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15Gerhard Martin Wölfle, Die Wesenslogik in Hegels “Wissenschaft der Logik”, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1994, pp 549, Hb DM180 (review)Hegel Bulletin 16 (2): 40-47. 1995.
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5Jens Brockmeier, “Reines Denken”: Zur Kritik der teleologischen Denkform, Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Verlag B R Grüner, 1992, pp 331, Hb Hfl 165/$95 (review)Hegel Bulletin 14 (1-2): 79-85. 1993.
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6Gilbert Gérard, Critique et Dialectique: l'itinéraire de Hegel à Jena . Bruxelles, Facultés universitaires Saint-Louis, 1982, pp. viii, 456 (review)Hegel Bulletin 5 (2): 42-45. 1984.
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10Alan White, Absolute Knowledge: Hegel and the Problem of Metaphysics. Athens, Ohio/Landon, Ohio University Press, 1983, pp. xi, 188, hardback £18.40, paperback £9.60 (review)Hegel Bulletin 5 (1): 36-41. 1984.
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21Right and Trust in Hegel’s Philosophy of RightHegel Bulletin 37 (1): 104-116. 2016.According to Hegel, true freedom consists not just in arbitrariness, but in the free willing of right. Right in turn is fully realised in the laws and institutions of ethical life. The ethical subject, for Hegel, is a practical subject that acts in accordance with ethical laws; yet it is also a theoretical, cognitive subject that recognizes the laws and institutions of ethical life as embodiments of right. Such recognition can be self-conscious and reflective; but it can, and indeed must, also b…Read more
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84Hegel on the Personhood of GodThe Owl of Minerva 39-58. 2017.In this essay, I examine Robert Williams’s account of Hegel’s concept of divine “personhood.” I endorse Williams’s claims that God, for Hegel, is not a person but exhibits only personhood, and that divine personhood realises itself in a human community based on mutual recognition. I take issue, however, with Williams’s further claim that Hegel also takes God and humanity to stand in a relation of mutual recognition to one another, since this claim, in my view, risks turning God into a person aft…Read more
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55Enseñando a hablar inglés a la filosofía hegeliana Entrevista a Stephen HoulgateIdeas Y Valores 66 (165): 373-411. 2017.RESUMEN Largamente desatendida o malinterpretada, la noción de caos en la filosofía de Nietzsche es una pieza constitutiva de la particular concepción del ser que este autor habría dejado apenas esbozada. El artículo se propone elaborar este concepto en la obra nietzscheana, siguiendo algunas de las metáforas que lo iluminan. Desde allí se busca plantear los rasgos centrales de una ontologia del caos, de sesgo no metafísico, que, al afirmar el carácter acontecimental de la realidad, puede verse …Read more
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7Right and Trust in Hegel’s Philosophy of RightIn Anders Moe Rasmussen & Markus Gabriel (eds.), German Idealism Today, De Gruyter. pp. 121-134. 2017.
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24Thought and Experience in Hegel and McDowellEuropean Journal of Philosophy 14 (2): 242-261. 2006.
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17Hegel and FichteThe Owl of Minerva 26 (1): 3-19. 1994.In his excellent recent book, Recognition: Fichte and Hegel on the Other, Robert Williams argues that, contrary to what many commentators claim, Hegel’s philosophy does not seek to swallow up individuality and difference in an all-embracing and all-consuming absolute, but rather takes individuality and differentiation seriously as essential features of the society and the world in which we live. Williams defends this interpretation by arguing that Hegel understands all forms of genuine human com…Read more
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15Response to Professor HorstmannProceedings of the Eighth International Kant Congress 1 1017-1023. 1995.
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54Hegel at Oxford, 1985The Owl of Minerva 18 (1): 103-109. 1986.The Seventh Annual Conference of the Hegel Society of Great Britain took place on September 12–13, 1985 at Pembroke College, Oxford. The theme of the conference was Hegel’s political philosophy.
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37Hegel at Oxford, 1984The Owl of Minerva 17 (1): 121-126. 1985.The Sixth Annual Conference of the Hegel Society of Great Britain took place on September 13–14, 1984 at the same venue as the 1983 conference, St. Edmund Hall, Oxford. The topic for this year’s conference was “The Young Hegel,” and the papers covered various aspects of Hegel’s thought in the period before 1803.
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39Hegel at OxfordThe Owl of Minerva 15 (2): 246-250. 1984.The Fifth Annual Conference of the Hegel Society of Great Britain took place on September 15–16, 1983 in the delightful setting of St. Edmund Hall, Oxford. The theme of this year’s conference - “Hegel’s Dialectic” - was approached in a variety of ways by the contributors and provoked several lively and interesting discussions. The first paper of the conference was to have been given by Howard Williams, but unfortunately he had found his way to Pembroke College instead of St. Edmund Hall and so w…Read more
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137I—Hegel's Critique of KantAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 89 (1): 21-41. 2015.In this essay I argue that Hegel criticizes Kant for failing to carry out a thorough critique of the categories of thought. In Hegel's view, Kant merely limits the validity of the categories to objects of possible experience, but he does not challenge the way in which the ‘understanding’ conceives of those categories and other concepts. Indeed, for Hegel, Kant's limitation of the validity of the categories itself presupposes the sharp distinctions, drawn by understanding, between concepts such a…Read more
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74G. W. F. Hegel: The Phenomenology of SpiritIn Robert C. Solomon & David Sherman (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Continental Philosophy, Blackwell. 1831.This chapter contains sections titled: Freedom and Mutual Recognition Consciousness, Self‐Consciousness, and Desire From Desire to Mutual Recognition The Dialectic of Master and Slave Death, Forgiveness, and Mutual Recognition.
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131Response to John McDowellThe Owl of Minerva 41 (1/2): 39-51. 2009.In this response, I accept some of McDowell’s criticisms of my presentation of his views in my essay, but argue that his understanding of Hegel remains problematic. In particular, I claim that he fails to see that, for Kant, intuitional unit y is inseparable from judging; that his understanding of Hegelian absolute knowing is wrong as it stands ; that he fails to see that self-consciousness aims, not to overcome the specific antithesis between self-consciousness and the empirical world, but to a…Read more
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46A Reply to Joseph C. Flay’s “Hegel’s Metaphysics”The Owl of Minerva 24 (2): 153-161. 1993.At the conclusion of TBKH, I expressed the hope that what I had written would provoke others to pursue further the issues raised by the paper. It will be evident from what follows that there is much in “Hegel’s Metaphysics”, Joseph Flay’s response to my paper, with which I do not agree. However, Flay has provided just the kind of thoughtful analysis of the issues that I was hoping for, and for that I am very grateful.