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261Aleatory Explanations ExpandedPSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982. 1982.Existing definitions of relevance relations are essentially ambiguous outside the binary case. Hence definitions of probabilistic causality based on relevance relations, as well as probability values based on maximal specificity conditions and homogeneous reference classes are also not uniquely specified. A 'neutral state' account of explanations is provided to avoid the problem, based on an earlier account of aleatory explanations by the author. Further reasons in support of this model are give…Read more
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139Computer SimulationsPSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990. 1990.This article provides a survey of some of the reasons why computational approaches have become a permanent addition to the set of scientific methods. The reasons for this require us to represent the relation between theories and their applications in a different way than do the traditional logical accounts extant in the philosophical literature. A working definition of computer simulations is provided and some properties of simulations are explored by considering an example from quantum chemistr…Read more
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13Consensus Institute StaffIn C. Wade Savage (ed.), Scientific Theories, University of Minnesota Press. pp. 417. 1990.
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264
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407Knowledge transfer across scientific disciplinesStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 77 112-119. 2019.
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109Unknowable TruthsLogos and Episteme 2 (4): 543-555. 2011.This paper addresses a solution due to Michael Fara to the Church/Fitch paradox of knowability. Fara’s solution has significant interest but the paradox can beresurrected within his approach by considering a slightly more complex sentence. The issue of what counts as an epistemological capability for enhanced agents is then discussed with some emphasis on the developmental heritage of agents and their ability to transcend conceptual frameworks.
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42Emergence: A Philosophical AccountOup Usa. 2016.Emergence develops a novel account of diachronic ontological emergence called transformational emergence and locates it in an established historical framework. The author shows how many problems affecting ontological emergence result from a dominant but inappropriate metaphysical tradition and provides a comprehensive assessment of current theories of emergence.
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28This collects some of the remarks made at the 2016 Pacific APA Memorial session for Patrick Suppes and Jaakko Hintikka. The full list of speakers on behalf of these two philosophers: Dagfinn Follesdal; Dana Scott; Nancy Cartwright; Paul Humphreys; Juliet Floyd; Gabriel Sandu; John Symons.
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44Computational ModelsPhilosophy of Science 69 (S3). 2002.A different way of thinking about how the sciences are organized is suggested by the use of cross-disciplinary computational methods as the organizing unit of science, here called computational templates. The structure of computational models is articulated using the concepts of construction assumptions and correction sets. The existence of these features indicates that certain conventionalist views are incorrect, in particular it suggests that computational models come with an interpretation th…Read more
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49Emergence, Not SuperveniencePhilosophy of Science 64 (S4). 1997.I argue that supervenience is an inadequate device for representing relations between different levels of phenomena. I then provide six criteria that emergent phenomena seem to satisfy. Using examples drawn from macroscopic physics, I suggest that such emergent features may well be quite common in the physical realm.
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2PrefaceIn Jim Woodward (ed.), The Chances of Explanation: Causal Explanation in the Social, Medical and Physical Sciences, Princeton University Press. 1993.
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3Chapter four. Scientific explanationsIn Jim Woodward (ed.), The Chances of Explanation: Causal Explanation in the Social, Medical and Physical Sciences, Princeton University Press. pp. 98-142. 1993.
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3Appendix three. Transitivity and negative linksIn Jim Woodward (ed.), The Chances of Explanation: Causal Explanation in the Social, Medical and Physical Sciences, Princeton University Press. pp. 153-157. 1993.
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6Chapter one. Traditional causationIn Jim Woodward (ed.), The Chances of Explanation: Causal Explanation in the Social, Medical and Physical Sciences, Princeton University Press. pp. 3-21. 1993.
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18Chapter three. Cause and chanceIn Jim Woodward (ed.), The Chances of Explanation: Causal Explanation in the Social, Medical and Physical Sciences, Princeton University Press. pp. 61-97. 1993.
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3Appendix two. Extension of the basic quantitative theoryIn Jim Woodward (ed.), The Chances of Explanation: Causal Explanation in the Social, Medical and Physical Sciences, Princeton University Press. pp. 145-152. 1993.
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1ContentsIn Jim Woodward (ed.), The Chances of Explanation: Causal Explanation in the Social, Medical and Physical Sciences, Princeton University Press. 1993.
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3Appendix one. Covariance measuresIn Jim Woodward (ed.), The Chances of Explanation: Causal Explanation in the Social, Medical and Physical Sciences, Princeton University Press. pp. 143-144. 1993.
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2IndexIn Jim Woodward (ed.), The Chances of Explanation: Causal Explanation in the Social, Medical and Physical Sciences, Princeton University Press. pp. 167-170. 1993.
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17Chapter two. Probabilistic causationIn Jim Woodward (ed.), The Chances of Explanation: Causal Explanation in the Social, Medical and Physical Sciences, Princeton University Press. pp. 22-60. 1993.
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1ReferencesIn Jim Woodward (ed.), The Chances of Explanation: Causal Explanation in the Social, Medical and Physical Sciences, Princeton University Press. pp. 158-166. 1993.
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3Book Reviews : Jon Elster, Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989. Pp. viii, US$34.50 (cloth), US$9.95 (paper (review)Philosophy of the Social Sciences 21 (1): 114-121. 1991.
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64Explanation as Condition SatisfactionPhilosophy of Science 81 (5): 1103-1116. 2014.It is shown that three common conditions for scientific explanations are violated by a widely used class of domain-independent explanations. These explanations can accommodate both complex and noncomplex systems and do not require the use of detailed models of system-specific processes for their effectiveness, although they are compatible with such model-based explanations. The approach also shows how a clean separation can be maintained between mathematical representations and empirical content
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