Thomas Blackson

In “Knowledge, Bets, and Interests,” Brian Weatherson makes a suggestion for how to frame a decision problem. He argues that “the states we can ‘leave off’ a decision table are the states that the agent knows not to obtain.” I present and defend an example that shows that Weatherson’s principle is false. Weatherson is correct to think that some intuitively rational decisions wouldn’t be rational if states the agent knows not to obtain were not omitted from the outcomes in the decision problem. This, however, is not true of every rational decision. Weatherson’s principle for how to frame a decision problem is open to counterexample.

This book may well become the definitive work on Philo of Larissa. It is comprehensive, and the knowledge of the texts and their historical contexts is impressive. My only concern is with the philosophical exposition. Philo is an important figure in the history of epistemology, and it seems to me that his contribution should have been specified more clearly. This of course is a tall order. Ancient epistemology is a difficult subject, and my desire for a clearer exposition is more of a wish than a criticism. Philo of Larissa is a very good book.

Keith DeRose gives an invalid argument for contextualism in “Assertion, Knowledge, and Context.” In section 2.4, entitled “The Argument for Contextualism,” DeRose makes the following remarks. “The knowledge account of assertion provides a powerful argument for contextualism: If the standards for when one is in a position to warrantedly assert that P are the same as those that comprise a truth-condition for ‘I know P,’ then if the former vary with context, so do the latter. In short: The knowledge account of assertion together with the context-sensitivity of assertability yields contextualism about knowledge”.