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48Objectivity and conditionality in frequentist inferenceIn Deborah G. Mayo & Aris Spanos (eds.), Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability, and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science, Cambridge University Press. pp. 276. 2009.
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36Philosophy of Science AssociationIn Richard Boyd, Philip Gasper & J. D. Trout (eds.), The Philosophy of Science, Mit Press. pp. 58--4. 1991.
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130Models of group selectionPhilosophy of Science 54 (4): 515-538. 1987.The key problem in the controversy over group selection is that of defining a criterion of group selection that identifies a distinct causal process that is irreducible to the causal process of individual selection. We aim to clarify this problem and to formulate an adequate model of irreducible group selection. We distinguish two types of group selection models, labeling them type I and type II models. Type I models are invoked to explain differences among groups in their respective rates of pr…Read more
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55Error statistics and learning from error: Making a virtue of necessityPhilosophy of Science 64 (4): 212. 1997.The error statistical account of testing uses statistical considerations, not to provide a measure of probability of hypotheses, but to model patterns of irregularity that are useful for controlling, distinguishing, and learning from errors. The aim of this paper is (1) to explain the main points of contrast between the error statistical and the subjective Bayesian approach and (2) to elucidate the key errors that underlie the central objection raised by Colin Howson at our PSA 96 Symposium
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249Ducks, Rabbits, and Normal Science: Recasting the Kuhn’s-Eye View of Popper’s Demarcation of ScienceBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (2): 271-290. 1996.Kuhn maintains that what marks the transition to a science is the ability to carry out ‘normal’ science—a practice he characterizes as abandoning the kind of testing that Popper lauds as the hallmark of science. Examining Kuhn's own contrast with Popper, I propose to recast Kuhnian normal science. Thus recast, it is seen to consist of severe and reliable tests of low-level experimental hypotheses (normal tests) and is, indeed, the place to look to demarcate science. While thereby vindicating Kuh…Read more
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14The Objective Epistemic Probabilist and the Severe TesterIn Gregory J. Morgan (ed.), Philosophy of Science Matters: The Philosophy of Peter Achinstein, Oxford University Press. pp. 135. 2011.
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9An ad hoc save of a theory of adhocness? Exchanges with John WorrallIn Deborah G. Mayo & Aris Spanos (eds.), Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability, and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science, Cambridge University Press. 2009.
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41Some problems with Chow's problems with powerBehavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (2): 212-213. 1998.Chow correctly pinpoints several confusions in the criticisms of statistical hypothesis testing but his book is considerably weakened by its own confusions about concepts of testing (perhaps owing to an often very confusing literature). My focus is on his critique of power analysis (Ch. 6). Having denied that NHSTP considers alternative statistical hypotheses, and having been misled by a quotation from Cohen, Chow finds power analysis conceptually suspect.
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23On After-Trial Criticisms of Neyman-Pearson Theory of StatisticsPSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982. 1982.Despite its widespread use in science, the Neyman-Pearson Theory of Statistics (NPT) has been rejected as inadequate by most philosophers of induction and statistics. They base their rejection largely upon what the author refers to as after-trial criticisms of NPT. Such criticisms attempt to show that NPT fails to provide an adequate analysis of specific inferences after the trial is made, and the data is known. In this paper, the key types of after-trial criticisms are considered and it is argu…Read more
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Introduction and backgroundIn Deborah G. Mayo & Aris Spanos (eds.), Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability, and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science, Cambridge University Press. 2009.
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