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239Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2003.In recent years there has been much psychological and neurological work purporting to show that consciousness and self-awareness play no role in causing actions, and indeed to demonstrate that free will is an illusion. The essays in this volume subject the assumptions that motivate such claims to sustained interdisciplinary scrutiny. The book will be compulsory reading for psychologists and philosophers working on action explanation, and for anyone interested in the relation between the brain sc…Read more
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Reply to J. Nadel's chapter:“Some reasons to link imitation and imitation recognition to theory of mind”In Jérôme Dokic & Joëlle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action, John Benjamins. pp. 137--149. 2002.
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137Joint attention and the problem of other mindsIn Naomi Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 2005.The question of what it means to be aware of others as subjects of mental states is often construed as the question of how we are epistemically justified in attributing mental states to others. The dominant answer to this latter question is that we are so justified in virtue of grasping the role of mental states in explaining observed behaviour. This chapter challenges this picture and formulates an alternative by reflecting on the interpretation of early joint attention interactions. It argues …Read more
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59Agents' knowledgeIn Timothy O'Connor & Constantine Sandis (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Action, Wiley-blackwell. 2010.This chapter contains sections titled: References.
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88Agency and self-awareness: Mechanisms and epistemologyIn Johannes Roessler (ed.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 2003.
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153Thinking, Inner Speech, and Self-AwarenessReview of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (3): 541-557. 2015.This paper has two themes. One is the question of how to understand the relation between inner speech and knowledge of one’s own thoughts. My aim here is to probe and challenge the popular neo-Rylean suggestion that we know our own thoughts by ‘overhearing our own silent monologues’, and to sketch an alternative suggestion, inspired by Ryle’s lesser-known discussion of thinking as a ‘serial operation’. The second theme is the question whether, as Ryle apparently thought, we need two different ac…Read more
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22Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and PsychologyPhilosophical Quarterly 55 (220): 528-530. 2005.
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61Self-knowledge and communicationPhilosophical Explorations 18 (2): 153-168. 2015.First-person present-tense self-ascriptions of belief are often used to tell others what one believes. But they are also naturally taken to express the belief they ostensibly report. I argue that this second aspect of self-ascriptions of belief holds the key to making the speaker's knowledge of her belief, and so the authority of her act of telling, intelligible. For a basic way to know one's beliefs is to be aware of what one is doing in expressing them. This account suggests that we need to re…Read more
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464Perceptual attention and the space of reasonsIn Christopher Mole, Declan Smithies & Wayne Wu (eds.), Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays, Oxford University Press. pp. 274. 2011.
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21Counterfactuals, and Special Causal ConceptsIn Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Sarah R. Beck (eds.), Understanding Counterfactuals, Understanding Causation, Oxford University Press. pp. 75. 2011.
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Mind |
Meta-Ethics |