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171Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability, and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science (edited book)Cambridge University Press. 2009.Although both philosophers and scientists are interested in how to obtain reliable knowledge in the face of error, there is a gap between their perspectives that has been an obstacle to progress. By means of a series of exchanges between the editors and leaders from the philosophy of science, statistics and economics, this volume offers a cumulative introduction connecting problems of traditional philosophy of science to problems of inference in statistical and empirical modelling practice. Phil…Read more
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148Error statistical modeling and inference: Where methodology meets ontologySynthese 192 (11): 3533-3555. 2015.In empirical modeling, an important desiderata for deeming theoretical entities and processes as real is that they can be reproducible in a statistical sense. Current day crises regarding replicability in science intertwines with the question of how statistical methods link data to statistical and substantive theories and models. Different answers to this question have important methodological consequences for inference, which are intertwined with a contrast between the ontological commitments o…Read more
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9An ad hoc save of a theory of adhocness? Exchanges with John WorrallIn Deborah G. Mayo & Aris Spanos (eds.), Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability, and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science, Cambridge University Press. 2009.
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60Toward a More Objective Understanding of the Evidence of Carcinogenic RiskPSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988. 1988.I argue that although the judgments required to reach statistical risk assessments may reflect policy values, it does not follow that the task of evaluating whether a given risk assessment is warranted by the evidence need also be imbued with policy values. What has led many to conclude otherwise, I claim, stems from misuses of the statistical testing methods involved. I set out rules for interpreting what specific test results do and do not say about the extent of a given risk. By providing a m…Read more
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225Philosophical Scrutiny of Evidence of Risks: From Bioethics to BioevidencePhilosophy of Science 73 (5): 803-816. 2006.We argue that a responsible analysis of today's evidence-based risk assessments and risk debates in biology demands a critical or metascientific scrutiny of the uncertainties, assumptions, and threats of error along the manifold steps in risk analysis. Without an accompanying methodological critique, neither sensitivity to social and ethical values, nor conceptual clarification alone, suffices. In this view, restricting the invitation for philosophical involvement to those wearing a "bioethicist…Read more
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317Models of group selectionPhilosophy of Science 54 (4): 515-538. 1987.The key problem in the controversy over group selection is that of defining a criterion of group selection that identifies a distinct causal process that is irreducible to the causal process of individual selection. We aim to clarify this problem and to formulate an adequate model of irreducible group selection. We distinguish two types of group selection models, labeling them type I and type II models. Type I models are invoked to explain differences among groups in their respective rates of pr…Read more
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56Error and the growth of experimental knowledgeInternational Studies in the Philosophy of Science 15 (1): 455-459. 1996.
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