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1Causation and ReductionIn Helen Beebee, Christopher Hitchcock & Peter Menzies (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Causation, Oxford University Press. 2009.
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4Wesley C. Salmon 1925-2001: A Symposium Honoring His Contributions to the Philosophy of Science-Some Thoughts on Wesley Salmon's Contributions to the Philosophy of Probability (review)Philosophy of Science 71 (5): 942-949. 2004.Wesley Salmon provided three classic criteria of adequacy for satisfactory interpretations of probability. A fourth criterion is suggested here. A distinction is drawn between frequency-driven probability models and theory-driven probability models and it is argued that single case accounts of chance are superior to frequency accounts at least for the latter. Finally it is suggested that theories of chance should be required only to be contingently true, a position which is a natural extension o…Read more
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78Speculative OntologyIn Don Ross, James Ladyman & Harold Kincaid (eds.), Scientific metaphysics, Oxford University Press. pp. 51. 2013.
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34Mathematical Modeling in the Social SciencesIn Stephen P. Turner & Paul A. Roth (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Blackwell. 2003.This chapter contains sections titled: Why Use Mathematical Models? Theory‐based Models Data‐based Modeling Computational Approaches Conclusions Notes.
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45Computational Science and its EffectsIn M. Carrier & A. Nordmann (eds.), Science in the Context of Application, Springer. pp. 131--142. 2011.
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6Observation and Reliable DetectionIn Maria Luisa Dalla Chiara (ed.), Language, Quantum, Music, . pp. 19--24. 1999.
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21Scientific knowledgeIn M. Sintonen, J. Wolenski & I. Niiniluoto (eds.), Handbook of Epistemology, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 549--569. 2004.
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16Teorías de causación y explicación:¿ necesariamente verdaderas o dominio-específicas?Enrahonar: Quaderns de Filosofía 37 19-33. 2005.
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34Letters to the EditorProceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 69 (5). 1996.
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76Understanding in the Not-So-Special SciencesSouthern Journal of Philosophy 34 (S1): 99-114. 1996.
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21Conceptual Sea ChangesSpontaneous Generations 4 (1): 111-115. 2010.The reshaping of much scientific research around computational methods is not just a technological curiosity. It results in a significant reshaping of conceptual and representational resources within science in ways with which many traditional philosophical positions are ill-equipped to cope. Some illustrations of this are provided and a consequence for the roles of science and the arts is noted
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51Self‐Assembling SystemsPhilosophy of Science 73 (5): 595-604. 2006.Starting with the view that methodological constraints depend upon the nature of the system investigated, a tripartite division between theoretical, semitheoretical, and empirical discoveries is made. Many nanosystems can only be investigated semitheoretically or empirically, and this aspect leads to some nanophenomena being weakly emergent. Self-assembling systems are used as an example, their existence suggesting that the class of systems that is not Kim-reducible may be quite large.
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121Network EpistemologyEpisteme 6 (2): 221-229. 2009.A comparison is made between some epistemological issues arising in computer networks and standard features of social epistemology. A definition of knowledge for computational devices is provided and the topics of nonconceptual content and testimony are discussed
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91Dynamical emergence and computation: An introduction (review)Minds and Machines 18 (4): 425-430. 2008.
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128Computational modelsProceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2002 (3). 2002.A different way of thinking about how the sciences are organized is suggested by the use of cross‐disciplinary computational methods as the organizing unit of science, here called computational templates. The structure of computational models is articulated using the concepts of construction assumptions and correction sets. The existence of these features indicates that certain conventionalist views are incorrect, in particular it suggests that computational models come with an interpretation th…Read more
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187Some considerations on conditional chancesBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (4): 667-680. 2004.Four interpretations of single-case conditional propensities are described and it is shown that for each a version of what has been called ‘Humphreys' Paradox’ remains, despite the clarifying work of Gillies, McCurdy and Miller. This entails that propensities cannot be a satisfactory interpretation of standard probability theory. Introduction The basic issue The formal paradox Values of conditional propensities Interpretations of propensities McCurdy's response Miller's response Other possibilit…Read more
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21Publisher's noteFoundations of Science 1 (3): 1-1. 1995.As Chinese Studies in Philosophy enters its twenty-fifth year, we wish to thank the editor since its inception, Professor Cheng Chung-ying of the University of Hawaii, for his many years of service, and to welcome with this issue our new editor, Professor Michael Schoenhals of Stockholm University
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84Computational empiricismFoundations of Science 1 (1): 119-130. 1995.I argue here for a number of ways that modern computational science requires a change in the way we represent the relationship between theory and applications. It requires a switch away from logical reconstruction of theories in order to take surface mathematical syntax seriously. In addition, syntactically different versions of the same theory have important differences for applications, and this shows that the semantic account of theories is inappropriate for some purposes. I also argue agains…Read more
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74Some Thoughts on Wesley Salmon’s Contributions to the Philosophy of ProbabilityPhilosophy of Science 71 (5): 942-949. 2004.Wesley Salmon provided three classic criteria of adequacy for satisfactory interpretations of probability. A fourth criterion is suggested here. A distinction is drawn between frequency‐driven probability models and theory‐driven probability models and it is argued that single case accounts of chance are superior to frequency accounts at least for the latter. Finally it is suggested that theories of chance should be required only to be contingently true, a position which is a natural extension o…Read more
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422How properties emergePhilosophy of Science 64 (1): 1-17. 1997.A framework for representing a specific kind of emergent property instance is given. A solution to a generalized version of the exclusion argument is then provided and it is shown that upwards and downwards causation is unproblematical for that kind of emergence. One real example of this kind of emergence is briefly described and the suggestion made that emergence may be more common than current opinions allow
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Patrick Suppes, Scientific Philosopher Vol. 1: Probability and Probabilistic Causality (edited book)Kluwer Academic Publishers. 1994.
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262Synchronic and diachronic emergenceMinds and Machines 18 (4): 431-442. 2008.I discuss here a number of different kinds of diachronic emergence, noting that they differ in important ways from synchronic conceptions. I argue that Bedau’s weak emergence has an essentially historical aspect, in that there can be two indistinguishable states, one of which is weakly emergent, the other of which is not. As a consequence, weak emergence is about tokens, not types, of states. I conclude by examining the question of whether the concept of weak emergence is too weak and note that …Read more
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115Computational science and scientific methodMinds and Machines 5 (4): 499-512. 1995.The process of constructing mathematical models is examined and a case made that the construction process is an integral part of the justification for the model. The role of heuristics in testing and modifying models is described and some consequences for scientific methodology are drawn out. Three different ways of constructing the same model are detailed to demonstrate the claims made here.
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21Models as mediators: perspectives on natural and social scienceStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 33 (2): 374-377. 2002.
Charlottesville, Virginia, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Science, Logic, and Mathematics |
Areas of Interest
Science, Logic, and Mathematics |
Computer Science |