch um eine andere Art von Kraft handeln? Wenn es sich bei dieser Kraft um eine Vorstellungskraft handelt, wie können dann die äußeren Bestimmungen der Substanz, d.h. ihre Beziehung zu den anderen Substanzen aussehen? Durch die Analyse der dogmatischen Vorgänger Kants und der sogenannten vorkritischen Philosophie wird schließlich klar, dass der Substanzbegriff des jungen Kants näher als bisher angenommen werden konnte an Leibniz steht

Kant’s postulate of the immortality of the soul has received strikingly little attention among Kant scholars, and only very few have regarded it positively. This is not surprising given the numerous problems associated with his argument. However, it is not the only argument for immortality that Kant offers in his critical philosophy. There is also a second argument that differs from the one furnished in the Second Critique and can be found both in the Critique of Pure Reason and later texts from the 1790s. Kant also addresses here many of the problems that interpreters have found with his postulate of immortality in both earlier and later texts. This paper considers the main difficulties associated with the postulate and proposes a coherent interpretation of Kant’s argument. I show that despite the apparent change in his approach to immortality Kant did not in fact substantially alter his position during his critical period.

In dieser Untersuchung soll gezeigt werden, dass Kant in der Idee einer moralischen Welt, wie sie in der transzendentalen Methodenlehre der Kritik der reinen Vernunft expliziert wird, einen ontologischen Gedankengang aus seinen vorkritischen Schriften aufgreift. Hierbei handelt es sich um einen aposteriorischen Gottesbeweis, den Kant zuerst in seiner Nova dilucidatio formuliert und nahezu unverändert in seine Inauguraldissertation übernommen hat. Auf diese Weise findet der aposteriorische im Gegensatz zu den apriorischen Gottesbeweisen der vorkritischen Schriften Kants in einer kritisch revidierten Form Eingang in sein theoretisches Hauptwerk. This paper wants to show that Kant uses an ontological argument that he formulates in one of his pre-Critical writings in the idea of a moral world as it is demonstrated in the "Transcendental Doctrine of Method" in the Critique of pure Reason. For the first time in his Nova dilucidatio Kant furnishes an a posteriori proof of the existence of God by demonstrating that the reality of the world as a community of substances needs a divine intellect as a common cause of their existence. He takes this argument almost unchanged in his Inauguraldissertation that appeared in 1770. In contrast to the a priori arguments of the existence of God, which Kant refutes at least since the mid 1760's, this a posteriori argument finds a way into his major theoretical work in a critically revised form

Der in Leipzig lehrende Philosoph und Theologe Christian August Crusius (1715-1775) ist bisher vorwiegend im Rahmen der Kant-Forschung berücksichtigt worden. Dabei war Crusius einer der ersten ernstzunehmenden Kritiker der Philosophie von Christian Wolff, der entscheidende Impulse von Christian Thomasius aufgriff, philosophisch vertiefte und bis in die zweite Hälfte des 18. Jahrhunderts wirkungsvoll tradierte. Der Sammelband nimmt die unterschiedlichen Aspekte des philosophischen und theologischen Schaffens von Crusius in den Blick und rekonstruiert die eigenständige Kontur eines Denkers, der einerseits auf allen Gebieten der Philosophie tätig war und andererseits nach seiner Berufung zum Professor der Theologie ausschließlich an seinem theologischen OEuvre arbeitete. Auf der damit greifbaren Spannung zwischen Philosophie und Theologie liegt ein Hauptaugenmerk des interdisziplinären Sammelbandes.