Blacksburg, Virginia, United States of America
  •  60
    Although both philosophers and scientists are interested in how to obtain reliable knowledge in the face of error, there is a gap between their perspectives that has been an obstacle to progress. By means of a series of exchanges between the editors and leaders from the philosophy of science, statistics and economics, this volume offers a cumulative introduction connecting problems of traditional philosophy of science to problems of inference in statistical and empirical modelling practice. Phil…Read more
  •  75
    Theories of statistical testing may be seen as attempts to provide systematic means for evaluating scientific conjectures on the basis of incomplete or inaccurate observational data. The Neyman-Pearson Theory of Testing (NPT) has purported to provide an objective means for testing statistical hypotheses corresponding to scientific claims. Despite their widespread use in science, methods of NPT have themselves been accused of failing to be objective; and the purported objectivity of scientific cl…Read more
  •  96
    Peircean Induction and the Error-Correcting Thesis
    Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 41 (2). 2005.
  •  72
    In defense of the Neyman-Pearson theory of confidence intervals
    Philosophy of Science 48 (2): 269-280. 1981.
    In Philosophical Problems of Statistical Inference, Seidenfeld argues that the Neyman-Pearson (NP) theory of confidence intervals is inadequate for a theory of inductive inference because, for a given situation, the 'best' NP confidence interval, [CIλ], sometimes yields intervals which are trivial (i.e., tautologous). I argue that (1) Seidenfeld's criticism of trivial intervals is based upon illegitimately interpreting confidence levels as measures of final precision; (2) for the situation which…Read more
  •  56
    Error and the growth of experimental knowledge
    International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 15 (1): 455-459. 1996.
  •  167
    I document some of the main evidence showing that E. S. Pearson rejected the key features of the behavioral-decision philosophy that became associated with the Neyman-Pearson Theory of statistics (NPT). I argue that NPT principles arose not out of behavioral aims, where the concern is solely with behaving correctly sufficiently often in some long run, but out of the epistemological aim of learning about causes of experimental results (e.g., distinguishing genuine from spurious effects). The view…Read more
  •  101
    We argue for a naturalistic account for appraising scientific methods that carries non-trivial normative force. We develop our approach by comparison with Laudan’s (American Philosophical Quarterly 24:19–31, 1987, Philosophy of Science 57:20–33, 1990) “normative naturalism” based on correlating means (various scientific methods) with ends (e.g., reliability). We argue that such a meta-methodology based on means–ends correlations is unreliable and cannot achieve its normative goals. We suggest an…Read more
  •  54
    Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge
    with Michael Kruse
    Philosophical Review 107 (2): 324. 1998.
    Once upon a time, logic was the philosopher’s tool for analyzing scientific reasoning. Nowadays, probability and statistics have largely replaced logic, and their most popular application—Bayesianism—has replaced the qualitative deductive relationship between a hypothesis h and evidence e with a quantitative measure of h’s probability in light of e.
  •  37
    Response to Howson and Laudan
    Philosophy of Science 64 (2): 323-333. 1997.
    A toast is due to one who slays Misguided followers of Bayes, And in their heart strikes fear and terror With probabilities of error! (E.L. Lehmann)