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56Error and the growth of experimental knowledgeInternational Studies in the Philosophy of Science 15 (1): 455-459. 1996.
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101The error statistical philosopher as normative naturalistSynthese 163 (3). 2008.We argue for a naturalistic account for appraising scientific methods that carries non-trivial normative force. We develop our approach by comparison with Laudan’s (American Philosophical Quarterly 24:19–31, 1987, Philosophy of Science 57:20–33, 1990) “normative naturalism” based on correlating means (various scientific methods) with ends (e.g., reliability). We argue that such a meta-methodology based on means–ends correlations is unreliable and cannot achieve its normative goals. We suggest an…Read more
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166Did Pearson reject the Neyman-Pearson philosophy of statistics?Synthese 90 (2). 1992.I document some of the main evidence showing that E. S. Pearson rejected the key features of the behavioral-decision philosophy that became associated with the Neyman-Pearson Theory of statistics (NPT). I argue that NPT principles arose not out of behavioral aims, where the concern is solely with behaving correctly sufficiently often in some long run, but out of the epistemological aim of learning about causes of experimental results (e.g., distinguishing genuine from spurious effects). The view…Read more
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69Error and the Growth of Experimental KnowledgePhilosophical Review 107 (2): 324. 1998.Once upon a time, logic was the philosopher’s tool for analyzing scientific reasoning. Nowadays, probability and statistics have largely replaced logic, and their most popular application—Bayesianism—has replaced the qualitative deductive relationship between a hypothesis h and evidence e with a quantitative measure of h’s probability in light of e.
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36Response to Howson and LaudanPhilosophy of Science 64 (2): 323-333. 1997.A toast is due to one who slays Misguided followers of Bayes, And in their heart strikes fear and terror With probabilities of error! (E.L. Lehmann)
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25NewPerspectiveson (SomeOld) Problems of Frequentist StatisticsIn Deborah G. Mayo & Aris Spanos (eds.), Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability, and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science, Cambridge University Press. pp. 247. 2010.
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224How everyone can have a rare property: Response to Sober on frequency-dependent causationPhilosophy of Science 54 (2): 266-276. 1987.In a recent discussion note Sober (1985) elaborates on the argument given in Sober (1982) to show the inadequacy of Ronald Giere's (1979, 1980) causal model for cases of frequency-dependent causation, and denies that Giere's (1984) response avoids the problem he raises. I argue that frequency-dependent effects do not pose a problem for Giere's original causal model, and that all parties in this dispute have been guity of misinterpreting the counterfactual populations involved in applying Giere's…Read more
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62The Philosophical Relevance of StatisticsPSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1980. 1980.While philosophers have studied probability and induction, statistics has not received the kind of philosophical attention mathematics and physics have. Despite increasing use of statistics in science, statistical advances have been little noted in the philosophy of science literature. This paper shows the relevance of statistics to both theoretical and applied problems of philosophy. It begins by discussing the relevance of statistics to the problem of induction and then discusses the reasoning…Read more
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59Evidence as Passing Severe Tests: Highly Probable versus Highly Probed HypothesesIn P. Achinstein (ed.), Scientific Evidence: Philosophical Theories & Applications, The Johns Hopkins University Press. pp. 95--128. 2005.
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232Behavioristic, evidentialist, and learning models of statistical testingPhilosophy of Science 52 (4): 493-516. 1985.While orthodox (Neyman-Pearson) statistical tests enjoy widespread use in science, the philosophical controversy over their appropriateness for obtaining scientific knowledge remains unresolved. I shall suggest an explanation and a resolution of this controversy. The source of the controversy, I argue, is that orthodox tests are typically interpreted as rules for making optimal decisions as to how to behave--where optimality is measured by the frequency of errors the test would commit in a long …Read more
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381Severe testing as a basic concept in a neyman–pearson philosophy of inductionBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (2): 323-357. 2006.Despite the widespread use of key concepts of the Neyman–Pearson (N–P) statistical paradigm—type I and II errors, significance levels, power, confidence levels—they have been the subject of philosophical controversy and debate for over 60 years. Both current and long-standing problems of N–P tests stem from unclarity and confusion, even among N–P adherents, as to how a test's (pre-data) error probabilities are to be used for (post-data) inductive inference as opposed to inductive behavior. We ar…Read more
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