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129A Defense of McDowell’s Response to the ScepticActa Analytica 29 (1): 43-59. 2014.Crispin Wright argues that John McDowell’s use of disjunctivism to respond to the sceptic misses the point of the sceptic’s argument, for disjunctivism is a thesis about the differing metaphysical natures of veridical and nonveridical experiences, whereas the sceptic’s point is that our beliefs are unjustified because veridical and nonveridical experiences can be phenomenally indistinguishable. In this paper, I argue that McDowell is responsive to the sceptic’s focus on phenomenology, for the po…Read more
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162The intuitive case for naïve realismPhilosophical Explorations 20 (1): 106-122. 2017.Naïve realism, the view that perceptual experiences are irreducible relations between subjects and external objects, has intuitive appeal, but this intuitive appeal is sometimes thought to be undermined by the possibility of certain kinds of hallucinations. In this paper, I present the intuitive case for naïve realism, and explain why this intuitive case is not undermined by the possibility of such hallucinations. Specifically, I present the intuitive case for naïve realism as arguing that the o…Read more
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64Kant's Theory of Knowledge: An Analytical Introduction ‐ By Georges Dicker (review)Philosophical Books 47 (4): 357-359. 2006.
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19Consciousness, Experience, and JustificationCanadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (1): 1-28. 2002.A belief must have justification if it is to count as knowledge. And it is a commonplace thought that in certain circumstances experiences can serve as justifications for beliefs. Moreover, many have thought that there is something distinctive about the wayin which experiences justify beliefs, and that there is something distinctive about experiences which accounts for the distinctive way in which they justify beliefs. In this paper, I seek to elucidate views about experience and justification t…Read more
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171Rationality, Justification, and the Internalism/Externalism DebateErkenntnis 68 (1): 79-101. 2008.In this paper, I argue that what underlies internalism about justification is a rationalist conception of justification, not a deontological conception of justification, and I argue for the plausibility of this rationalist conception of justification. The rationalist conception of justification is the view that a justified belief is a belief that is held in a rational way; since we exercise our rationality through conscious deliberation, the rationalist conception holds that a belief is justifie…Read more
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88Kant's compatibilism and his two conceptions of truthPacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (2). 2000.In this paper, I explain how Kant's views can be reconciled, and I argue that the relevance of transcendental idealism here is that it shows that determinism is known to be true, not in accordance with the familiar correspondence notion of truth, but only in accordance with a weaker notion of truth, Kant's empirical notion of truth, which is a kind of coherence notion of truth. (edited)
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89A Defense of Restricted Phenomenal ConservatismPhilosophical Papers 42 (3). 2013.In this paper, I criticize Michael Huemer's phenomenal conservatism, the theory of justification according to which if it seems to S that p, then in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has at least some degree of justification for believing that p. Specifically, I argue that beliefs and hunches provide counterexamples to phenomenal conservatism. I then defend a version of restricted phenomenal conservatism, the view that some but not all appearances confer prima facie justification on their prop…Read more
Charlottesville, Virginia, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Mind |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Mind |