• PhilPapers
  • PhilPeople
  • PhilArchive
  • PhilEvents
  • PhilJobs
  • Sign in
PhilPeople
 
  • Sign in
  • News Feed
  • Find Philosophers
  • Departments
  • Radar
  • Help
 
profile-cover
Drag to reposition
profile picture

Deborah Mayo

Virginia Tech
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    67
    • Most Recent
    • Most Downloaded
    • Topics
  •  Events
    8
  •  News and Updates
    15

 More details
  • Virginia Tech
    Department of Philosophy
    Retired faculty
Blacksburg, Virginia, United States of America
  • All publications (67)
  •  175
    Error statistics and learning from error: Making a virtue of necessity
    Philosophy of Science 64 (4): 212. 1997.
    The error statistical account of testing uses statistical considerations, not to provide a measure of probability of hypotheses, but to model patterns of irregularity that are useful for controlling, distinguishing, and learning from errors. The aim of this paper is (1) to explain the main points of contrast between the error statistical and the subjective Bayesian approach and (2) to elucidate the key errors that underlie the central objection raised by Colin Howson at our PSA 96 Symposium
    Bayesian Reasoning, Misc
  •  480
    Ducks, Rabbits, and Normal Science: Recasting the Kuhn’s-Eye View of Popper’s Demarcation of Science
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (2): 271-290. 1996.
    Kuhn maintains that what marks the transition to a science is the ability to carry out ‘normal’ science—a practice he characterizes as abandoning the kind of testing that Popper lauds as the hallmark of science. Examining Kuhn's own contrast with Popper, I propose to recast Kuhnian normal science. Thus recast, it is seen to consist of severe and reliable tests of low-level experimental hypotheses (normal tests) and is, indeed, the place to look to demarcate science. While thereby vindicating Kuh…Read more
    Kuhn maintains that what marks the transition to a science is the ability to carry out ‘normal’ science—a practice he characterizes as abandoning the kind of testing that Popper lauds as the hallmark of science. Examining Kuhn's own contrast with Popper, I propose to recast Kuhnian normal science. Thus recast, it is seen to consist of severe and reliable tests of low-level experimental hypotheses (normal tests) and is, indeed, the place to look to demarcate science. While thereby vindicating Kuhn on demarcation, my recasting of normal science is seen to tell against Kuhn's view of revolutionary science.
    Demarcation of ScienceThomas KuhnPopper: Demarcation of Science
  •  89
    Understanding frequency-dependent causation
    Philosophical Studies 49 (1). 1986.
    Theories of Causation
  •  114
    Severe tests, arguing from error, and methodological underdetermination
    Philosophical Studies 86 (3): 243-266. 1997.
    Underdetermination of Theory by Data, Misc
  •  80
    An error in the argument from conditionality and sufficiency to the likelihood principle
    In Deborah G. Mayo & Aris Spanos (eds.), Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability, and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science, Cambridge University Press. pp. 305. 2009.
    Philosophy of StatisticsBayesian ReasoningFrequentism
  •  51
    Philosophy of Science Association
    In Richard Boyd, Philip Gasper & J. D. Trout (eds.), The Philosophy of Science, Mit Press. pp. 58--4. 1991.
    General Philosophy of Science, Misc
  •  78
    Learning from error, severe testing, and the growth of theoretical knowledge
    In Deborah G. Mayo & Aris Spanos (eds.), Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability, and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science, Cambridge University Press. pp. 28. 2009.
    General RelativityDecision Theory and Hypothesis TestingPhilosophy of StatisticsEvidence, MiscScient…Read more
    General RelativityDecision Theory and Hypothesis TestingPhilosophy of StatisticsEvidence, MiscScientific Change, MiscQuine-Duhem Thesis
  • Prev.
  • 1
  • 2
  • 3
  • Next
PhilPeople logo

On this site

  • Find a philosopher
  • Find a department
  • The Radar
  • Index of professional philosophers
  • Index of departments
  • Help
  • Acknowledgments
  • Careers
  • Contact us
  • Terms and conditions

Brought to you by

  • The PhilPapers Foundation
  • The American Philosophical Association
  • Centre for Digital Philosophy, Western University
PhilPeople is currently in Beta Sponsored by the PhilPapers Foundation and the American Philosophical Association
Feedback